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This book reflects on retirements. Real ones and potential ones. Normally, age 
is the indicator. End of career is often implied. NATO’s retirement can be 
expected in 2014. According to myth and a bit of historical evidence, in 1889 
Bismarck introduced 65 as the proper age for retirement for the very reason that 
on average most people didn’t reach it. Peter Volten will. Nowadays, social 
welfare states – and also less social ones – have fear for old people. ‘Ageing’ 
has been securitized. It forms a threat to the stability of Europe, if not the entire 
world. The UN’s Vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing dates back to 
1982. But despite its continued attention and relevance, alarming reports keep 
appearing. “Why an ageing population is the greatest threat to society”, The 
Independent wrote in 2002 when the UN Second World Assembly on Ageing 
took place in Madrid: “Of all the threats to human society, including war, disease 
and natural disaster, one outranks all others. It is the ageing human population. 
No invading army, volcanic eruption or yet undreamt of plague can rival ageing 
in the breadth or depth of its impact on society” (Jeremy Laurance in The 
Independent, 10 April 2002). Still, up to now, ageing has not been listed in the 
strategic reports of NATO about the new, non-traditional threats. After the Cold 
War, NATO appeared quite creative in listing new risks and threats, and it still 
is. The New Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010 tries to provide an 
answer to “regional disputes or efforts of political intimidation ... along [NATO’s] 
borders ... acts of terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and other advanced 
weapons technologies, cyber attacks ... the sabotage of energy pipelines, the 
disruption of critical maritime supple routes”, and, yes, the Official Report of the 
Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO also mentions 
“demographic changes that could aggravate such global problems as poverty, 
hunger, illegal immigration, and pandemic disease” – but ageing is not specified 
in this context (NATO, 2010).The growing sum of pensions, however, puts the 
working classes under pressure. It burdens the competitive edge of the 
European economies. Greying is an economic security issue, and Peter Volten 
is going to contribute to it. 
The central issue in this book, written in honour of Peter Volten, is whether 
NATO is at the end of its official career too. Ever since the creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, its ability to survive as a collective 
security arrangement for its member-states has been questioned. Existential 
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crises seem to be part of NATO’s identity. In its initial years, NATO’s future was 
questioned on theoretical grounds mainly. The issue if military alliances could 
institutionalize successfully existed only in the abstract. History had no 
experience with institutionalized alliances yet. In a distorted version, Karl 
Deutsch’s theory of ‘security communities’ was and is used to show the 
pacifying internal qualities of the alliance (Adler and Barnett 1998). How strong 




All but one of the tests so far have come from the inside. The Soviet Union and 
its Warsaw Treaty Organization formed a robust raison d’être that helped to 
keep the ranks closed. The only test, therefore, that came from the outside was 
when the common enemy disappeared. “Back to the Future” predicted classical 
Realist John Mearsheimer in 1990 in a by now likewise classic article. Europe 
and the transatlantic ties would collapse together with NATO’s biggest if not 
sole enemy: “it is the Soviet threat that provides the glue that holds NATO 
together. Take away that offensive threat and the United States is likely to 
abandon the Continent, whereupon the defensive alliance ... may disintegrate” 
(Mearsheimer 1990, 52). History proved him wrong – for the simple reason that 
classical Realism is essentially wrong in its assumptions and analyses. NATO 
survived the death of its enemy, and in fact became, together with the European 
Union, pivotal in discussions about Europe’s new political and military order. All 
other challenges to NATO originated from conflicts within. 
In the 1960s France provoked a crisis in the alliance by leaving the military 
part of NATO. President Charles de Gaulle’s nationalism (chauvinism to be 
more precise) and ambitions to restore the French grandeur in world politics 
required a European version of the Monroe Doctrine: Europe for the Europeans 
– dominated by France, of course. He feared misuse of NATO by its hegemonic 
leader, the USA. The conditions of the Cold War in Europe kept France 
politically on board, but its military independence, symbolized by its nuclear 
force de frappe, and underpinned by its veto power in the UN Security Council, 
clearly set limits to NATO’s Musketeer logic of ‘one for all, all for one’. In 2009, 
France rejoined the military structure of NATO. But how to interpret this? Does it 
prove NATO’s vitality and strength or its decline? If the USA has to find 
coalitions of the willing rather than direct NATO troops to its war fronts, there is 
no harm by joining NATO’s integrated military structure. 
Meanwhile the USA have not always been enthusiastic about NATO either. 
From its very beginning up to the present, the USA have been concerned about 
Transatlantic burden sharing and free-rider behaviour. The underlying problem 
here is how to establish what the minimum ceilings for ‘required’ military 
spending are. The perception of the US in this respect differs from all other 
states on earth, except, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union. In 2009 the US 
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were spending some 661 billion US$ on what traditionally is called defence. The 
European NATO member-states together spent some 306 billion US$. Potential 
traditional enemies, like the Russian Federation for old sentiments, and the 
Peoples Republic of China for new ones, spent each about 53 (Russia) and 100 
(China) billion US$ per year (Sipri 2010). In face of the figures, a debate about 
American overspending would be more rational than debates about burden 
sharing. But politics seldom follows a logic of consequences – as Peter Volten 
discovered himself in face of responses to his rational choice and cost/benefit 
based analyses about task specialization (Volten 1987). Politics follows a logic 
of appropriateness, not of consequences (Kratochwil 1989). Hence NATO still 
has its friction about burden sharing across the Atlantic – and still lacks 
progress in task specialization (although budget cuts in France and Britain 
seem to provide a new stimulus for true integration of defence efforts, as shown 
by the Declaration on Defence and Security issued at the UK-France Summit 
2010). 
Related to the issue of minimum ceilings for credible defence, another 
internal conflict questioning the future of NATO has come from public opinion. In 
the late 1970s and early 1980s public opinion in Western Europe widely 
protested against nuclear weapons and NATO’s flexible response strategy to 
use them if need be, including first use. The protests were backed by peace 
movements and peace research. Already in the 1960s the famous Dutch 
professor in peace research and international law, Bert Röling – founder of the 
Polemological Institute of the University of Groningen – wrote with great 
concern about ‘weapons insecurity’: “the mad escalation of armament and the 
mentality that goes with it, will sooner or later inevitably trigger off the 
‘accidental war’, the total war accidentally unleashed” (Röling 1969, 155). 
Rational choice stands no chance in case of accidents, miscalculation or 
blunder – as was powerfully illustrated by the Hollywood movie Dr Strangelove 
(1964). And even if Ratio has a choice, the right one is hard to make – as was 
convincingly shown in the British series Yes Prime Minister, when in the first 
episode the newly elected Prime Minister is confronted with scenarios when ‘to 
push the button’ (Gregg 1998). Moreover, during the Falkland/Malvinas war in 
1984, Margaret Thatcher seems to have considered a nuclear strike on 
Argentine indeed. It is the theory of the hammer: possessing it, makes every 
problem look like a nail; and even if it clearly isn’t a nail, you can at least hit it. 
The mass demonstrations put the governments of the member states under 
pressure to reconsider the logic of their rational policies. But again NATO 
survived the high waves. 
At the end of the Cold War, NATO feared for its own future and started to 
broaden its concept of security to include all types of existential threat, trying to 
carve out new roles for the military to deal with them. An existential crisis was 
avoided for external reasons once again: the wars in former Yugoslavia showed 
that the military had not lost their role in European politics, and the end of 
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deadlock in the UN Security Council opened routes to new military roles in 
world politics – at first in the form of peacekeeping, later in the form of peace 
enforcement, humanitarian interventions and peace building. Crisis 
management in former Yugoslavia showed the continued hegemonic position of 
the USA in Europe. They took the lead, and all NATO members had to follow, 
however reluctantly. But the legitimacy of NATO was seriously jeopardized by 
the open breach of international law by bombing Belgrade in 1999. Notably 
Greece and Italy were critical of the NATO operations. The Greeks had 
historical ties with Serbia, while Rome was fearing the refugee flows to their 
country. NATO’s new members Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were 
also reluctant to agree to the intervention, but they all had to comply. 
On the other hand NATO’s legitimacy was kept alive by the new 
membership requests. All former Warsaw Pact countries, except for Belarus 
and the Russian Federation, were eager to join. Many of them achieved 
membership indeed. Even Russia – let’s not forget: also experimenting with 
democratization – had a clear interest in developing good ties with NATO. It 
signed the Partnership for Peace program and in 2002 got its own special 
relationship in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).  
Since the enlargement from 16 to 28 member states, the original outside 
support has now become an internal problem. The strict intergovernmental 
formula of reaching consensus among equal sovereign states has become 
problematic, and tends to turn the organization into a debating club. Article 5 
was successfully raised within days after nine-eleven. But what this solidarity 
clause implied is debated ever since. There may be an easy explanation for 
this: the attacks of nine-eleven 2001 on the symbols of US power (the Twin 
Towers, the Pentagon and, failed, the White House, symbolizing its economic, 
military and political power) were extraordinary but remained so. The enemy 
was invisible, and whether invading Afghanistan was the right way of tracing Bin 
Laden or was just treating any problem as a nail can still be debated. Hence, 
second thoughts about the immediate US response were reasonable. But the 
explanation can also be that in functional military terms NATO belongs to the 
Cold War indeed, and retired with it. Closing the ranks worked in a bipolar 
world, a discourse on total war, and a frozen front in Europe. Does this imply 
that Mearsheimer is right after all? Not at all, NATO is still pivotal in all debates 
about military security, it has a clear dynamics of its own, and it is operationally 
more active than ever before. It merely implies that the test of solidarity requires 
more manifest and concrete threats than those the alliance has witnessed since 
the implosion of the Soviet Union. 
A new type of challenge to the future of NATO comes again from mainly its 
own member states, i.e. those who are also member of the EU. The urge to 
decorate the EU with statist symbols like its own constitution, flag and anthem 
(failed, but still) is also visible in the debate about a European army. At last, 
some may say. The failure of the European Defence Community in the 1950s is 
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history. Using the WEU as a diplomatic vehicle, the EU ever since its birth in 
1992 has developed the ambition to create a security and defence policy of its 
own, backed by its own forces, i.e. excluding North America. Can it be 
successful? Probably. But when it is, what does this mean for NATO? So far 
discursively only, the EU is arms racing NATO, and in particular the most equal 
among its sovereign member-states, the USA. Various chapters in this volume 
reflect on this development.  
In sum, outside developments keep saving NATO’s continued existence 
either by posing new threats or by validating its legitimacy. Whereas internal 
conflicts (who is willing to send troops to Afghanistan, and for how long?) and 




A Career to Follow 
This book contributes to this internal/external duality of NATO’s existence, and 
in doing so follows the main line in Peter Volten’s career. In a way, he also 
experienced NATO’s dilemmas, crises and developments from both the inside 
and outside. Academia and its ‘real life’ impact have always gone hand in hand 
in Volten’s long and distinguished career. After receiving his degree in Political 
Science at the Free University of Amsterdam (a university that insists to be 
called Vrije Universiteit in English), he had a two year stint as a Visiting Scholar 
at Stanford University. There he laid the foundations for his dissertation on 
Soviet security and defence policy. He finalised his dissertation, Brezhnev's 
Peace Program – with the rhetorical subtitle: Success or Failure?, with the 
University of Amsterdam in 1981, while working at the Dutch Ministry of 
Defence’s Directorate of General Policy Affairs. Eventually, he became the 
Ministry’s Director of Studies and Strategic Planning and was, i.a., involved in 
the work of NATO’s body which takes decisions on the Alliance’s nuclear policy: 
the Nuclear Planning Group. On leave from the Ministry from 1985 to1987 at 
the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, Volten wrote a 
book, More Value for Defence Money, which still today is notable for its 
relevance and timeliness (Volten 1987). In addition to his work at the Ministry, 
Peter stayed well within the academia through a Professorship in the History of 
War at the University of Utrecht (1984-1989). 
NATO tends to pride itself as a strictly intergovernmental organization: its 
credibility is its consensus. All sovereign members have to agree about its 
policies because without collective support NATO’s raison d`être will end. This 
implies continuous diplomatic efforts to create such a consensus. Especially 
during the Cold War, when NATO counted 16 members only, the permanent 
representations were almost locked up together in a gated compound in 
Brussels. Completely sovereign, but also completely socialized. Not being 
invited at a reception or other signs of exclusion from the ‘club’ were important 
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indicators of trouble, and were reported back to the capitals with great concern. 
Tensions between Greece and Turkey, e.g., at times had to be controlled by 
collective diplomatic pressure, backed-up by the leading sovereign, the USA. As 
senior official for the Dutch ministry of Defence, Volten knew that the fate of 
NATO depends on the support of its member states indeed. Also after the Cold 
War, this is still the case. It can even be argued that the eagerness of former 
Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet republics to join NATO’s ‘consensus 
club’ has proved to be a lifeline for the alliance. Its continued attractiveness for 
non-members in its environment is crucial added value for NATO. Part I of this 
volume therefore focuses on “State Perspectives”. 
 In the first chapter Anatoliy Grytsenko makes a critical analysis of NATO’s 
partnership with Ukraine. Although the partnership has until now been beneficial 
for both parties, the author shows that the current framework is in need of 
rationalization. Moreover, he wonders how much security NATO could provide 
for their partners in return. Velizar Shalamanov’s chapter on NATO’s role in the 
consolidation of South-East Europe is equally critical on future developments. 
The alliance evidently helped the region to further peace and democracy, but 
the future stabilization and integration of the region is only possible through a 
synchronized approach of political, military-technological and societal aspects of 
comprehensive security. As usual, NATO should provide the framework, but 
NGOs are needed to provide for societal awareness and public support. 
Whereas the first two chapters offer a view from the outside, the next two 
chapters analyse NATO from the perspective of a member-state. In chapter 3 
Ali Karaosmanoğlu clarifies why Turkey joined NATO, and why it still remains a 
dedicated member. The Soviet-threat played of course an important role in the 
process, but Turkey’s security culture and problematic identity should also be 
considered a major driving force. The author thus combines both Realism and 
Culturalism and is therefore capable of understanding Turkey’s growing 
activism in the alliance despite the demise of the Soviet Union. Doeko 
Bosscher, in chapter 4, uses the idea of culture and image in order to 
understand the developments in the transatlantic relation in the early years of 
the Cold War. He eloquently shows that the creation of images of Self and 
Other, or better, American and anti-American, is dynamic and reciprocal, and 
certainly not as clear-cut as one would expect.  
The part on “State Perspectives” is concluded by the chapter by Herman 
Hoen in which he uses a club-theoretical approach to alliance formation. He 
addresses the same type of questions as the first two chapters: how can NATO 
survive its increasing heterogeneity? According to this approach NATO has 
become too large, meaning too many members, to be useful as a club per se. 
But when the alliance transforms itself into a ‘club of clubs’, with a certain 
degree of homogeneity within the sub-clubs, it could still postpone its 
retirement. 
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The second part of this volume focuses on “IO Perspectives”. IO stands for 
International Organizations – another field in which Volten has worked actively. 
Leaving government in 1989, he joined the EastWest Institute in New York as 
Director of Research. He became Senior Vice President for Programs and 
Policy in 1990, responsible for the substantive work of the Institute's research 
programme. He stayed in New York for three years, which proved to be very 
formative years. Volten landed in the midst of the end of Soviet domination of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the ensuing transition process of the region. 
Upon return to the Netherlands in 1993, he founded a Dutch branch of the 
EastWest Institute to contribute from The Hague to the democratic 
transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in the field of the 
functioning of the armed forces in a democratic society. When he was 
appointed Professor of History and Theory of International Relations at the 
University of Groningen in 1994 Volten also took his growing activities in the 
Central and Eastern European region with him, and in 1995 he founded the 
Centre for European Security Studies (CESS). Being Chair of the Department 
and Director of CESS was his double hat for thirteen years. The Centre soon 
became a well-established NGO and a steady presence in, at first, the Central 
European region, but later on also in East and South-Eastern Europe. 
Education and research programmes were implemented from Poland to 
Ukraine, Slovenia and Kazachstan and most countries in between. Throughout 
all this, Volten played a crucial role as inspirator, networker, researcher and 
fundraiser. 
Volten’s involvement with International Organisations was mostly in his the 
capacity of the last three roles. Particularly the European Union, which was 
gaining a more prominent security role in the last two decades, became 
available as a sponsor for CESS, as stability and democratic civil-military 
relations became issues in the accession processes. 
 It is this branching out of the EU into an International Organisation with a 
security and defence dimension and how this relates to NATO that is addressed 
in Chapter 6 by Wim van Eekelen. The title of this Chapter, “Europe as a 
Reluctant Security Actor” already betrays the slow and cumbersome path from 
the Brussels Treaty to, eventually, a European Security and Defence Policy. 
Van Eekelen concludes that the EU is better equipped for tackling the post-
conflict stabilisation phase from a ‘whole of government’ approach than NATO. 
Conversely, however, large military operations can only be undertaken with 
participation of the USA. This makes a broad EU-US consultation mechanism 
necessary, which lies beyond the remit of NATO. In Chapter 7, Jan van der 
Harst, delves deeper into the background of European defence cooperation by 
looking at the early phases of NATO’s existence and the closely related plans 
for a European Defence Community (EDC). The French and Dutch positions on 
EDC feature as the extremes in his Chapter, which Van der Harst to a large 
extent regards as persistent to this day. Nevertheless, in recent years the 
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staunch Atlantic ally the Netherlands has gravitated towards supporting a 
European role in security as the US are no longer prioritising NATO. Van der 
Harst also underlines the continuing relevance of Volten’s early work on military 
task specialisation for European countries to maintain relevant armed forces.  
Menno Kamminga, in Chapter 8, takes a political-ethical angle and 
assesses the post-Cold War attitude of the peace movement to NATO. His point 
of departure is Peter Volten’s advice from 1986 to the peace movement to 
function as an intellectual hornet and keep politics on its toes by pointing out the 
ethical standards that should inform its choices. Unfortunately, Kamminga has 
to conclude that Volten’s challenge has not been met by the peace movement. 
In the two cases he investigates, IKV Pax Christi’s attitude towards the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo and the recent discussion on the future of nuclear 
weapons, the positions by IKV Pax Christi fall short political-ethically. 
The final Chapter of the second section is by Joost Herman. Herman goes 
into the complex relationship between NATO and non-governmental 
organisations, who increasingly find themselves in the same conflict areas. In 
an attempt to find a modus vivendi of cooperation and coordination it turns out 
that both NATO and the NGOs have conceptualized civil-military relations in 
terms close to their core beings. In doing so, both sides have put forward a 
notion of civil-military relations which are in practice incompatible. 
Part III focuses on “Security Policies and Actions”. In Chapter 10, Marjan 
Malešič uses Crisis Management Theory to analyse NATO’s Civil Emergency 
Planning (CEP). This is one of NATO’s answers to the new spectrum of threats 
that has been defined. More and more NATO is focussing on manmade and 
natural disasters in national contexts, i.e. moving away from the traditional 
military roles in interstate conflicts. There are planning groups in civil protection, 
transport, public health (including food and water), and industrial resources and 
communications – all coordinated by the Civil Emergency Planning Committee 
at NATO Headquarters. This development acknowledges the blurring of 
traditional divisions of labour between the military, the police and intelligence. 
The security sector is responding in its organisation to the youngest phase in 
globalisation, triggered by the micro-electronic revolution. ‘Sovereignty’ still is 
the name of the game, but in functional terms territorial borders have lost their 
protective value almost completely. The ‘iron curtain’ between North and South 
– quite literally so at the borders between Mexico and the USA, and between 
Spain and Morocco – is of symbolic value mainly (Anderson & Snyder 2000). 
The south of the US is bilingual, while smuggling of people and illicit goods 
merely profits from the higher risks involved. Walls don’t work – at least not the 
way they are intended. Even North Korea hardly feels secure behind its fences. 
Similarly, the wall erected by Israel against the Palestinians has not solved but 
rather contributed to the conflict. Hence, the role of the military to keep 
unwanted foreigners out has changed. Civil Emergency Planning is one of the 
answers, and Malešič concludes that it is becoming a pivotal task of NATO. 
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Hans-Joachim Giessmann (Chapter 11) applies the same logic by 
emphasizing a new role for NATO across the borders of its member-states. The 
UN’s attempt to operationalize the responsibility of governments to protect their 
subjects – R2P – creates new incentives for humanitarian interventions. He 
focuses on ‘territories under disputed rule’; popularly phrased the ‘no-go areas’ 
within otherwise relatively stable countries. In this context he analyses the 
dilemmas of isolation, of territory, and of responsibility in the context of the UN 
Millennium Goals and traditional concerns about state sovereignty. The 
Millennium Goals can be seen as a benchmark for R2P. Yet the conflicts of a 
failing national government with often successful local rulers overshadows the 
centrality of the people, whose well-being is at stake. The international 
community – made up of sovereigns – still has hard time to put the ethics of 
well-being before the formal integrity of states. 
So, both within NATO’s own area and out of its area, the characteristics of 
domestic contexts are determining a large share of today’s international security 
dynamics. In particular the quality of the security sector in each country is a 
strong indicator of stability. Sami Faltas has become a leading authority in the 
field of security sector reform. His reflections in Chapter 12 are linking the 
issues raised in Chapters 10 & 11 to the general question if diplomacy, 
development and defence can go hand in hand. This so-called 3D-approach is 
cherished by i.a. the Dutch government, and is also basic to the human security 
approaches in countries like Canada, Norway and Japan. Moreover, the UN, 
the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the European Union and also NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace programme all adhere to such comprehensive 
approaches. His conclusions, however, are quite sceptical. By drawing a 
parallel to the successful security sector reform in West-Germany after the 
Second World War, he shows that the conditions for success are hard to meet: 
integration within NATO was essential as was acceptance of the conditions by 
the German government; there was local ownership of the process, and, in 
contrast to the contemporary donor community, there was a united allied effort.  
The difficulties of achieving such coherence is well illustrated by the 
Western involvement in the former Yugoslavia. In Chapter 13 Sipke de Hoop 
takes stock of NATO’s interventions in the Balkans. In laying bare the decision-
making process about the interventions, he highlights the misuse of historical 
analogies. Politicians mobilize images of the past to interpret the apparent 
motives of the actors in the region. Misled by these analogies, a new chapter in 
the history of the Balkans has been written.  
Part III ends with a chapter by Ine Megens about NATO’s Annual Review 
procedure. Policies and actions are in the end valued by future generations, but 
the evaluation begins with the organisation’s own reports. By focusing on the 
reviews from 1952 and 1953, Megens shows how delicate the composition of 
NATO’s track record is. The complex bureaucratic process involves multiple 
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levels of government, showing that recorded history has a history of its own. 
What ‘really’ happened is buried in language and thus largely unknown. 
Obviously this is even more so for the future: the crystal ball cannot but reflect 
our limited understandings of past and present. But on that basis we are able to 
build scenarios and to highlight developments that seem crucial. In Part IV, 
Hugo Klijn (Chapter 14) highlights one of these developments: the prospects for 
the Transatlantic relationship in face of the EU’s growing military identity. He 
rightly puts his finger on the sore spot, by showing how amazing it is that NATO 
and EU are living in two completely different institutional worlds. A Brussels 
Wall stands between them. Will then an EU-US framework replace NATO? He 
is cautious in putting his money on this, but raising the question opens the 
horizon. In one of Nienke de Deugd’s scenarios the road to this horizon is 
sketched out. She completes this volume by returning to its central question: 
what about NATO’s retirement? A retired or a rejuvenated NATO depends on 
two crucial developments, she argues: NATO’s track record in world politics, 
and its enlargement process. Will NATO’s mission in Afghanistan come to a 
successful end? Will NATO’s Kosovo Force be able to build an effective multi-
ethnic Kosovo Security Force? Is there a future for its counter-piracy missions? 
Will NATO continue to assist other regional organisations in their missions, like 
it does with the African Union in Somalia? It seems that, just as in the past, 
NATO’s future finds its strongest support from the outside challenges, whereas 
its strongest obstacles will be internal. Building consensus among a growing 
number of members demands ever higher diplomatic skills. Finding active 
support for the missions at times even looks harder.  
Volten retires at 65, three years before NATO reaches that age. His life and 
career evolved in the same historic context as NATO did. Both needed to adapt 
to the structural changes triggered by the end of the Cold War. Both embraced 
the chances offered by the end of the communist regimes in Central and 
Eastern Europe. NATO’s enlargement gave it a second life. Volten organized 
his new insights in the CESS and in the teaching programmes of IRIO. We are 
confident that Peter Volten will contribute to improving pan-European ties 
between scholars and practitioners for the rest of his life. Let’s hope NATO will 
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Chapter 1. NATO's Advanced Partnership with Ukraine.  
Cooperation Without Guarantees 
 
Anatoliy Grytsenko 





In the past decade, Ukraine’s course towards building democracy and NATO 
membership and its close security cooperation with Western democracies 
provided opportunities to gain valuable foreign experience and practical support 
in democratic and defence transformations, as well as in peacekeeping and 
antiterrorist operations. The example of Ukraine is one among many others that 
demonstrates NATO’s ability to assist a country through the Partnership for 
Peace programme (PfP) in implementing a major transformation of its security 
posture. At the same time, the mutually beneficial relationship between NATO 
and Ukraine has contributed to regional and global security. However, the 
changing scope and nature of the PfP overall and the NATO-Ukrainian 
partnership in particular, puts forward the need for reevaluation and adjustment 
of this framework in order to preserve and promote its positive security impetus. 
I will present some observations and thoughts on how progress can be 




NATO Partnership in General 
Today, NATO is the most powerful collective security alliance in the world. Its 
political influence, military might and prosperity altogether radiate security 
confidence for the allies’ population and security expectations for the aspirants. 
In spite of the differences among NATO members on several fundamental 
issues, like the interpretation of the exact meaning of Article 5 or the exact value 
of the consensus principle of decision-making, the primary mission of the 
Alliance will remain the collective defence of its members’ population and 
territories. However, the nature of the current threats makes it clear that such a 
mission cannot be fulfilled successfully within the allies’ territorial borders. While 
traditional dangers of military conflicts, proliferation, and terrorist attacks remain 
relevant, new issues such as energy security, cyber-defence, and climate 
change knock on the door and call for security efforts beyond the Alliance 
borders. 
Outside of the national borders of the member-states NATO can use either 
its own capabilities or support from its partners, or both. Openness of NATO to 
cooperation helps to develop the relationship with many, and its devotion to 
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democratic values helps to build deeper relations with some. At this point, it 
makes sense to recall the meaning of partnership at its start, when in January 
1994 the PfP programme was adopted. By signing the Framework Document 
the non-member countries committed themselves to ensuring democratic 
control of defence forces, facilitation of transparency in national defence 
planning and budgeting processes, maintenance of the capability and readiness 
to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the 
responsibility of the OSCE, the development of cooperative military relations 
with NATO for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to 
strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, 
search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and the development, over the 
longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO 
members. 
More than fifteen years later, the overall institute of NATO partnership is 
even more important, due to the generally positive security effect of keeping 
contacts, maintaining dialogues, promoting democratic values and performing 
real missions and operations. However, geographical and functional 
frameworks of partnership have become almost too wide to manage. They 
stretch from Morocco to Japan, and from Australia to Ireland. Statistically, there 
are 37 countries today that are considered to be NATO partners: 22 members 
of PfP, seven participants in the Mediterranean Dialogue, four Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative countries, and four Contact Countries.1  
While at the start participation in PfP was associated with a possible 
invitation to join the Alliance, today this is no longer the interest for most 
partners. Recent experience calls for better and more appropriate differentiation 
among the numerous partners. Limited resources and growing needs naturally 
request higher effectiveness and better efficiency of relations between NATO 
and partner states. Today’s dilemma for NATO partnership is how to promote 
the partnership, while avoiding ‘resource overstretch’ – as happened with its 
former competitor, the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union spent tens of billions of 
dollars to support many ‘friendly’ regimes worldwide, often for mere slogans and 
declarations against capitalism, flattering the Soviet communists’ ideological 
zeal against the capitalist West. 
In recent years many observers emphasise the desirability to distinguish 
more and encourage those NATO partners who are willing and capable to 
contribute to the practical security efforts – be it in military operations or 
humanitarian assistance. Since the Prague Summit in 2002, each next summit 
                                          
1
 PfP: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, 
Ireland, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Republic of 
Macedonia, Russian Federation, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan. MD: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia. 
ICI: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Contact Countries: Australia, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. 
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– in Istanbul, Riga and Bucharest – focused on specific issues related to the 
partnership. In these years, many officials and independent observers 
addressed the possible approaches to a modern partnership agenda at 
conferences and in the press: John Colston (former NATO Assistant Secretary 
General for Defence Policy and Planning), Christopher Donnelly (former Special 
Adviser to NATO Secretary General for Central and Eastern European Affairs), 
Ron Asmus (executive director of the Transatlantic Centre at the German 
Marshall Fund of the US in Brussels, and former US Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State), Prof. Julian Lindley-French (Netherlands Defence Academy, and 
senior associate fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom), James 
Townsend (director of the international security programme at the Atlantic 
Council of the United States), Dr. Graeme P. Herd (Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy), Prof. Carlo Masala (Bundeswehr University Munich) and many others. 
The range of opinions on the future of partnership spreads from an ambitious 
option of further promotion under a Global Partnership Initiative (GPI) to a very 
limited option of marginalizing the partnership in case NATO decides to reduce 
its out-of-area role. As the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral 
Giampaolo di Paola (2009), put it: “We are faced with a truly potent cocktail of 
choices, and options. But, given the realities of resource and capability 
constraints, reinforced by the economic crisis, how should we identify which are 
the most urgent priorities? How do we optimise the allocation of resources 
between them, and between current and future tasks?” In this regard, in order to 
better substantiate further reasoning, it will help to consider in detail one 
particular case of NATO partnership: my native country Ukraine, which, if 
considered both individually and in a broader context beyond its current 
geopolitical and functional specifics, is quite representative. 
  
 
NATO Partnership with Ukraine  
NATO partnership with democratic Ukraine is the largest in scope compared to 
other partners. In recent years, especially after the NATO Bucharest Summit of 
April 2008, NATO-Ukraine relations became a key factor of European and Euro-
Atlantic security agendas. The basic aspects of this partnership are: defence 
transformation, democratizing of the security sector, and regional security 
cooperation.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine appeared to be an emerging 
democracy living next to several violent conflicts and trying to avoid one on its 
own territory. In 1994 it became the first CIS country to join the PfP. The 
principle document for NATO-Ukraine cooperation is the Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership, which was signed in Madrid in 1997. It stipulates the 
principles, the scope, and the mechanisms of cooperation. The Charter paved 
the way to establishing the key institutions for coordinating defence and security 
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cooperation: the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform and the NATO 
Liaison Office.  
In 2005, after the democratic political process in Ukraine was consolidated, 
NATO agreed to discuss the issue of Ukraine’s accession and to start the 
Intensified Dialog. NATO and Ukraine maintained the Intensified Dialog for the 
next three years, until early 2008, when Ukrainian leadership applied for a 
Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, instead of a MAP, NATO offered 
Ukraine another substitution, called Intensive Engagement. 
The term Intensive Engagement first appeared in April 2008, in the 
Bucharest Summit Declaration. Most significant, Article 23 of the Declaration 
says that Ukraine (and Georgia) “will become members of NATO”. At the same 
time, due to certain political and security developments, both inside and outside 
of Ukraine, the country was not invited to a MAP. At least in the defence sector, 
NATO recognized Ukraine’s significant progress. Though Ukraine was not 
granted MAP status, the mechanism of a MAP was de facto introduced under 
the name of Intensive Engagement. In order to formalize this mechanism, as 
well as to strengthen the mechanism of security consultations, the NATO-
Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership was complemented.  
Ukraine noticeably benefited from the PfP programme mechanisms. 
Addressing the practical side of NATO-Ukraine relations, it is evident, that the 
NATO-Ukraine partnership encouraged building a functioning system of 
democratic control, developing institutions and procedures of policy, planning, 
and resource management in the Ministry of Defence, and improving 
effectiveness of command and control system in the Armed Forces. By 2010, 
NATO-Ukraine cooperation played an instrumental role in implementing the 
comprehensive reforms in Ukraine’s security sector.  
Modernisation of the armed forces of Ukraine in cooperation with NATO, 
though incomplete, made them more relevant to security needs – both national 
and international: The operational chain of command has been modernised in 
line with experiences of NATO members such as Germany, France, the UK, 
and the USA; Joint Operational Command has assumed the responsibilities of 
three former territorial operational commands; three Army Corps, formerly 
controlled by the territorial operational commands, have been put under direct 
control of the Army Command; a new command structure, the Command of 
Special Operations Forces, has been created at the branch level in response to 
the changes in the threat environment; and the General Staff has been 
restructured in accordance with standards of modern military headquarters. 
Moreover, the NATO-Ukraine partnership was not only about documents, 
meetings, exercises and structural reforms. It was also about many practical 
cooperative mechanisms, including domestic support, resettlement, disposal of 
ammunition, professional development, etcetera.  
Most prominent of all these activities were of course operations. The 
transformations facilitated Ukraine’s contribution to NATO’s peacekeeping 
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missions. Ukraine became the only partner country participating in all NATO 
operations: KFOR, ‘Active Endeavour’ in the Mediterranean (OAE), ISAF, and 
NTM (Iraq). 
 
Kosovo At the start in 1999, Ukraine contributed to KFOR transport helicopters, 
and mechanized and engineer troops. Early 2010 there were some 200 
peacekeepers, who served as part of the joint Polish-Ukrainian battalion 
and in KFOR Headquarters.  
Iraq  In 2003-2005, over 1,700 Ukrainian troops were deployed to Iraq. About 
300 were deployed as CBR-protection unit in Kuwait for several months 
in 2003. Since March 2005, Ukraine is contributing officers to the NATO 
Training Mission. Its contribution in 2010 is eight officers, though it was 
over forty in the past. 
Afghanistan Since 2007, Ukrainian medical personnel supports the Lithuanian-
lead Provincial Reconstruction Team. In 2010 Ukrainian officers also 
serve in the ISAF Headquarters with ten officers, but it has been 
decised to raise this number to thirty. 
Mediterranean Ukraine offers support to the NATO Operation ‘Active 
Endeavour’. The Ukrainian corvette URS Ternopil was the first ship to 
be deployed in June 2007, followed in the same year by the corvette 
URS Lutsk, and a frigate, the URS Hetman Sahaidachnyi, in the 
summer of 2008. Late 2009 and late 2010 the URS Ternopil was 
deployed again.  
Additionally, Ukraine offers NATO an airlift, over-flight clearance, and 
intelligence sharing. In the 1990s Ukraine also contributed to NATO’s IFOR and 
SFOR operations in Bosnia. 
The past experience of the NATO-Ukraine partnership is a success story. 
There is no reason why Ukraine and NATO should not continue it in the future. 
Continuation is both logical and desirable: in operations; in further developing 
interoperability and transformation (under the PfP Planning and Review 
Process, PARP); and in many other areas, like providing robust domestic 
support, disposal of obsolete ammunition, science, etcetera. 
Military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO countries has 
developed quite slowly. However, there is a great room for, and some interest 
in, more intensive cooperation with NATO countries in weapons development 
and production. The first positive signs of emerging future cooperative ties 
already appeared between Ukraine and France, as well as between Ukraine 
and the Visegrad countries. Provided that Ukraine consolidates its political 
emphasis on the cooperation with NATO, and improves certain financial and 
judicial mechanisms, it is possible to expect the improvement of cooperation 
with other Western countries, including the USA as well. 
Utilizing Ukraine’s unique capabilities is not really a new area. Rather, it 
should receive a new emphasis. Ukraine has a proven capability and 
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experienced personnel in CBR-protection, combat engineers and military 
medicine. Ukrainian science and industry still possess many unique capabilities, 
like, for example: air transport, technical intelligence, radio and hydro location, 
missiles, and space satellites. Already Ukraine became the first partner country 
to contribute its units to the NATO Response Force (air transports, CBR-
protection platoon, etc.). The Information Agency Ukrinform reports that Ukraine 
has been invited to join the NATO Response Force (NRF) as a partner country 
in 2015-2016, a spokesman for the NATO Military Committee said on 20 
January 2010. Colonel Massimo Panizzi said that Ukraine would become “the 
first non-NATO country to join the Response Force” (TV Channel 1+1). Panizzi 
added that Ukraine would submit its proposals to NATO regarding its 
participation in the Alliance’s rapid response force at a meeting of the NATO-
Ukraine Commission at the level of the chiefs of staff on 26 January 2010. He 
described the move as “a significant step forward in the implementation of 
military reform” that NATO is expecting from Kiev “on its way” toward NATO 
membership. When asked if other NATO partners could join the Response 
Force, Panizzi said: “All partners are invited to cooperate within the framework 
of the process” (NIDC Weekly Media Report, 15-21 January 2010). So, greater 
emphasis on Ukraine’s unique capabilities makes sense and it will be just a 
matter of time when Ukraine will be invited by NATO to offer more of its 
capabilities. 
These future cooperative options and contributions are about improving 
regional and international security by Ukraine in partnership with allies and non-
members. If successful, it can be a model for a number of other emerging 
democracies, which have developed a distinctive practical mutually beneficial 
partnership with NATO beyond military diplomacy, but short of membership.  
 
 
Advancing Further  
The steps in the direction of structuring the partners in accordance with their 
desire to share the values and burdens of the Alliance are likely to help in 
making the partnership more manageable, and, consequently, more effective 
and efficient. At the moment, however, as Carlo Masala and Katarina 
Saariluoma (2006, 25-26) have noted: “Partners are placed into a partnership 
according to their geographical location, thereby neglecting the different 
contributions they are or could be making to help NATO fulfil its core missions. 
Current frameworks do not differentiate between countries that are security 
contributors (providing significant force contributions to NATO-led operations), 
and those that are security consumers.” To mend this problem, Prof. Masala 
suggested for NATO to adopt the mixed approach based on differentiating 
partners on geographical, as well as functional and value-based criteria. Indeed, 
while clearly differentiating partners according to geographical criteria, NATO 
seemingly hesitates to adopt a similarly clear differentiation according to its 
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partners’ operational and/or financial contributions. So far, opinions of officials 
and experts on this issue generally recognise the problem, but give different 
explanations and suggest different solutions for it.  
In summary three major points can be indicated: 
 –  There is a suggestion that security today “cannot rely solely on military 
assets and capabilities” and therefore a “truly comprehensive approach is 
required” (Colston, 2007: 12-14). Indeed, the invitation to participate in 
NATO operations can be extended to countries which do not strive to build 
democratic regimes (monarchies, autocracies), or to democracies which are 
not ready for membership or do not intend to apply for membership. As 
such, cooperation programmes with partners in security sector reform, in 
joint training of personnel, or just in maintaining political dialogue are as 
important modalities, as participation in operations; of which the importance 
for NATO should continue to be valued and recognised. If, for some 
reasons, an individual partner, like Georgia, Russia or Ukraine, is 
exceptionally important for regional security, then the proven mechanism of 
special (or distinctive) partnership can be initiated through a NATO-partner 
agreement beyond PfP and similar geographical frameworks. 
 –  There is a concern that promotion of the practical contribution by partners 
through, e.g., a membership in GPI can be too sensitive for NATO. “How 
does NATO avoid alienating those states that are excluded and, more 
generally, avoid the creation of a ‘the West is best versus the rest’ 
syndrome that is divisive and undermines the agendas of defence and 
security sector reform?” It is further noted that too much emphasis on 
missions versus diplomacy can be detrimental to NATO image as an honest 
broker (Herd and Kight, 2007).  
 –  Further broadening of the options is needed for those actively supporting 
NATO operations. Key partners already have the option to contribute to the 
NATO Response Force. More elaborated and specific venues have to be 
developed to regulate an access for contributing partners to NATO planning 
and intelligence, securing for them the appropriate channels to participate in 
NATO’s decision-making process.  
So, at present, in 2010, the option of joining the NATO Response Force or 
concluding ‘distinctive partnership’ agreements are the best options available to 
NATO to recognise the importance of the individual partner and formally 
differentiate the partnership beyond the geographical criteria. However, the 
question remains how much NATO can give back to contributing partners in 
terms of security. This is clearly illustrated by NATO Spokesman James 
Appathurai’s comment on the question whether accepting the Ukrainian 
contribution to the NATO Response Force means that Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty will now be applicable to Ukraine: “No, this does not mean the 
application of Article 5, but this also does not mean that NATO will not be able 
to come to help if there is an emergency situation” (Kyiv Post. 20 Jan. 2010).  
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Conclusion 
Modern NATO has a global reach, but its effectiveness is still limited due to 
resource constraints and other factors. One of the factors, which define the 
Alliance’s effectiveness, is NATO partnership with countries all over the world. 
At the moment, it is widely recognised that there is a need to rationalize this 
framework. As the example of the Alliance’s distinctive partner Ukraine among 
other partners has shown over the years, in order for NATO to be more 
effective, its partnership on the one hand needs to better serve goals of the 
Alliance, but on the other hand it needs to better serve the needs of the partners 
– providing them with better opportunities to participate in NATO’s decision-
making process and better options in receiving security rewards.  
At the current stage, NATO has good chances to improve the mechanisms 
of cooperation. The Alliance can ensure a basis in joint planning and 
participation, for instance through its Response Force or through individual 
‘distinctive partnership’ agreements. It can also ensure that crisis consultations 
with partners could provide real possibilities for concrete action. However, it is 
unlikely that today’s NATO will advance beyond consultations in order to 
resolve the concerns and expectations of key contributing partners, like 
Ukraine, on the issue of security guarantees. While the progress in further 
promoting NATO partnership will be evident soon, for the near future it will 
concentrate on improving the mechanisms of cooperation. The question for 
adequate (formal or informal) security guarantees to the active participants in 
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Steps Towards a Euro-Atlantic Community 
About two decades ago, South-East Europe (SEE) was perceived as a region 
dominated by conflicts, policy stagnation and unwillingness for cooperation. 
Today, the region seems a safer and more secure place to be: the main 
conflicts are eliminated, some countries are already members of NATO and the 
EU, and things seem to be getting better. It was a long and difficult road that 
made all this possible. Most that was done in the region was due to the 
engagement of NATO and the decision of the Alliance to start out of area 
operations, such as the ones in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many 
people have argued that the NATO missions in SEE are problematic. However, 
NATO seems to be the only international organization that has significance in 
SEE, especially in the Balkans, as the organization is the only international 
actor that can help in preventing future conflicts in the region. 
Over the past two decades a lot was going on in SEE. There were many 
conflicts that even developed into wars. Even though the number of casualties 
is quite high, one cannot dismiss the fact that without the NATO interventions, 
things could have been even worse. Many analysts referred to the region as 
‘troubled’, even in the beginning of the year 2002, when most of the conflicts 
had already calmed down. This might be because even then there was a lot 
going on in the region and none of the countries had been admitted in the 
Alliance. Nevertheless, after 2004, the situation started to improve and 
cooperation between SEE-countries began to develop after the admission of 
Bulgaria and Romania to NATO together with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia. Then in 2009, Albania and Croatia were accepted, 
which was a huge step ahead towards the Euro-Atlantic consolidation of the 
region.  
There are at least three vivid examples of how the Alliance helped the 
region and the establishment of peace and democracy. The first one is actually 
the first ever out-of-area operation of NATO, SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
where in 1995 there was a war, with lot of victims and refugees, caused by 
‘ethnic cleansing’. Today, this country has its first non-nationalistic government. 
It is experiencing peace and security, which was ensured by the huge 
international civilian and military presence. Another example that shows how 
important the role of NATO is in the SEE, is Kosovo. In 1999, in Kosovo human 
rights violations, mass killings and violence were present. While today, after the 
efforts of the Alliance, Kosovo is in peace, free elections were conducted, and 
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the country gained international recognition – something quite hard to believe 
ten years ago. Last but not least is the example of Yugoslavia and the regime of 
Milosevic which had not ended if not for international intervention. All three 
examples show that without the help of NATO and other international 
organizations and their willingness to provide help to the region and help in its 
European and North-Atlantic integration, today the region would still be in 
conflict (Robertson, 2001). 
 The perception of society at large is that a lot has been achieved, but that 
SEE still is not at the end of the transition process, while new challenges lie 
ahead. The positive developments provided the opportunity to enlarge and 
deepen the South-East Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) Process that is 
considered here as the main regional instrument of consolidation of NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. Two other instruments will be looked at: 
first, technological cooperation, in particular in the area of command and control 
(or in jargon C4ISR: command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and second, the activities of 
NGOs. These two aspects are complementary because SEDM is going beyond 
pure defence matters (as is NATO itself) and in direction of operationalizing the 
Comprehensive Approach to security and defence that requires new C4ISR 
capabilities on one hand and a new level of understanding of security and 
security cooperation (including on the technology level) in society. The former is 
a challenge for specialized agencies and industry, the latter for NGOs. Only 
synchronized work on political and military, technological and societal aspects 
of this process of change can provide a basis for success in finalizing the 
transition of SEE in the next five to ten years. NATO with its new Security 
Concept of 2010 will play a key role as it has done with the Strategic Concepts 
from 1991 and 1999. 
 
 
Regional Cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic Context 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, the situation was really critical. Great powers, the UN, 
and the EU were not able to find a solution and political leaders from the region 
were not ready to propose and implement regional arrangements. NATO and 
US leadership stepped in with a three phases approach: (1) stop the war in 
Former Yugoslavia, stabilize Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Kosovo, start democratization of Serbia and Montenegro with taking out 
President Milosevic to the tribunal in The Hague; (2) approve a common 
security assessment for the region, and invite in NATO countries ready to join 
through the Membership Action Programme (MAP); (3) improve the SEE 
security environment politically and militarily through several initiatives. Most of 
these were in the framework of PfP, established by NATO in 1994. 
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The Key to integration is the South-East Europe Defence Ministerial, which 
is based on both regional ownership and a NATO role (including US support). It 
is therefore important to consider other forms of cooperation in the SEDM 
format, which together contribute to the further consolidation of SEE security. In 
addition, the SEDM provides positive influence on Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova, being participants in the process. Political, operational and mil-to-mil 
cooperation through NATO involvement were after 1999 followed by Stability 
Pact activities, led by the EU containing many NGO programs as well. The 
South-East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security 
Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP, 2001) was a serious achievement to 
provide a basis for the implementation of stabilization and good neighbourly 
relations. 
The process started in early 1990s as the strategic reorientation of the 
countries of the former Eastern Block towards NATO and the EU led to a 
considerable geopolitical restructuring of the European political space. In the 
beginning, the instability and tensions confirmed the principle of security as the 
main priority for stability in the region. This led to the SEDM Process, which 
began with a meeting of six Ministers of Defence in Tirana (Albania), in March 
1996. Currently there are twelve full SEDM member states: Albania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Italy, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Turkey, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Ukraine and the USA. The four 
SEDM observer nations are: Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, and Serbia. The 











SEEBRIG and ETF 
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The activities within the SEDM are developed with the idea to strengthen 
politico-military cooperation and to enhance stability and security in SEE by: 
• Promoting regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations 
• Strengthening regional defence capabilities as well as cooperation 
through collective efforts 
• Establishing links to facilitate the integration into Euro-Atlantic 
institutions and organizations. 
Among the SEDM initiatives, one that carries the most significant prominence is 
the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), established 
with the MPFSEE agreement, also known as the South-Eastern Europe Brigade 
(SEEBRIG). The Brigade consists of a land force that acts on an on-call basis 
and has an operational nucleus staff. In 1999, an Engineering Task Force was 
added to provide capability for disaster relief operations. The SEDM's objectives 
are directly focussed on SEE consolidation from a security perspective and 
include the improvement of the member states interoperability; Euro-Atlantic 
integration of the SEDM member states; and the facilitation of SEEBRIG 
employment in peace support operations. 
In 2004 Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia, and later, in 2010, Albania and 
Croatia joined NATO and practically all other nations in SEE are part of MAP 
(except Serbia, which is not interested in joining). Moreover, KFOR is in Kosovo 
(even though not recognized by all NATO members). So the political and 
military dimension of consolidation has significantly progressed. Now we could 
consider as another key challenge the technological integration of the SEE 
NATO-members in the Euro-Atlantic domain from Alaska to the eastern border 
of Turkey. 
It is clear that for SEE NATO-members the adaptation of military capabilities 
is much more difficult than it is for the long-standing NATO-members. Most of 
these nations first have to deal with the challenge of converting existing national 
military capabilities to be interoperable with NATO and also to develop new 
ones to meet the minimum requirements for collective defence and 
expeditionary operations. The challenge for the NATO partners is even higher. 
What is really missing, and we now face challenges because of it, is the 
technological level of cooperation to provide real capabilities for integrated air, 
maritime, border security, emergency management, and a capacity for 
expeditionary operations. These challenges are not of a technological origin 
only, but are also related to the development of industry, quality of acquisition 
and program management processes and the integrity of governance.  
The role of NATO in this new area is threefold: political encouragement 
through Secretary General leadership and NAC decisions; military advice 
through JFC Naples and Brunssum; technological and programmatic support 
from the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) in defining 
and implementing critical C4ISR regional projects. This process should be 
31  
matched with public awareness and support. It even demands to effectively 
achieve the required minimal capability in a cooperative and clean environment. 
 
 
Cooperation in C4ISR  
The success of NATO missions increasingly depends on sophisticated C4ISR 
capabilities and the ability to integrate national and NATO owned systems. The 
costs of the capabilities and their integration with NATO can be significant and 
national defence budgets are coming under increasing pressure. In order to 
square this potentially vicious circle, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen has called for multinational cooperation and a smarter use of 
available funding. “Making savings includes doing more together, and that will 
deepen the solidarity between Allies”, he recently said (NATO News, 5 Feb 
2010). With the current security challenges, especially in the area of Cyber 
Defence, Missile Defence and Energy Security, it is obvious that nations need 
to pool their resources facing these new threats. Nations need to act in line with 
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lester Pearson’s observation from 1949: 
“peace and freedom can be secured only if those who love peace and freedom 
pool their resources and stand together” (quoted by Secretary General 
Rasmussen; NATO Speeches & Transcripts, 2010). 
During the last SEDM Ministerial in Sofia in October 2009, host nation 
Bulgaria proposed the concept of a project for C4I Cooperation in South East 
Europe (C4ICSE). Its main objective is the enhancement of security and 
confidence building and improvement of interoperability amongst SEDM 
nations. As stated at the SEDM Coordination Committee on 24 March 2010 in 
Sofia, there is urgent need to harmonize current projects or transfer current 
projects in to the C4ICSE, e.g. transfer of South Eastern European Simulation 
Network (SEESIM) into South-Eastern European Education and Training 
Network (SEEETN). Management of the C4ICSE Project could be under the 
SEDM process when endorsed by the Ministers in Tirana in October 2010. The 
aim would be to identify the C4ISR requirements amongst the nations, which 
could differ between countries.  
NATO could support the process by offering the potential role of Executive 
Agency to itsNC3A to coordinate the management of activities funded by the 
participating countries. These countries would then retain financial 
accountability for inputs to the joint projects/programs. It must be noted that, 
even though a project or program is adopted under the SEDM umbrella, it does 
not imply that all members are required to participate, only those with a 
common interest and appropriate resources. As the Executive Agency for the 
SEDM, NC3A could play an important role in the capabilities review package for 
SEEBRIG as well and provide that C4ISR systems of the brigade to become 
reference for tactical C2 systems. It could also guarantee the interoperability 
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required for the NATO Response Force contribution as well as for the 
contingents involved in NATO operations.  
The mission of the NC3A is to “enable NATO’s success through the 
unbiased provision of comprehensive Consultation, Command & Control, 
Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
capabilities”. The word 'comprehensive' has been added to NC3A’s mission 
statement to explicitly recognize the fact that NATO's success will be 
increasingly dependent on the capability of NATO agencies, and in particular for 
NC3A, to deliver coherent, high quality C4ISR capabilities to the whole security 
sector. NC3A works to efficiently and transparently leverage different sources of 
funding for the benefit of NATO member states, and addresses the needs and 
requirements of not just the Ministry of Defence but the larger integrated 
security sector. It covers, in partnership with other NATO agencies and entities, 
all aspects of the capability provisioning life-cycle, from the identification of the 
requirement to the continued support and upgrade of the delivered capability. 
Also the new NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is now taking into 
account non-military disciplines or domains, such as Air Traffic Management, 
Military Medical, Research & Technology, Logistics, and Civil Emergency 
Planning (NATO C3 Agency Strategic Plan 2011 – 2013, 2010). 
The NATO C4ISR Comprehensive Approach takes into consideration the 
different functional areas (Land Forces, Air Forces, Maritime Forces, Special 
Operations Forces, Intelligence, Logistics, CBRN, Joint/general functions), 
having in mind a ‘joint’ approach, in adherence with the principles of the NATO 
Network Enabled Capability (NNEC). The NNEC ‘joint’ vision provides that the 
acquisition of a capability for a specific force (for example, the Air Force) takes 
into consideration from the start its integration with the other forces, in order to 
avoid stove-pipe acquisitions and systems which are not able to integrate to 
form a common operational picture and situational awareness. In addition, the 
NNEC speaks in terms of ‘Services’ and not ‘Technologies’, favours the 
adoption of common (NATO if possible) standards for better and wider 
interoperability amongst the member states, and the building of services using a 
modular approach in order to leverage on existing services and to avoid 
reinventing the wheel each time. This is the paradigm of Service Oriented 
Architectures (SOA), which is an integrating part of the NNEC (NATO C4ISR 
Comprehensive Approach, 2010). 
As a tool to foster multinational cooperation and opportunities, NC3A has 
conducted international Chief Information Officers (CIO) Conferences. These 
regional conferences bring together national CIOs and NATO leaders with the 
objective to facilitate C4ISR interoperability amongst the countries through a 
wider adoption of NATO Standards and wider adherence to NNEC principles 
and roadmaps. The aim is to conduct at least one CIO International Conference 
per year with the location varying between the South-Eastern European region 
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and the Central/North-Eastern European region. The first CIO Conference took 
place on 24 and 25 February 2010 in Sofia, Bulgaria.  
The NC3A Industry conference provides a venue to meet with the industry 
of NATO nations and to exchange information on upcoming projects and 
acquisition activities. The CIO International Conference and the Industry 
Conference includes high-level participation from key NATO organizations or 
bodies such as the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), Allied Command 
for Operations (ACO), the Infrastructure Committee, the International Staff (IS), 
and NC3A. 
At the programme, portfolio and project (P3) management level, NC3A 
established a P3 environment, which permits and provides traceability of the 
programme of work over the life cycle of the projects and monitors the progress 
of the projects. This allows a stringent control over the time, scope and cost 
aspects of project management. Relatively unique among NATO entities is the 
fact that NC3A employs a Time Accounting System (TAS). TAS entries allow 
NC3A to measure and monitor monthly ‘productivity’ at the individual and group 
levels. The Project management, time accounting and the accounting systems 
are integrated in an overall management information system. The overall 
system for monitoring and control includes oversight and guidance by a P3 
Board composed of NC3A senior staff. In January 2010, NC3A published its 
C4ISR catalogue – a compendium of expertise and services provided by the 
Agency in all domains of C4ISR, with the intent to provide the nations a 
description of what the Agency does in order to support NATO member states 
and to facilitate multinational cooperation (NC3A C4ISR Catalogue, 2010).  
Closer cooperation between SEDM and NC3A is a very good example of 
the NATO role in the further consolidation of SEE in the area of new 
technologies as a basis for better and a cooperative way of developing 
capabilities for lower costs to the taxpayers. 
 
 
The Role of NGOs 
The last twenty years were the period of transition from the Cold War 
arrangements in SEE to integration in the Euro-Atlantic space from Alaska to 
the eastern border of Turkey. The process is not finished yet, but we can say it 
was shaped by the NATO framework. However, the process of change is larger 
than security sector reform and includes a shift in attitudes, perceptions, culture, 
the development of a Western type civil society that has an active role in 
governance, also when security policy and capabilities development are 
concerned. 
In this sense the role of NGOs and university research centres has been 
and will be quite important. NATO was able to set up a framework through 
Science for Peace (SfP) and Security through Science programs. The PfP 
Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Study Institutes created a large 
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enough network of experts. At a smaller scale, the NATO Defence College, the 
George C. Marshall Centre, and the NATO School contributed to building 
capacity in civil society. The main focus of these institutions is education and 
training of people in administration and military, but they start to be more open 
to civil society year by year. Even the EU in its Framework Programme 7 (FP7) 
established the ‘Security’ theme in its horizontal research program and is 
thinking to link security and defence research in FP8. In parallel there are two 
NGOs – DCAF and CESS – that are highly recognized in SEE with their 
contribution. 
While DCAF is focusing on research and consulting on parliament and 
government level, CESS, being closely related to the University of Groningen 
and part of a large NGO network, is contributing more to the preparation of the 
next generation and building capacity in local SEE NGOs. Being situated in the 
Netherlands, the centre is combining very effectively Dutch funding with NATO 
and EU sources to ‘export’ knowledge to SEE and to acquire through field 
experience and closer cooperation with local NGOs a unique understanding of 
the processes in this part of Europe. An effective internship programme is 
contributing to a flow of information between the CESS and SEE academic 
institutions and NGOs.  
Key topics in the last 10-15 years are transparency, accountability, 
civilian/democratic control, good governance at large, and recently integrity-
building in defence institutions. Regional cooperation and development of 
security policy are other topics of interest to NGOs. Step by step the issues of 
intelligence services, police (including border police), and emergency 
management services were covered by projects and contributed a lot to develop 
knowledge and understanding in SEE. This was reflected in new legislation and 
implementation of good practices in governance and management (ESCADA 
Report, 2003). 
Problems of defence procurement were addressed through a special study 
by Willem van Eekelen with DCAF, which was further developed in the research 
of CESS. Still there is a lack of publications on the role of technology and the 
industrial base for security. As an example: in the US National Defensc 
University there is the Information Resource Management College, Industrial 
College and Centre for NS and Technology Studies – something lacking in 
Europe and for sure missed in the SEE consolidation process. It is a challenge 
for NGOs to address this problem, which is technical only at first glance. If we 
really try to implement a comprehensive approach to this topic, it will prove to 
be critical for security, stability, economic development and as a result for the 






A New NATO Strategic Concept and the Consolidation of SEE 
At the end of 2010 we will have a new NATO Strategic Concept to replace the 
one of 1999 (NATO Official Texts, 2010). The last eleven years were years of 
many changes, including in SEE. Currently we have a clear perspective of 
practically the whole region to be integrated in NATO and later in the EU. But as 
we know from the experience of Bulgaria and Romania, this will not solve all the 
problems of transition in one night (the one of celebration). In parallel with the 
new strategy of the Alliance, active political dialogue and military cooperation, 
the efforts for technological integration will be required in order to face emerging 
security challenges – especially in SEE and the Black Sea region. In other 
words, we need a new level in the integration process and respectively a new 
area for NGOs and academic institutions to prepare society. 
SEE and Central Eastern Europe (CEE) are different, but not as much as 
SEE and Western Europe. Having in mind the successful transition of Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary it is good to consider close technological 
cooperation between these two regions as well as NGO cooperation in the 
NATO/EU framework. Later on, the transfer of experience between SEE and 
the Black Sea region will be growing. CESS is well situated to support this 
process. At the same time, NC3A will play a critical role in technology 
integration of the SEDM C4SIR systems and their further integration into the 
NATO federation of systems, both territorially and for expeditionary operations. 
Having in mind that a large part of NC3A is located in The Hague, gives 
additional stimulus for CESS to bring the technological integration aspect in the 
transition process. 
The New Strategic Concept will call for a comprehensive approach, missile 
defence, partnership and an open door policy and a readiness to address 
emerging security challenges. For SEE it will require closer NATO and EU 
cooperation, technological integration of the nations in the region with more 
multinational projects on a regional base or within a larger NATO/EU context. 
Again, NATO will provide the framework and instruments, but NGOs as CESS 
have to be able to provide societal awareness and public support and even 
demand for new ways to implement new technologies in a cooperative way in 
order to have both better capabilities and healthy, competitive industry, working 
in environment of integrity of governance. We cannot expect to succeed 
anywhere in the world if we are not able to finalize the consolidation of SEE and 
its full integration in Euro-Atlantic space. 
Current positive developments on the level of political and military 
consolidation of SEE is giving us the opportunity in the light of the New NATO 
Strategic Concept to look more actively to the area of technological 
consolidation through the process of cooperative development of capabilities. 
To succeed in this area, as was required for the political and defence reforms, 
we will need a new endeavour from NGOs to prepare society for this challenge. 
A challenge that is more complex and controversial in times of financial 
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difficulties. The SEDM could move this process forward supported by NATO 
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Chapter 3. Turkey’s Alignment with NATO. Identity and Power 
Politics 
 




This chapter seeks to explain Turkey’s alignment with NATO after the Second 
World War. Attempts to explain Turkey’s alliance behaviour have so far 
remained within the framework of (neo)realist theory. Although such an 
approach is not completely irrelevant, the reality is more complex. Turkey has a 
deep-rooted national security culture which reflects a problematic identity as 
well as a tradition of realpolitik. Both dimensions of Turkey’s strategic culture 
have had an impact on its NATO membership. This chapter will answer the 
question why Turkey aligned with NATO after the Second World War. The first 
two sections will be devoted to a brief survey of the theory and a brief 
examination of Turkey’s national security culture and its identity. The rest of the 
chapter will explain Turkey’s alliance behaviour with reference to (neo)realism 
and culturalism. This will include Turkey’s growing activism in the alliance 
despite the demise of the Soviet Union. 
 
 
Realism and Culturalism in Alliance Theory 
Mainstream alliance theory is based on (neo)realist assumptions. It takes actor 
identities for granted and usually treats cultural factors as irrelevant. Material 
capabilities, military and economic, are the main constitutive element of the 
international system and alliances are caused by power imbalances, threats or 
struggle for survival. 
However, radical systemic changes in the Soviet Union and the resurgence 
of ethnicity after the Cold War induced scholars to question the relevance of 
realist approaches for understanding and explaining contemporary international 
affairs. Recent neoclassical realist writers argue that there are possibilities of 
‘cross-fertilization’ between culturalists and realists (Glenn 2009, 523-551). 
Events also encouraged scholars to promote cultural explanations for state 
behaviour, including national security policies (Desch 1998, 144-150; 
Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999). Katzenstein and his colleagues emphasize 
culture and identity as important determinants of national security policy. They 
argue that states define their security interests by responding to cultural factors. 
Identities in an international system provide each state not only with a certain 
understanding of the ‘self’, but also with an understanding of other states, their 
interests, roles and motives (Hopf 1998, 193). Differently put, definitions of 
identity depend on a distinction, and possible conflict, between the ‘self’ and the 
‘other’, implying definitions of threat and security interest. State behaviour, 
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including responses to threats, is determined by the state’s identity which is 
intersubjectively constructed in relation to other states’ identities. Consequently, 
this conceptual linkage between identity and threat has considerable effects on 
national security policies and alliance patterns (Katzenstein 1996, 18-19). In 
other words, it is not the threat in objective terms, but a shared perception 
resulting from the similarity of identities which brings about an alliance. Thomas 
Risse-Kappen argues that alliances such as NATO coalesce around shared 
norms and a common identity rather than responding to mutual threats. NATO, 
he further argues, “represents an institutionalization of the transatlantic security 
community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal 
democracies” (Risse-Kappen 1996, 395). Shared norms and regulative 
practices, such as consultation and consensus-building, affect interaction 
processes among democratic allies and strengthen a common identity (Risse-
Kappen 1996, 369). Furthermore, the security community argument allows the 
prediction that NATO will persist despite the disappearance of a mutual threat. 
 
 
Turkey’s Security Culture and Problematic Identity  
In the past two decades Ottoman/Turkish historiography began to dwell on 
change and continuity between the Empire and the Republic, instead of earlier 
scholarship which emphasized a radical break with the Empire (Deringil 1987; 
Zürcher 1993). From the ongoing debate it is possible to extrapolate a 
significant degree of continuity in Turkey’s security culture despite the radical 
republican reforms. Continuity is observable in a certain tradition of realpolitik as 
well as in identity problems reflected in Westernization and Western-oriented 
policies. In the Ottoman Empire, the security culture evolved from an offensive 
realpolitik to a defensive one. The latter continues to dominate the foreign policy 
and defence planning in the Turkish Republic. The process of modernization 
had two interrelated aspects: (1) state reform, and (2) integration in the 
European state system. These policies led to the imperial elite’s, and later the 
republican elite’s, opening up to European ideas and values and eventually to a 
comprehensive policy of Westernization which realized a breakthrough with the 
Atatürkist reforms (Karaosmanoğlu 2009, 27-46). 
Modern Turkey, however, has been the principal heir of Ottoman diplomatic 
tradition. The Republic inherited the imperial bureaucratic and military elite, who 
did not carry the psychological burden of colonialism and was never anti-West 
in the sense in which former colonies of Western powers were. The young 
republic confined itself to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace where the majority of the 
population was Turkish-speaking, and repudiated revisionist doctrines such as 
pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism. A certain distrust towards the West, however, 
was a notably lingering trend, given the imperialistic behaviour of Great Power 
bargaining over a third party.  
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Another Ottoman legacy was the balance of power diplomacy pursued by 
the republican elite, who often sought support from an outside power to counter 
the threat of another. For instance, during the war of independence from 1919 
to 1922, the Ankara government received military, financial and diplomatic 
support from Soviet Russia against the occupying powers. When Moscow 
became an imminent threat to Turkey following the Second World War, Ankara 
sought diplomatic support from the United States and Britain. This resulted in 
American economic and military assistance in accordance with the Truman 
doctrine. Turkey had declared war on Germany to qualify for participation at the 
San Francisco Conference of April-June 1945 which laid the foundation of the 
United Nations. When the new world order was to be defined by Western 
democracies Turkey had serious doubts about the conformity of Western 
designs with its own interests. That the Allies would accommodate the Soviet 
Union by acknowledging spheres of influence had not fared in Turkish 
diplomatic calculations. Now that the Soviet Union was one of the Allies, 
Turkey’s suspicion over whether it might be subject of bargaining aroused its 
traditional fear of abandonment (Gardener 1994). 
The Ottoman Empire’s experience with Russia greatly influenced the 
Turkish Republic’s approach to security matters. The emergence of Russia as a 
great power in the 18th century brought about a significant change in the 
European balance of power to the detriment of the Ottoman Empire. This image 
softened somewhat after the Bolshevik Revolution and during the Turkish War 
of Independence. Despite the common interests that brought about this 
rapprochement between Turkey and Soviet Russia, their policies differed in a 
fundamental way. The new Turkish leaders pursued Western-oriented reformist 
policies and they had no intention to adopt a Marxist-Leninist socio-economic 
system. Furthermore, Atatürk never ceased to show his distrust of communism 
and despite his friendship with Moscow, he pursued an anti-communist policy 
within Turkey.  
Given the rigors of transition from the empire to the republic and the 
security culture predicated upon the ruling elite who witnessed the demise of 
the Empire, continuity of distrust with the North as well as the West was 
perhaps inevitable. Turkey was not about to feel at ease until it joined a serious 
and structured military alliance, NATO, in 1952. In general, the Cold War froze 
previous security concerns. But Turkey’s distrust toward Europe does not result 
only from its long experience as part of the European balance of power but also, 
and probably more significantly, from the fact that Turkish and European 
identities have been constructed through an intersubjective process which can 
be defined in terms of a ‘self and other’ dichotomy. Since there is an interaction 
between identity and security interest, threat formation depends upon the 
definition of the ‘self’ and of the ‘other’. Turkey’s identity formation can be traced 
back to relations between European states and the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s 
long Westernization process on the one hand, and its tapered but 
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insurmountable Islamic and Eastern characteristics on the other, have resulted 
in a complicated and ambivalent identity. 
Through wars, alliances, and economic policies, the Ottomans became 
significantly involved in the continent’s international affairs. Their state was 
formally included in the European state system after the Crimean War by the 
Treaty of Paris in 1856: “That simple formality codified a century and a half of 
precedent, embedded in an even longer process.” But the Ottoman state was 
never fully accepted as an integral part of the European system. European 
statesmen and political theorists consciously or unconsciously assumed that the 
European balance of power was a culturally homogenous system and that the 
Ottoman state, representing a different culture, could at best be “an irregular 




The classical arguments explaining Turkey’s quest for NATO membership 
emphasize the ‘Soviet threat’ as the main determinant. However, the notion of 
an unqualified ‘Soviet threat’ acting only as an international constraint, isolated 
from Turkey’s historical and cultural milieu, cannot by itself explain Ankara’s 
position. The ‘threat’ of growing Soviet power would, and in fact did trigger a 
Turkish response in general terms. But it did not determine the nature of the 
response. Ankara’s way of perceiving this threat and its ensuing choice of 
NATO membership, among other alternative policies, can only be understood 
by reference to Turkey’s national security culture and its problematic identity.  
It is commonly argued that an important cause of Turkey’s alignment with 
the Western block were Stalin’s demands for a joint Turkish-Soviet defence 
arrangement for the Straits, compounded by territorial claims over the Turkish 
provinces Kars and Ardahan on the Caucasian border (Vali 1971, 173). At first 
sight, it is impossible to refute Ankara’s perception of a Soviet threat. After the 
Second World War, Turkish policy-makers focused on the Soviet Union which, 
in their eyes, could constituted an effective threat given its geographical 
proximity, the capabilities at its disposal, and Turkey’s own past experience with 
imperial Russia. This Turkish concern was confirmed by Moscow’s demands 
toward Ankara. The Turks, therefore, could hardly interpret Moscow’s actions 
on the assumptions that the Soviet Union would behave peacefully and without 
any intention to extend its sphere of influence at the expense of Turkey. It is, 
however, important to elucidate the nature and extent of the threat. 
Immediately after the Second World War, Western countries regarded the 
Soviet Union as their wartime ally. Therefore, the Western governments did not 
expect the Soviet Union to enlarge its own sphere of influence (Gaddis 1997, 
32). The Western governments did not take a firm stand against Soviet 
intentions, even when those intentions became obvious. This led to Turkey’s 
feeling of insecurity when faced with Soviet pressures, because there was no 
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firm Western commitment to Turkey. Based on the historical experiences of the 
Ottoman Empire, Turkey thought that it could again be subject for bargaining 
between great powers. 
The United States regarded Soviet policy toward Turkey as an issue 
between Britain and the Soviet Union and, on 29 June 1945, declared its policy 
toward Turkey in a report. According to this report, because of its geographical 
position, Turkey had always been “an area of diplomatic, economic and military 
conflict between Britain and the USSR”. This raised Turkish anxieties that 
Turkey could be abandoned by the West, which meant that it would assume a 
Middle Eastern identity, and remain as a country vulnerable to pressures from 
both blocks. This feeling of insecurity led Ankara to criticize US policy and claim 
that the Soviet Union was a serious threat (FRUS 1945, Vol. 1, 1029-1030).  
On 2 August 1945, the Postdam Protocol provisions concerning the Black 
Sea Straits were signed at Berlin. Significantly, the USA, the UK and the USSR 
agreed that the Montreux Convention should be revised since it failed to meet 
present-day conditions. It was also agreed that the next step in this matter 
should be the subject of direct conversations between the three governments 
and the Turkish government (FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, 1236-1237). In August and 
September 1946, the Soviet Union sent two diplomatic notes to Turkey 
regarding the revision of the Montreux Convention. Both notes were rejected by 
Turkey with American and British support. The latter two had been amenable to 
revision, provided that the issue was discussed at an international conference; 
but the Soviets, by insisting on bilateral talks with Turkey on the matter, caused 
the USA and Britain to change their course.  
In 1946, the US government announced that it would have a permanent 
naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (Campbell 1960, 5, 32). Turkey 
was gaining in importance for the United States, because its firm stance against 
the Soviets showed that it would be a barrier to Soviet expansionism in the Near 
and Middle East. From a general perspective, American Cold War psychology 
corresponded with Turkey’s long-term policies. If one of these policies was to 
avoid diplomatic and military isolation, another was its quest for Westernization. 
Turkey’s NATO membership would strengthen the country’s Western identity as 
well as its position in Europe by adding an institutionalized transatlantic 
dimension to its security policy (Athanassopoulou 1999, 108-110, 145). 
Turkey’s recognition as a European state had become “almost a matter of 
honour” for the Democrat Party Government after 1950 (Athanassopoulou 
1999, 242).  
On 4 April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The Turkish 
government, once again, expressed its willingness to join. Inclusion of Italy, a 
Mediterranean country, and territory in North Africa comprising the Algeria 
departments of France in the scope of NATO, led to increased Turkish 
objections and public uneasiness. Turkey felt abandoned, because the USA 
pledged, in terms of Article 5 of the Washington treaty, to come to the aid of 
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Western European countries in case of attack, but such a guarantee was not 
offered to Turkey (FRUS 1949, Vol. VI, 1652). 
Most scholars agree that Turkey’s decision to send 4,500 soldiers in 1950 
to assist the UN/USA war effort in Korea was prompted by its desire to join 
NATO. One concern was to eradicate its image as an unreliable ally, because 
Turkey had declared non-belligerency in the Second World War despite its 
treaty alliance of 1939 with Britain and France (Turan and Barlas 1998, 647-
662). The Korean War, then, was a propitious occasion to demonstrate that 
Turkey was ready to assume and execute military obligations. 
While both Greece and Turkey wanted to join NATO, European members of 
the alliance, especially the British and Scandinavians, objected to their 
admission for ideological as well as practical reasons. As a Muslim country 
Turkey did not belong in a Euro-Atlantic block, and the frontiers to protect would 
stretch to the Caucasus, making burden sharing more burdensome (Vali 1971, 
116-120). 
The question of Turkey’s policy in case of a future war was the main reason 
for the USA and its allies’ acceptance of Turkey’s full membership in NATO. 
They feared that Turkey, with a vital strategic importance, might remain neutral 
in case of a war with the Soviet Union. Since Turkey had no means to defend 
itself against a Soviet attack, it could even make concessions to the Soviet 
Union, which would hamper defensive policies of the USA. The best way to 
guarantee Turkey’s alliance with the West was to include it in NATO (Gönlübol 
1971, 1-38). After its contributions to the Korean War, Turkey could choose 
neutrality because of disappointment with the West. The same question was 
asked by the Turkish Foreign Minister during his Washington visit in April 1949: 
“Why should Turkey take such risk if the USA would not promise to defend it? 
Why provoke the Kremlin if the Soviets might otherwise avoid war with Turkey, 
like they had done during World War II?” (Leffler 1992, 289-290). Finally, on 15 
May 1951, Washington proposed NATO membership to Greece and Turkey. 
Both acceded to the Atlantic Alliance on 16 February 1952. Turkey’s national 
security policies thus became embedded in the Western alliance. 
 
 
Alternatives to NATO 
Nevertheless, there were alternatives to the Western military alliance. Neutrality 
was certainly an option. It could help to reassure Moscow and reduce Turkey’s 
vulnerability. Learning theory argues that states ally or refrain from alliances 
based on the previous formative experience in war (Reiter 1994, 490-526). By 
this token, since neutrality served Turkey fairly well in the Second World War, 
one might think that Ankara would have stayed neutral in its aftermath. If one 
takes into account a longer period of historical experience, however, Turkey’s 
security culture, formed since 1878, shaped its preference for a serious and 
lasting military alliance. In essence, neutrality would increase Turkey’s isolation 
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even further. The Turkish elite plausibly concluded that neutrality would be of no 
avail given its geostrategic position. Neutrality definitely would not provide 
immunity against trespassing and against the Soviet violations of the Montreux 
Convention. 
Non-alignment might be another option. There were similarities between 
Turkey and the Third World countries: Turkey was underdeveloped; the Turkish 
Republic had emerged from a conflict with the European powers; and Turkey’s 
War of Independence and Atatürk’s reforms had presented a model to Third 
World countries. Ankara, like other non-aligned capitals, was very jealous of its 
own independence. The distinctive characteristic of Turkey, however, was that 
its national security culture was not imbued with a colonial past. Non-aligned 
countries viewed their policies as the expression of ‘real’ independence. They 
felt the necessity to demonstrate that their independence, recently obtained 
from colonial powers, was not nominal but real. Thus the exercise of this 
independence “could be put in evidence by the regime’s refusal of formal 
alignment which presented the danger of the renewed control of the strong over 
the weak and meant a renewed loss of voice and identity” (Korany 1976, 271). 
Yet the Turkish Republic had inherited a security culture which was heavily 
inspired by realpolitik and balance of power practices. Moreover, Turkey had an 
identity problem which it traditionally tended to overcome not by distancing from 
the West but by joining the West. 
Assuming a role solely in a Middle East defence formation was not 
appealing to Turkey either. Apart from its quest for Westernization, the Turkish 
elite did consider their country not belonging to the Middle East except as a 
geographical extension. To be part of a Middle East collective defence 
arrangement, albeit with Western participation, would have imposed upon 
Turkey a Middle Eastern identity, something which Ankara wanted to avoid. 
Consequently, Ankara did not accept the British idea of making Turkey’s NATO 
membership conditional upon its inclusion in the Middle East Command and did 
convince Washington about the impracticability of such a proposal. Finally, 
Turkey was integrated into the European Command of General Eisenhower 
instead of the Middle East Command (Athanassopoulou 1999, 230). It is to be 
noted that, during the Cold War, Turkey never was favourable to the extension 
of NATO’s area of responsibility to the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. 
Nevertheless, it did not see any problem in joining the Middle East security 
organizations, completely separate from the Atlantic Alliance, such as the 
Baghdad Pact and CENTO. 
Exogenous realities as conceived in light of Turkey’s national security 
culture as well as its problematic identity came to a full cycle and brought about 
Ankara’s choice of alliance. It was not the Soviet threat or demands per se 
which caused Turkey to seek NATO membership. The Soviet demands had 
begun to fade away five years before Ankara’s admission to the Atlantic 
Alliance. Nonetheless, the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union, its 
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offensive capabilities such as air power, and Soviet assertiveness, when 
combined with Western complacency towards Turkey, revived the fear of 
abandonment ingrained in Turkey’s strategic culture. This feeling of strategic 
vulnerability was the core of Ankara’s threat perception after the Second World 
War. Neutrality or non-alignment would not be an acceptable option for Ankara, 
because both would imply self-isolation. Although the Soviet option would help 
overcome isolation, it would distance Turkey from the West, hence was equally 
unacceptable. A Middle East collective defence arrangement or the Middle East 
Command would bring Turkey’s precarious Middle Eastern identity to the 
forefront, although it could provide a security guarantee from Britain, and even 
the United States. While a realist case for the impact of international constraints 
– Soviet power and assertiveness, and the fear of isolation – on the formation of 
Turkey’s security policy can be made, Ankara’s decisiveness to join a specific 
alliance, which was NATO, derived mostly from a profound belief in Western 
values and in the virtues of Western political systems. Exclusion of the Soviet 
and non-aligned options, as well as the Middle Eastern option, did not result 
primarily from international constraints, but rather from a combination of the 
peculiarities proper to Turkish identity and the heterogeneity of the bipolar 
system. Options other than NATO would imply for Turkey the abandonment of 
its Western orientation. On the contrary, NATO membership would solidify its 
Western orientation by establishing a long-lasting institutional and functional link 
with the West. As Bernard Lewis puts it: “The Turkish alignment with the West is 
not limited to strategic and diplomatic considerations. It is the outward 
expression of a profound internal change extending over a century and a half of 
Turkish history and sustained attempt to endow the Turkish people with these 
freedoms, economic, political and intellectual, which represent the best that our 
Western societies have to offer” (Lewis 1990, 15). “NATO membership solidified 
Ankara’s Western orientation by establishing a long-lasting institutional and 




The Interplay of Realism and Culture 
This chapter does not take an a priori stance on the debate between realism 
and culturalism. The challenge of culturalism or the relevance of realism should 
not be defined in absolute terms. Michael C. Desch asserts that the key 
question is “whether the new strategic culturalism supplants or supplements 
realist explanations” (1998, 143). The problem, however, is more complicated 
than Desch’s forthright statement. As Katzenstein puts it, “without a particular 
political problem or a well-specified research question, it makes little sense to 
privilege cultural context over material forces. By the same logic, it makes little 
sense to make the opposite mistake, focusing exclusively on material resources 
or assuming that state identities can be taken for granted” (Katzenstein 1996, 
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499). Simply put, the problem is not whether culture and identity matter in 
alliance theory, but rather where, when and how they supplant or supplement 
realist explanations. This way of posing the problem implies that culture and 
identity are empirical questions to be analyzed within a historical context and in 
relation to specific issues.  
The explanation of the initial response of Turkey to Moscow’s highly 
assertive policy after the Second World War could well be based on the realist 
notions of balance of power, balance of threat or survival. The reality, however, 
was more complex and could not be convincingly explained just in terms of the 
(neo)realist theory. The external world constituted only a part of the reality. 
What was at least equally significant was the interpretation of that reality 
through the prism of the Turkish elite’s national security culture, emphasizing 
Moscow’s centuries-old geopolitical ambitions and Turkey’s traditional fear of 
abandonment. It would, however, be a mistake to draw a sharp distinction 
between culturalism and realism. In the Turkish case, the former has developed 
to a great extent as a result of a long practice of realpolitik, and in response to 
international factors. In return, the national security culture affected Turkey’s 
threat perceptions and alliance behaviour. The main threat, in the Turkish case, 
was isolation or abandonment in the face of Soviet power. In this sense, culture 
shaped Turkey’s sensibilities and refined the explanatory value of realism by 
qualifying the threat perceived by Ankara. But, at the same time, it blurred the 
demarcation line between realism and culturalism.  
As A.I. Johnston suggests, “a wide variety of disparate societies may share 
a similar realpolitik strategic culture. This strategic culture may have an 
observable effect on state behaviour, but contrary to much of the existing 
literature on strategic culture; it may not be unique to any particular state” 
(Johnston 1995, 33). This statement implies that the link between national 
security culture and strategic behaviour is vague and that culture may not have 
a direct independent effect on strategic behaviour. In other words, in this 
context, culture does not supplant but, at best, supplements the neorealist 
alliance theory. Indeed, this was the case when Turkey found itself in a 
vulnerable position after the Second World War. Ankara’s evaluation of the Cold 
War environment was indirectly affected by its realpolitik culture. 
The Cold War international environment combined with Turkey’s realpolitik 
security culture determined Ankara’s perception of a certain threat, but it did not 
determine Ankara’s choice of NATO membership. Turkey’s national security 
culture reflects not only a tradition of realpolitik, but also a deep-rooted 
problematic identity. Since the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has 
gradually adopted Western institutions and values. Moreover, the Turkish elite 
has hankered for making their country an integral and equal member of the 
Western community of nations. Thus, Turkey’s centuries-old Western vocation 
had a direct, independent and societal-specific effect on Ankara’s choice of 
NATO membership. At that level, culturalism supplanted neorealism.  
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Turkey has remained strongly committed to NATO after the Cold War. 
Moreover, it has enthusiastically participated in the Alliance’s efforts of 
adaptation to new circumstances. From a (neo)realist standpoint, this can be 
explained by Russia’s uncertainties and other instabilities originating from 
neighbouring countries, and also by Turkey’s desire to remain in a structured 
institutional security relationship with the United States and the West-European 
allies. Although this (neo)realist explanation reflects only one of the aspects of 
Turkey’s continuing alignment with NATO, it is far from being adequate to 
explain Ankara’s new activism within NATO. 
First of all, NATO membership continues to be a cornerstone of Turkey’s 
Western identity. Therefore, Ankara is not willing to give it up. Although there 
are at present a number of problematic issues, such as the decreased 
relevance of Article 5 commitments, they do not overshadow the positive 
identity that Turkey has developed with the West through NATO. Furthermore, 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme of NATO in which Turkey actively 
takes part, is a process of socialization through which the Alliance projects its 
values and norms to its partners. Therefore, Ankara’s active participation in the 
implementation of the PfP programs as an old member of the Alliance makes it 
an active promoter of Western values and, in return, promotes Turkey’s own 
identification with the West. Turkey’s participation in peace operations such as 
ISAF also produces the same effect. 
With the end of the Cold War, culture and identity have undoubtedly 
become more salient in security affairs. Consequently, interactions between 
security interests and cultural factors have become increasingly significant in 
explaining alliance politics. NATO’s identity-constructing and identity-
consolidating functions have come to the forefront. The Central and East-
European countries’ accession to NATO mainly fulfils their need of identification 
with the West. On the other hand, however, it would be a mistake to ignore the 
risks and uncertainties emanating directly from the post-Cold War environment, 
including Russia’s perceived uncertainties which have also motivated the 
Central and East-European countries’ search for NATO membership. 
The Turkish case suggests that a multi-perspective methodology, 
legitimating diverse theoretical approaches, would enhance the explanatory 
relevance of a study on the alliance politics. Against one-sided positions, the 
Turkish case suggests that a combination of (neo)realism and culturalism would 
more convincingly explain states’ alliance behaviour. The Turkish case confirms 
that we should seek to avoid the characteristic deficiencies of neorealism that 
result from an excessively mechanical view of international affairs and, also, 
from a generalizing political discourse that ignores differences. On the other 
hand, however, we should not adopt an extremist view of identity politics that 
overlooks any realist concept. Both (neo)realism and culturalism have merits 
and limitations. Neither of them can provide a convincing explanatory 
framework by excluding the other. 
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Chapter 4. Friends Both Close and Distant. Transatlantic 






This chapter deals with America’s self-image and American perceptions of 
Europe after the Second World War. Masses of Americans traversed Europe, 
some as tourists, others as GIs providing security, still others as diplomats 
bringing nations together or businessmen searching out opportunities. Together 
they explored the space of other and self. Post-war Europe confronted 
Americans with their own identity as much as with the realities of other cultures. 
The process of Americanization was not a one-sided affair, but one of mutual 
influences.  
The questions raised in this chapter mostly deal with diplomacy. How 
American or un-American did the US government and American diplomats in 
Europe consider the old continent to be? And how European was America? 




Good to be beaten? 
At the time, Germany struggled hard to cope with the fate of a humiliated and 
divided country. The moral guilt for the death of millions of Jewish and other 
innocent civilians weighed heavily. The born-again democrats in Germany bent 
over backwards to prove that they could do better for their country than the 
Nazis. The people worked long days and weeks to regain a fair degree of 
wealth, (self-)respect, and independence, and to forget the recent past. It was 
not easy to lie down defeated, not even if the main enemy had been Franklin 
Roosevelt, Harry Truman, or Dwight Eisenhower. The same counts for 
Austrians and Italians and other peoples on the losing end. As Europe as a 
whole, including the Axis states, grew prosperous rapidly, the memory of the 
war gave Germany and its former allies plenty of reasons to feel unease, if not 
desperation.  
In the final stage of the war and in the months immediately after the war, the 
United States and its allies went to great lengths to explain their war aims to the 
European public. Understandably these were put forward in the most favourable 
light. It was a time when ‘good’ propaganda to prevent misunderstandings was 
of primary importance. Books were among the means applied to transmit the 
message, selected by the Office of War Information. Let us take a closer look at 
just one of them. Between 1942 and 1944 the American journalist Walter 
Lippmann wrote two books that perfectly fit the purpose of convincing the 
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sceptics in Europe who still thought that America had a selfish agenda for the 
future of the continent or that reconstruction could be completed without 
American intervention. The first was U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic; 
the second U.S. War Aims. After being published initially for an American 
audience, they were given a second life as a combined publication: U.S. 
Foreign Policy and U.S. War Aims  
Lippmann was no literary hack. He had learned about foreign policy the 
hard way, and internationalism had become his creed. Confessing his own 
ignorance and “mistaken judgments” in the past, he tried to convince his 
readers that “the effortless security” of the “Victorian Age” which had created 
“an unconcern with public responsibilities”, was gone and that “fate has brought 
it about that America is at the centre, no longer at the edges, of Western 
civilization” (Lippmann 1944, 248-249). In Lippmann’s view relations between 
the Soviet Union and the United States were paramount. Given the wide 
geographical separation of the two superpowers he considered the prospect of 
peace to be extremely good. Yet he would not let down his guard as it was 
impossible to prove Stalin’s peaceful intentions or disprove the hypothesis of 
Soviet Russia’s aggressive nature. The US, therefore, would have to rely on the 
solidarity of Western Europe and the Americas (Lippmann 1944, 201). The 
American democratic impulse he defined as the main source of strength for 
peace in the future world, but it should be linked to the strategic and economic 
realities of the times. Lippmann proposed a clear agenda for American 
diplomacy: peace through strength. He dismissed Wilson’s disregard for French 
fears and his crusade for the League of Nations after the First World War as 
misguided, and envisioned a world order based not on trust but on a close 
cooperation between the victors in the war and forceful furthering of democratic 
ideals.  
Was Lippmann’s formulation also a clear agenda for American diplomats 
who had to implement this mission in Europe? The agenda appeared clear 
enough, but those assigned to carry it out needed flexible minds and alert ears 
on widely divergent political views among the European populace. In Europe 
the war struck deeper and differently than in the United States. It had made 
people more conservative and paradoxically prone to sweeping changes in 




The United States and Europe: More than Oceans Apart 
Theoretically the worldviews of the United States and Europe – their thinking 
about democracy, politics, civil society, and governance – had not drifted far 
apart in wartime. They still belonged to the same democratic family. The 
countries liberated from the German yoke had all been democracies for a long 
time. The Axis states, to whose populations Lippmann also spoke, knew or at 
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least remembered a democratic tradition as well. Understandably no American 
policy maker deemed it necessary to ‘translate’ Lippmann’s publications for 
Europeans or to tailor the message to their intellectual grasp and tastes. 
European eyes and ears were supposed to catch the same meaning as 
American eyes and ears. All the publisher, Overseas Editions, Inc., took upon 
itself to do was to make sure that the European public got hold of books which 
had been denied to them by censors during the war.  
But that was theory. On closer examination, the fairly unspecific ideological 
rift between the two continents and systems that had existed before the war had 
become more distinct and more complicated. Take the danger of communism. 
Whereas America had maintained and even built up its hostility towards that 
doctrine, European electorates were much more divided on the issue. Although 
Europe had learned to appreciate Americans as liberators, they were not 
generally looked upon as ‘kin’ or ‘friends’. On the whole people lacked the self-
confidence they had possessed before the war and also the self-understanding 
one needs to understand ‘strangers’. Europe was in a kind of limbo. Not 
America.  
After the war several years elapsed before Europe was won over to the 
view that the world had to be interpreted as a dichotomy; that communism 
constituted a mortal danger; that the American side was their side. Only after 
the coup d’état in Prague in 1948 was the general public converted to anti-
communism. In many countries the communists at first joined coalition 
governments of the popular front model. After 1948 they had been thrown out 
everywhere except Iceland (Laqueur 1982, 158). 
How did this contrast occur? Before 1939, few people in Europe regarded 
communism as something alien to the continent or talked about it in terms 
equivalent to the description of ‘un-American activities’ in the official American 
political language. The war increased rather than decreased the mental 
separation between America and Europe on this issue. When Nazism 
disappeared from the scene in 1945, many people at first did not know what 
‘ism’ to love or to hate. As a result of the war, Stalin and his ideology had 
become popular among many by 1945. After all, the Soviet Union had borne the 
brunt of the Nazi aggression and had suffered enormously doing the right thing. 
Capitalism was still compromised by the lingering memories of the Great 
Depression with its many social injustices. As the US took the lead in the Cold 
War with the Soviet Union, Europeans questioned why they should side 
unequivocally with America.  
Linked to the moral and political uncertainty was an unclear self-image. 
There was no concept of ‘Europeanness’, and some people would say such a 
concept still does not exist today after fifty years of European unification. In 
most of Europe people identified solely with their own nation, but during the war 
so much had happened that made people less proud of their country and fuelled 
a rethinking of nationalism. Identification with the state became relatively weak 
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in many countries. For want of a strong sense of self, the idea of Americanness 
also remained rather vague. Only at the end of the 1940s notions of ‘freedom’ 
versus ‘slavery’, ‘communism’ versus ‘capitalism’, and ‘Europe side-by-side with 
America’ became less abstract.  
This is all broadly speaking of course. Reactions to America’s presence 
were as diverse as Europe. Varieties of anti-Americanism were everywhere, 
and relatively strong from the start in some countries. France, struggling to be 
recognized as a great power, discovered that America was an obstacle and 
reacted bitterly. The French people did not stay neutral in that debate. American 
opposition, however weak, to the resurgence of France to great power status 
was an insult added to injuries inflicted previously. After the First World War 
America had resisted endorsement of the Versailles Treaty, which was to a 
certain extent a French project. Although Woodrow Wilson was on the French 
side on this issue, he was, says Simon Schama in his recent but already 
famous essay in The New Yorker, “perhaps the most detested of all American 
presidents by the French, for whom his self-righteousness was compounded by 
his failure to deliver results” (Schama 2003, 38).  
Schama provides some clear and in their silliness almost frightful examples 
of conspiracy theories which were popular in France in the 1920s and 1930s. 
They dwelled on plots of capitalists and other sinister elements in the United 
States to dwarf Europe by increasing its financial debts. These French anti-
Americans were inspired among other things by American willingness to let 
Germany off the reparations hook for the sake of peace in Europe. Both in the 
First and Second Wold War there were French who felt that America opened a 
second front unnecessarily late and all too reluctantly. Some of them joined the 
Soviet government in suggesting that the US delayed joining the war to bleed 
Europe and the Soviet Union white. Whatever the roots and forms, French anti-
Americanism following the Second World War was another cause for the 
communist party to rise in popularity (see also Kuisel 1993). 
In the United States, interruptions or modifications in opposition to 
communism had been relatively marginal. Between 1941 and 1945 a sizable 
number of people had grown to admire the Soviet war effort, most of them in the 
wake of a government drive to rally the people behind American-Soviet military 
cooperation. Even so, the campaign against ‘fellow-travellers’ had never halted. 
The vast majority of Americans mistrusted Stalin and his comrades. After the 
war Stalin’s reputation had improved, but a lot of distrust remained. Capitalism 
had won the war. Communism was thought to be plainly un-American. 
What exactly the terms ‘American’ and ‘un-American’ stood for was 
manifest to all Americans. Even a person with the best of anti-fascist credentials 
could not always escape the wrath of ‘real Americans’. Under these 
circumstances, American diplomats who arrived in Europe after the war to 
represent their country and market their government’s ideas about the future of 
Europe had a difficult task. Most history books say that they were received with 
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open arms, but that is just one side of the picture. The other side is the gradual 
forging of resistance of some importance to the US on the basis of a different 
wartime experience. Economic misery and other adverse conditions made 
people susceptible to the lure of easy solutions, such as ‘the inevitable victory of 
the masses’ that would come about if only the class struggle were kept going.  
 
 
Limited Ambitions in Germany 
The diplomats learned fast. Their most valuable training ground was Germany, 
where the US became the leading power in the occupation. In his famous book 
on that era, The United States in Germany, Harold Zink, the official chief 
historian of the US High Commission in Germany, wrote about America entering 
this adventure immature and inexperienced in international relations but 
adapting so well to its new responsibilities that after ten years a good many 
people “would place the United States in the top category of nations on the 
basis of knowledge of world affairs and expertise in handling difficult 
international situations” (Zink 1957, 2). His estimate is that the total number of 
Americans involved in the occupation reached “into the millions”. To conquer 
and occupy a country was an affair of complex reciprocation. Many people 
trying to make an imprint on Germany discovered also receiving an imprint from 
their stay in Europe. Zink concludes that the impact on Americans and the 
American way of life has “not been negligible” (Zink 1957, 4). Some had their 
“outlooks broadened immeasurably”, while others “have not been able to 
survive the stresses and temptations of the occupation”. Many thousands of 
German brides became the mothers of Americans. In all, Zink sees a positive 
result, as the vast majority of Americans went home with the firm conviction that 
“communism is a snare and a delusion, having little to offer humanity other than 
misery”. 
In light of what we know today about operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) with all 
the rivalry between the military and the State Department, we might expect a 
similar struggle between the American High Command and the diplomats for 
control of the occupation of Germany. The reverse, however, was true. General 
Eisenhower wanted to hand over the army’s responsibility for all non-security 
matters to civilians as soon as possible, but the State Department declined the 
offer. With tensions increasing between the US and the USSR, the diplomats 
foresaw that the nature of the occupation needed to remain military. Not until 
1949 did military rule end and did authority transfer to the State Department 
(Zink 1957, 45).  
 As relations with the Soviet Union worsened and the Cold War reached a 
threatening level, it became more and more necessary to treat the Germans as 
allies instead of subordinates who had to follow orders. This awareness resulted 
in various shifts in the organizational structure of the occupation authority. 
Civilian-oriented military personnel gained the upper hand within a framework 
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which remained only formally. The more military-oriented specialists in the 
armed forces, as Zink phrases it, “found little to attract them unless they had 
become wedded to life away from home, had few prospects in the United 
States, or had entered into domestic arrangements of various sorts with 
European women in preference to returning to their families at home” (Zink 
1957, 42).  
Zink seems critical of the Americans who, after having worked for military 
government in the initial phase, were hired again in the more civilian-oriented 
phase, saying with so many words that “having lost touch with current 
developments at home”, they were becoming less valuable (Zink 1957, 50). 
Though he admits that this attitude was almost impossible to avoid after a stay 
in Germany of several months, he thinks they went too far in taking on “the 
ways of victors in a conquered land”. Zink also criticizes representatives of 
American businesses who took their share of the revenues of American 
government in Germany, but particularly on “‘wine, women, and song’ boys who 
were so notorious in their exploits that they often brought a bad name to the 
entire military government organization” (Zink 1957, 76). However small their 
number, relatively speaking, “the depraved manner in which some of these 
openly flaunted their mistresses in their contacts with their fellows as well as 
with the German people” was a great embarrassment. 
But enough about individual soldiers. Many of them were young and 
immature, and their behaviour can be dismissed as typical of their age. Zink 
wanted the military to be good ambassadors of the United States. Most of them 
were, some were not. For the purpose of this chapter it suffices to point at his 
explicit and implicit observation that the more detached from realities in the 
home country they became, the more difficult it was to live and act in 
accordance with the aims of American intervention in Europe. Any awareness of 
dissonance between America’s intentions and what could be achieved by 
American individuals under the circumstances is absent in the official language 
of the American High Commissioner or in the political rhetoric of high-ranking 
government officials who visited Germany at the time. Political and 
administrative pronouncements strictly conformed to the American agenda in 
which there was no place for any serious contrast or discord between American 
political goals and preoccupations that were typical for Europeans.  
 
 
A Cultural Cold War 
Hundreds if not thousands of books and articles tell us the story of the Cold 
War, the Truman Doctrine (1947), the Marshall Plan (1947/1948), and concerns 
in the United States that Europe might fall like ripe fruit from the tree of freedom 
into the hands of the communists. Without those worries, America would not 
have invested so much in a ‘cultural’ Cold War fought inside the ‘big’ Cold War 
to win the hearts and minds of Europeans and stave off Soviet domination of 
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the world. We cannot deduce from this massive cultural, political, and economic 
offensive in Europe that America concluded that Europeans needed special 
treatment. After all Americans at home were also put under FBI surveillance. 
The single most important reason behind the special attention for Europe was 
that it was battlefield and frontier territory. There, not in the United States, the 
Soviets would gain ground or be thwarted. There was no need to mount a large-
scale defence against communism in the United States proper. But in terms of 
quality rather than quantity the means applied to fight the cultural Cold War in 
Europe were practically the same as the means used in America in the 
McCarthy era (Whitfield 1991).  
America’s own security was a major consideration within a more generally 
formulated and heart-felt responsibility for the well-being of the world and 
Europe in particular. To help Europe in its distress, to “salvage the victors as 
well as the vanquished”, as Truman put it in his memoirs, was in keeping with a 
long tradition (Truman 1965, 134). This is not the place to go into the exact 
assessment politicians in Washington made of the magnitude of Europe’s plight 
and the political risks involved. They concluded that the balance of power was 
in danger and that free Europe should be kept within the American zone of 
influence. To achieve this, they started the European Recovery Program (ERP). 
However enormous this operation was, its ambition to create new people was 
limited. It was launched as a primarily technical project to improve the lives of 
human beings who were considered to be roughly the same as Americans.  
The ERP paid little attention to differences in culture or psychology. 
Improvement of material conditions, not brain-washing of any kind would be 
needed to do the job. Even in Germany the approach was practical and far from 
intent upon the ‘conversion’ of an entire population. At a very early stage the 
American, and in their wake the British authorities, decided that the Germans 
could stand on their own feet again. So they let them go. The Germans were 
ready to work as hard as Americans. That was sufficient evidence that they 
were capable of charting their own future. The denazification effort never really 
took off, not because the United States condoned the Nazi philosophy, but 
because it would be counter-productive if it were not limited to catching the 
bigger fish. Plans for a major overhaul of the German education system were 
executed lukewarmly, not because America found it good enough as it was, but 
for the simple reason that the Germans took it upon themselves to do the work. 
The establishment of contact with the outside world, and especially a program 
to let German teachers and professors visit American schools, turned out to be 
enough to get them going. 
Paradoxically and in view of the big and bloody war they had just fought, the 
Germans did better in the eyes of most Americans than the French. Although 
General De Gaulle, who briefly led France after the war and returned to power 
again in 1958, eventually accepted an important role for Germany and Franco-
German rapprochement, he and the other French governments obstructed the 
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America-inspired reconstruction of Germany and its promotion to great power 
status short of UN Security Council membership. This was a major bone of 
contention between the two countries.  
Meanwhile the Cold War progressed. Feelings of solidarity between the 
United States and Germany became stronger. After the Second World War 
there had been a brief period in which Americans serving in occupied Germany 
awaited confirmation of their assumption that the Germans had not changed 
profoundly. As Robert Murphy, who was in Berlin, wrote in his memoirs: “In 
addition to three million Germans in Berlin, thousands of displaced persons 
were roaming around the shattered city. None of us could be sure how these 
people might behave, whether their experiences had made them apathetic, 
revengeful, or crazy” (Murphy 1964, 264). But things turned out right. The 
Germans behaved. They were not Huns, but perfectly normal human beings. 
The Berlin blockade from June 1948 until May 1949 and the airlift organized by 
the United States to help the Berliners survive, was the final moment of truth: 
the definitive end of all divisions the war had brought about. It was a time when 
an alliance between Washington and the provisional government of Germany 
developed into an allegiance between peoples. This marked the elevation of 
Germany to the rank of most favoured nation in Europe (Murphy 1964, 298).  
For America, Germany was no longer an exceptional case as soon as 
‘Bizonia’ came into being, and it became all the more ‘normal’ once it had 
elected to join the community of nations in Europe which received Marshall aid. 
From then on American policy makers in their rhetoric even more emphatically 
included West Germany in what they called the free world. When Harry Truman 
in his inaugural address of 1949 spoke about the spectre of communism 
threatening big parts of the world, he expressed no qualms about counting 
Germany among the free nations of Europe in company with which the ERP, 
“the greatest cooperative economic program in history” was carried out (Truman 
1949). If it goes too far to say that the US considered them as Americans in 
German clothes, to say that they thought them to be as American as Europeans 




To this day the term ‘ugly American’ serves to depict foreign service officials 
who know little and do not care to learn anything about the faraway countries 
where they nonetheless do their work with utmost dedication to the American 
cause. Not only in Asia but everywhere across the globe, these types have 
shown up. But very many American diplomats were aware of the danger to 
become, or to come across as aloof and culturally insensitive, and therefore did 
their utmost to avoid it. 
How real is the concept of the ‘ugly American’? When I was working on this 
chapter I tried to get in touch with people who have served in Europe during the 
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Cold War in some diplomatic capacity. Nowadays that is not so difficult, as 
retired diplomats have discussion lists of their own on the internet. The answers 
I received when I asked what the State Department did in terms of teaching 
sensitivity, and what they themselves had done to be accepted by the locals, 
make clear that indeed a serious effort was made in this respect. Their self-
study went well beyond teaching them ‘not to sneeze on the Mona Lisa’ and 
“when in France not to start shouting at the manager of your hotel when you get 
hot water after turning on a faucet marked ‘c’, the things you will find in 
guidebooks for tourists”.  
In Foreign Service Assignment Notebooks published by the State 
Department, future diplomats were (and are) encouraged to become more 
aware of their own culture, “the concepts in the American way of life which 
influence each of us to some degree”. That was considered to be the ideal 
starting-point for learning how to respect other cultures, by focusing on the most 
likely points of cultural differences. One former diplomat, who has served in 
Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia throughout the Cold War, told 
me that in basic training (the course all aspiring diplomats called ‘the 200 
course’) there was considerable emphasis on how to avoid the ‘ugly American’ 
syndrome. “Woe to anyone who would do anything stupid that would come to 
the attention of the ambassador”. All trainees were urged to blend into the local 
scene as well as possible, on the basis of a list of country specific ‘dos’ and 
‘don’ts. This same correspondent sharply distinguished between ‘officers’ and 
‘staff’. The latter category was expected to remain within the expat community, 
or was even expressly forbidden to interact with the local community, so as to 
avoid any risks of recruitment as agents by foreign intelligence services. 
Another former diplomat said, “While there were not, to my knowledge, formal 
classes on ‘not being an ugly American’ we were all pretty clearly told that we 
were representing our country at all times, not just at work. Most diplomats I 
was in contact with were by inclination very sensitive to that issue. I know that I 
felt and tried to behave as though I was constantly in a fishbowl with a large ‘US 
diplomat’ sign on my back”.  
 
 
‘Ich bin (ein) Berliner’ 
The first cycle of the Cold War ended with the ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech of 
John Kennedy in June 1963. Kennedy was an expert in softening up opponents 
and rivals and making friends like him even more than they had done before. 
Although President Eisenhower had never managed to find any soft spots in 
fellow-general De Gaulle, the President of France since 1958, Kennedy 
shrewdly threw in Jackie Bouvier’s good French language competence to charm 
the old giant. And it worked. When Kennedy visited Paris, he made sure she 
would accompany him everywhere he went and made a point of publicizing the 
fact that her dresses were designed by French couturiers. In Germany Kennedy 
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did not need his wits that much. Even before he visited, his popularity was more 
than secured. On a state visit, the American President saw cheering crowds, 
and nothing but cheering crowds. In Bonn he said that the United States would 
risk her cities to protect German cities because America needed German 
freedom to protect her own freedom. This was excellent and very welcome 
rhetoric. The masses loved it. As his biographer Richard Reeves writes: ”The 
Germans went wild ... [I]t was as if he [Kennedy] were being crowned Prince of 
the World” (Reeves 1993, 535).  
Then Kennedy flew to West Berlin. His motorcade covered more than 50 
kilometres in the city under siege. Again he spoke to a huge crowd at City Hall, 
and again the people waved and cheered. We do not know for certain whether 
the ‘Berliner’ part, and particularly the fact that he used the phrase twice, was 
pure improvisation by a man who got mesmerized by the ecstasy of those all 
around him, or that it was carefully designed to be the very high point of this 
already successful public relations campaign. Kennedy abandoned some parts 
of the speech he had in his pocket. He had thought up new lines while on the 
road, but we just cannot tell exactly the new from the old. To be sure, he did not 
claim to be an inhabitant of Berlin as straightforwardly as many people think. It 
was purely symbolic, and Kennedy made no secret of it. This is what he said: 
“Two thousand years ago the proudest boast was ‘Civis Romanus sum’. Today, 
in the world of freedom, the proudest boast is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’.” Further 
down his speech he repeated the punch line in a slightly different manner, and 
this time he came closer to a personal claim: “Freedom has many difficulties 
and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep 
our people in ... All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and 
therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words, ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’.” 
Did Kennedy give up his American citizenship with this speech? Of course 
not. Did he apply to be registered as a taxpayer in Berlin? I do not think so. Did 
he speak terrible German, as the story goes? Well, his German was not entirely 
correct. ‘Ein Berliner’ is a German jelly donut without a hole in the middle. If 
Kennedy had said ‘Ich bin Berliner’ he would have been right on target and no-
one would have perceived a double meaning. But by saying ‘ein Berliner’ the 
president was not committing a terrible gaffe. Those who found reason to fault 
Kennedy for what he had said, took his words out of context and deliberately 
misinterpreted him. What is much more important than this kind of word-
splitting, is the fact that at this very tense moment, just eighteen years after the 
war, and less than two years after the Berlin Wall was built, the president 
reaffirmed American solidarity with Berlin. He could not have done it more 
eloquently or more effectively. He proclaimed himself a soul mate of the 
average person in Berlin. Not many times before in history had different 
identities of different nationalities and backgrounds been officially and so 
emphatically intertwined as on this day in June 1963. Kennedy was quite right 
when, on his flight to the next country on his whistle-stop tour of Europe, he said 
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to Theodore Sorensen: “We’ll never have another day like this one, as long as 
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Chapter 5. NATO’s Retirement? A Club-theoretical Approach 
to the Alliance 
 




The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 by 
twelve founding nations. The signatories – Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Italy, Iceland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) – set the task to build a 
defence arrangement between North America and Europe. The alliance was 
based on the treaty signed on 4 April in Washington DC and was meant to 
provide peace and security for its member states. Article 5 of the Treaty is 
pivotal to the alliance. It states: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each 
of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area. (NATO 2010).  
Guaranteed mutual defence as stated in the treaty, of course, needed military 
resources as well management and control mechanisms in order to be secured 
as a genuine international organization rather than as a treaty. This required, 
first of all, financial support from the USA for the European NATO-members, 
which after the Second World War were left in economic and military disarray. 
To that end, President Harry S. Truman launched the Mutual Defence 
Assistance Act, which passed Congress in October 1949 (Henderson 1982, 24). 
Secondly, European integration was deemed necessary. Europe needed to 
become less vulnerable to the Soviet threat. Thirdly, North Atlantic integration 
was seen as a prerequisite for NATO to become a genuine international 
organization. It was not just a matter of financial means, but the international 
alliance had to overcome differences in operational procedures and techniques 
and communications incompatibilities as well.  
The idea of international alliances by means of organization is extensively 
studied in International Relations (IR) and, in particular, security matters still 
dominate leading IR journals, such as International Organization, International 
Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution and 
                                          
2
 I am grateful to Joachim Ahrens and Todd Sandler for discussing the arguments on 
club theory and the NATO alliance.  
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World Politics. Currently, the economics of alliances is gaining intellectual 
support, but the market share of these publications still remains relatively low 
(Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999; Sandler and Hartley 2001). Moreover, despite 
the fact that all of these studies refute the classical distinction between ‘high 
politics’ and ‘low politics’, they rather scarcely address the economic incentives 
of whether or not to join an alliance. The scope of security is ‘economized’ 
rather than that the trade-off between costs and benefits of an international 
alliance, such as NATO, is scrutinized. 
This chapter seeks to fill part of that scholarly gap by addressing NATO as 
a club. International Political Economy (IPE), as sub-discipline in IR, 
acknowledges club goods. These are excludable goods that are non-rival in 
consumption. The NATO alliance can very good be conceived of as a club that 
provides these exclusive but non-rival goods. Article 5 of the Treaty, concisely 
summarized as ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’, perfectly fits the definition 
of a club good. Moreover, Article 5 presents the club good, whereas other 
international clubs, such as the European Union, provide numerous services to 
their members, some of these fit the definition of club goods, whereas others do 
not (Ahrens, Hoen and Ohr 2005). NATO is there to secure the safety of its 
members – it is exclusive – and the members are homogeneous, since there 
will be guaranteed equal treating in case one of them is militarily offended – the 
service is non-rival. 
The chapter applies a club theoretical approach to NATO and focuses on 
the problems that emerged after the latest enlargement rounds. These have 
triggered the question of NATO’s retirement. Formulated differently, are there 
economic arguments that underpin the notion that NATO has reached it 
optimum size or even expanded beyond that? The next section, in a slapdash 
fashion addresses the history of NATO and its expansion. It focuses in 
particular on the nature of the services the alliance provides and underlines that 
these can be conceived of as a club good. The subsequent section elaborates 
on club theory. Based upon Buchanan’s seminal work (1965), his theoretical 
model will be reframed to fit for NATO’s global alliance. The argument is that, 
given the level of international security integration, the optimum number of 
member states of NATO is a dependent variable that, in principle, can be 
determined. Enlargement rounds come along with additional costs of control 
and, therefore, the third section addresses these additional costs by focusing on 
increasing heterogeneity of preferences in the alliance. From a club-theoretical 
perspective it is unclear whether NATO has already moved beyond the optimum 
amount of member states, but that leaves unaltered the task to economize on 
costs. Besides, it scrutinizes the possibility to economize on governance costs, 
which leads to the conclusion that NATO need not necessarily retire, but should 




NATO’s Past Expansions 
After NATO was established, several rounds of enlargements followed in the 
sixty years of its existence. Table 1 presents an overview of the six rounds of 
enlargements since the establishment in 1949.  
 






















Albania       x 
Belgium X       
Bulgaria      x  
Canada X       
Croatia       x 
Czech Republic     x   
Denmark X       
Estonia      x  
France X       
Germany   x     
Greece  x      
Hungary     x   
Iceland X       
Italy X       
Latvia      x  
Lithuania      x  
Luxembourg X       
Netherlands X       
Norway X       
Poland     x   
Portugal X       
Romania      x  
Slovakia      x  
Slovenia      x  
Spain    x    
Turkey  x      
United Kingdom X       
United States of 
America 
X       
 (Σ = 28) 12 2 1 1 3 7 2 
Source: http://www.nato.int/. 
 
Some of these rounds were rather straightforward, such as the first, the second 
and the third. These entailed the accession of one (West-Germany in 1955 and 
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Spain 1982) or two countries (Greece and Turkey in 1952). But the fourth, fifth 
and sixth round, that took place as a consequence of the collapse of the 
communist systems in Central and Eastern Europe, were much more intricate. 
These involved a larger number of relatively poor countries. Besides, the twelve 
countries that since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (1991) have joined NATO 
reveal a much larger heterogeneity in their preferences regarding their role in 
Europe and the world. 
A relatively easy accession of Greece, Turkey and West-Germany did not 
imply that there was no discussion in NATO. On the contrary, enlargement was 
far from obvious, since from its incipient stages the danger of overstretched 
commitments and resources in the alliance was at stake. But Greece and 
Turkey entered in 1952, since there was the communist threat. In Greece, the 
threat was internal (during 1946–1949 there was a civil war with strong 
communist involvement), whereas in the case of Turkey external Soviet 
pressure was decisive. The accession of West-Germany was convoluted, 
among other things, by the occupation of German territories by allied forces. To 
many of the NATO-members, Germany remained a tantalizing candidate. But 
since European integration was seen as a sine qua non for NATO and Germany 
was the fence towards the East, it was invited to become NATO-member. After 
the status of an occupied country came to an end with the signing of the Bonn-
Paris convention on 5 May 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany joined 
NATO as from the next day (Henderson 1982, 33). 
Spain’s accession to the alliance did evoke an enormous amount of 
discussion in Spain rather than in NATO. NATO was especially convinced about 
the strategic importance of the Iberian country, but Spanish politicians in the 
post-Franco era hotly debated the issue. The standpoints were divided between 
and within the parties. Since NATO was perceived as a necessary step for 
joining the EEC, a majority for NATO-membership emerged in the autumn of 
1981. Spain joined NATO as from May 1982. 
Since the demise of communism, there were three rounds of expansion. All 
of them included the accession of formerly communist economies. It took a 
decade before a group of three Central European countries joined NATO: the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These countries were most outspoken in 
their attitude to participate in European integration processes – and to become 
a member of the European Union – and as a prerequisite to that, to become a 
full-fledged NATO-member. The accession to NATO, therefore, was 
instrumental. It was a tool to achieve EU-membership. The countries’ 
preferences were slightly deviant from the above mentioned original aims of 
NATO. 
Dispersed preferences were even much larger in the subsequent round of 
enlargement. In 2004, seven countries joined NATO. Three of them – Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania – had a genuine interest in becoming a NATO-member. In 
the Baltic states the Soviet legacy and renewed independence was extremely 
65  
important and the countries want to safeguard their borders. For Bulgaria and 
Romania the motives were different. NATO-membership was seen as the ‘royal’ 
trail leading to EU-membership. Slovakia and Slovenia wanted to have become 
a member in 1999, but since NATO believed that the two countries were not 
ready for accession yet, they had to wait. Their NATO-accession coincided with 
the EU-membership. 
In 2009, Albania and Croatia joined NATO. The accession negotiations 
were long-lasting and complicated, as has always been the case with countries 
from the Balkan region. Currently, Macedonia is knocking on NATO’s door and 
the invitation is expected as soon as the dispute with Greece about the name of 
the applicant is settled. Apart from membership, NATO also recognizes 
partnerships with a number of countries. The partner countries are classified in 
different structures of dialogue, such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 
the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Gulf Cooperation countries and, last but not 
least, the Contact countries. The latter includes countries that have similar 
strategic concerns as the NATO-members and share the NATO values. The 
emerging pattern of membership, partnership and contacts after the Cold War, 
on the one hand, reveals the success of NATO and, on the other, divulges the 




Club Theory: Optimizing the Size of the Alliance 
NATO can be thought about as an intergovernmental organization that, based 
on Article 5 of the treaty, provides a non-rival good to its members, the benefits 
of which cannot be enjoyed by non-members. Given the limited number of 
military resources, there can only be quasi non-rivalry in consumption, but 
Article 5 can be perceived as club goods and NATO as the entity that provides 
its members with these good.  
The application of club theory to international organization is still in its 
infancy, although there have been several attempts (Sandler and Hartely 2001). 
One of the problems is that many international organizations, intergovernmental 
or supranational alike, provide multiple club goods. The EU is an obvious 
example (Ahrens, Hoen and Ohr 2005). For NATO, the problem of multiple club 
goods is less mystifying, since it is a military organization and as such only 
provides one sort of service. In what follows, club theoretic analysis is 
addressed as a means to better understand the key problems of institution-
building in NATO given the political imperative that both deepening and 
enlarging the alliance are to be pursued simultaneously.  
As a point of departure, Buchanan’s (1965) seminal paper on club theory is 
taken. His original model developed is applied in a simple theoretical framework 
to questions of NATO integration against the background of the enlargement to 
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the East in 2004 and 2009. The assumptions are as follows: 
• Club goods show two defining characteristics: They are non-rival – or only 
partially rival – in their consumption and non-members of the club can be 
excluded from their consumption; 
• club members are homogeneous and share the costs of providing the club 
goods equally; 
• there is no discrimination against any of the club members; and 
• non-members can be excluded from benefiting from the club goods at no 
cost. 
The critical variables to be optimized in the framework comprise (i) the number 
of club members and (ii) the provision of the club good, which refers to the 
degree of deepening or integration with respect to a particular club good. In the 
first step, only one club good that is provided by NATO is considered, for 
example, the good ‘Article 5’. The representative club member, i.e. a 
government of the current NATO-members, seeks to maximize its utility 
according to (1) subject to a binding budget constraint (2). 
 
 
In (1), Ui denotes the utility of the representative club member i, Gi represents 
real government expenditure of i as a proxy variable for the provision of national 
public goods. From a club theoretic perspective, G represents a ‘quasi-private’ 
good, because it can be only consumed by the citizens of country i. The 
variable X represents the degree of integration with respect to the club good 
‘Article 5’, i.e. different values of X can be interpreted as different stages of 
integration ranging from national military autonomy to a common NATO-border 
with fully standardized military procedures across all club members. Finally, n 
denotes the number of club members. While increases in G and X have a 
positive impact on U, changes in n may be positively or negatively correlated 
with i’s utility. Basically, it appears to be plausible to assume a negative 
correlation between n and U, because an increasing number of club members 
significantly raises political transaction costs, particularly organizational and 
administrative costs as well as costs relating to political bargaining and decision 
making. Yet, a positive correlation is assumed for a relatively small club, as long 
as the utility due to an enhanced allocative efficiency and increased political 
stability which are caused by political and economic cooperation exceeds the 











Equation (2) is the side condition faced by the representative government. It 
represents a binding budget constraint holding that the exogenous tax revenue 
of i must equal nominal government expenditures plus i’s share of the cost for 
providing the club good at a given degree of deepening X. Costs are assumed 
to be positively correlated with the degree of integration. 
Maximising (1) subject to (2) yields the following necessary marginal 
conditions for Pareto optimality: 
 
Conditions (3) and (4) represent the optimal conditions that allow for a 
simultaneous solution for X and n. While (3) is the traditional Samuelson 
condition for the optimal provision of public goods, when satisfied implying that 
further substituting private goods provision for public goods, or vice versa, 
decreases social utility (Samuelson 1954), the membership condition (4) 
addresses the question of when it is beneficial for the club to admit a further 
member (Yew-Kwang 1973). Figure 1 portrays the simultaneous solution for X 
and n graphically. 
Figure 1 (see overleaf) represents the case of homogeneous club members 
and considers one club good, for example, military support in case of external 
attacks and border violations. The variable X denotes the degree of deepening 
military integration, i.e. X=0 implies that there is no integration, so that – in the 
underlying example – all countries can be regarded as completely autonomous 
in their military operations and X=Xmax can be interpreted as full military 
integration, i.e. all club members do have a common external border and apply 
fully standardized military policies. The latter implies that the notion of national 
armies is meaningless. One can only speak of NATO-troops. 
In quadrants I and II of Figure 1, the utility function and the cost function of 
the representative club member are depicted given a variation of n and X, 
respectively; X and n are the corresponding shift parameters. The optimal 
values for X and n are achieved when the difference between the costs and 
benefits of a representative member is maximized. In quadrant IV, the curves 
Xopt and nopt can be spotted, which correspond to equations (3) and (4), 



















































Figure 1 Optimal Club Size and Optimal Deepening 
 
At first sight, two conclusions follow from the graphical illustration. Firstly, the 
utility and cost functions will differ for different club goods, that may be provided 
by NATO, the derived functions for nopt and Xopt will differ as well. This implies 
that the optimal club size will also differ for different club goods and that a single 
club, which provides more than one club good to its members, will be sub-
optimal from a theoretical point of view. This point also triggers another 
problem, which will be even more difficult to overcome. Eventually, institutional 
reforms along the lines of addressing the ‘leftovers’ are necessary but 
insufficient to adequately deal with the problem of simultaneousness, i.e. 
‘enlarging-cum-deepening’ the NATO. Since NATO provides several club goods 
and its members are by no means homogenous entities – in particular if one 
considers an enlarged NATO comprising more than thirty countries – the 
functions nopt and Xopt depicted in Figures 1 and 2 will differ from one club good 
to another. This implies that the optimal club size will also differ contingent on 
the nature of the respective club good and various degrees of integration, i.e. 
deepening. In that case, a single club providing several club goods to all its 
members, all of which enjoy the same degree of integration, will neither be 
theoretically efficient nor will it be politically feasible. 
Secondly, if it is assumed that n* equals the membership size of the NATO 
in 2009, i.e. n*=28, then an enlargement of NATO will lead to a sub-optimal club 
size even if NATO restricts itself to providing only one club good. Of course, it is 
conceivable that NATO’s membership size of 28 was already too large and 
hence theoretically sub-optimal. In that case the derived conclusions and policy 
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implications hold as well, because, for political reasons, it would not be feasible 
to reduce the number of NATO-members. The second conclusion implies that 
enlargement will only be efficient if political transaction costs can be 
appropriately reduced. However, given that the envisaged NATO-enlargement 
is a political imperative which cannot be altered, an optimal club size would be 
only achieved if the utility curves in quadrants I and II can be shifted upwards. In 
that case, a downward shift of both the nopt curve and the Xopt curve would be 
induced that yields a larger club size as the optimal solution. This case is 
depicted in Figure 2, in which it is assumed that the NATO-enlargement relates 
to the admittance of Macedonia as the 29th member, after Albania and Croatia 
entered the NATO in 2009. 
Note in this context that, besides an upward shift of the utility curves in 
quadrants I and II, one needs also to consider a downward shift of the cost and 
utility curves in quadrant I, in which club size n is regarded as a shift parameter. 
Hence, an increase in n, ceteris paribus, shifts both curves downwards. The 
economic rationale behind this is that (a) an increase in club size implies higher 
political transaction costs which badly affect the utility of the representative 
member; and that (b) the costs for the provision of the club good are now to be 
shared by a larger number of club members.  
 
 
Figure 2 Enlargement for a Given Degree of Integration 
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Increasing Heterogeneity of Preferences Within the Club: What to Do? 
The several rounds of NATO enlargements have revealed that increasing 
heterogeneity of member states’ preferences and costs of control gradually 
become a burden to further expansion of the alliance. The section addresses 
these both aspects. 
The heterogeneity partly stems from the success of NATO over the last 
decades. What began as a genuine ‘North-Atlantic’ treaty has shifted to an 
alliance that has to serve the interests of members far away from the Atlantic. 
The fall of communism enabled the accession of former communist countries, 
but at the same time the Soviet threat was the main argument to seek 
accession. Since the beginning of the 1990s, that threat has gradually 
disappeared. With the exception of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania none of the 
post-1989 members did perceive NATO as a military safety net. NATO-
membership was rather seen as a tool for entering in the EU. 
Another bone of contention is the lack of financial means of the new 
members. In terms of military commitments, i.e. the costs of supplying the club 
good, there are sound arguments that many of the poorer members will be 
overburdened when facing their obligations (Thies 2009). 
NATO is facing this problem for quite some time now and has come up with 
the idea of a partnership, which among other things implies friendly cooperation 
in the field of the military, as an alternative to membership. This can be an 
option to control for governance costs in the alliance indeed, but from a club-
theoretical perspective there is an alternative that might be cheaper and more 
flexible. The idea is to create a club of clubs. 
The case of multiproduct clubs with heterogeneous membership has been 
rarely discussed in the literature (Sandler and Tschirhart 1997). What seems to 
be uncontroversial, however, from both the preceding analysis and the 
theoretical research on multiproduct clubs, is that increases in allocative and 
dynamic efficiency can only be expected if one succeeds in partitioning the 
overall NATO-club area into smaller clubs including relatively homogeneous 
members. A formation of smaller clubs would need to be focused on particular 
club goods with respect to which relatively homogeneous ‘political and 
economic consumers’ can be identified. In that sense, ‘Article 5’ represents a 
club good which should be provided by NATO to all its members because the 
degree of heterogeneity can be neglected in this area. But this may be different 
if one turns to the club good ‘common military forces’. This club good includes a 
level of integration for which the costs cannot be paid for by the all member 
states, either due to their financial means or to the willingness to pay. 
Given club-theoretic and political-economy considerations, it is not clear 
why all policy fields should be harmonized. On the contrary, a more flexible 
integration, i.e. the perception of NATO as a club of clubs, promises to be a 
suitable strategy to simultaneously realize optimal values for membership size n 
and the degree of integration X in smaller, more homogeneous clubs. As is 
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proposed in the case of the EU (Ahrens, Hoen and Ohr 2005; Ahrens and Hoen 
2007) it might even imply a systematic and institutionally safeguarded splitting 
up into sub-clubs in which the possibility to compete with one another promises 
to yield more efficient economic outcomes and contribute to attenuate persistent 
political power struggles and distributional conflicts. Last but not least, such a 
decentralized, competitive process of club formation would be most appropriate 
to lower – national and regional – preference costs and to take advantage of the 




NATO exists since 1949. The alliance is now over sixty years old and the 
question arises whether it should retire. The arguments to dissolve the alliance 
are twofold. Firstly, the focus on the demise of a Soviet threat. This has led to 
large heterogeneity in the preferences of the member states. Secondly, the 
several rounds of enlargements have increased the costs of control. 
Starting from these two problems, this chapter has analysed NATO 
expansion with a club-theoretical framework. Club theory provides a tool to 
simultaneously optimize the size of membership and the deepness of 
integration for the provision of exclusive but not-rival goods. Article 5 of the 
Treaty is seen as the pivotal club good provided by NATO: an attack on one is 
an attack on all. 
The analysis shows that expansion leads to larger costs of control. One of 
the assumptions in club theory is that preferences are homogeneous. It is quite 
clear that in an enlarged NATO this assumption is no longer sustainable and 
increasing heterogeneity in itself will lead to larger governance costs. It might 
well be the case that from a cost-benefit-analysis NATO may already have 
expanded beyond its optimum size. But given the political imperatives, the 
question then is how to control the marginal costs of control. 
The argument has been put forward that NATO should move towards a club 
of clubs. In this club of clubs, Article 5 remains a club good provided for all the 
members, but in other fields this is not necessarily the case. This option 
ensures homogeneity with the sub-clubs and a most efficient tool to create the 
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Chapter 6. Europe the Reluctant Security Actor 
 




The security and defence dimension of European integration has developed 
very slowly over the decades and still lags behind the impressive progress in 
other fields. This Chapter will focus on how the European Community and later 
on the European Union slowly and reluctantly developed a security dimension. 
It also discusses how the resulting European Security and Defence Policy 
relates to NATO and maps the way forward for the two organisations.  
The Brussels Treaty of 1948 was the first demonstration of European 
willingness to work closer together and contained a variety of issues, including 
an automatic military security guarantee in case of aggression between France, 
the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries. NATO was established the next 
year in the light of the growing Soviet threat. Europe proceeded with the Coal 
and Steel Community but faltered in the envisaged follow up with an European 
Defence Community and a Political Community. A French initiative failed in the 
French parliament and Germany became a full member of NATO, while 
accepting some limitations on its armaments and the prohibition of producing 
ABC weapons in the Modified Brussels treaty, henceforward called the Western 
European Union (WEU). Germany and Italy joined and Britain, which had not 
participated in the EDC negotiations, committed itself to station three divisions 
and a tactical air force on German territory. All WEU members agreed to 
inspections on their force levels, thus attenuating the discriminatory aspects 
with regard to Germany. The British commitment lasted until the 1990’s when it 
was terminated during my tenure as secretary general of the WEU. 
In the aftermath of the Korean war the focus of defence and security policy 
shifted to NATO and European integration was pursued under its umbrella. It 
remained a political process – never again war between France and Germany – 
but the means were at the economic level. It would take until 1969, when 
president Pompidou accepted to negotiate again on British entry into the 
Economic Community, before the Netherlands agreed to start the European 
Political Cooperation in the field of foreign affairs. The closest it came to the 
issue of security was in 1975 with the rather successful coordination of positions 
on the Helsinki process of the Conference, later Organisation of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  
Some wanted to go further. An initiative by ministers Genscher and 
Colombo failed in 1982 because of opposition by Denmark, Greece and Ireland, 
which in turn led to a revitalisation of the WEU and joint meetings of the 
ministers of foreign affairs and defence. A new window of opportunity opened 
when after the fall of the Berlin Wall the priority of collective defence diminished 
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as the overriding element in transatlantic relations. A brief period of uncertainty 
followed in which Germany was united and remained anchored in the west, but 
the relevance of NATO was questioned. NATO had served us well in providing 
the necessary American leadership in East – West relations, but as a security 
organisation would no longer provide the umbrella forum under which most 
politico-military issues were discussed and acted upon. Of course, even during 
the Cold War the umbrella did not cover every rainstorm, as was shown in the 
Vietnam war. But on the whole the US, with its nuclear deterrent and 300.000 
soldiers in Western Europe as the best guarantee for their involvement, had a 
powerful impact in defining the issues. Even after the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the Warsaw pact and communism as an organising principle there were 
good reasons to maintain that link, much strengthened by the exemplary 
behaviour of the US with regard to German unification. Contrary to the 
reluctance of Mitterrand and Thatcher, president Bush senior and his secretary 
of state James Baker grasped the moment and supported chancellor Kohl. The 
unification of Germany meant the unification of Europe which avoided the drift 
of the former satellite countries of the USSR into a grey zone of chaos and 
instability.  
After the paradigm shift of 1989 both NATO and the EU slowly moved 
towards a different notion of security, which focused on new risks and 
challenges, on inter-ethnic strife in former communist countries, on the 
restoration of stability and – in short – on peace support operations of many 
kinds. Peace support was a better term than the peacekeeping formula of the 
UN, which was conditioned by a cease fire in place and its continuation and the 
will of the parties to accept peacekeepers. That notion failed in Srebrenica when 
there was no peace to keep and the warring parties resorted to ethnic 
cleansing. The newly created European Union (EU) failed to act, in spite of 
claims that the hour of Europe had arrived, and NATO recovered its leading 
role. Or rather, the US did, with assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke 
clanging heads together and arriving at a Dayton agreement where Milosevic 
signed on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, but managed to keep the Kosovo issue 
off the table. Peace enforcement had become the new parameter, which would 
be demonstrated again in Kosovo in 1999. 
Yet, NATO remained a security organisation which alone would provide 
insufficient cement to paste the transatlantic link together at a time of increasing 
globalisation and the emergence of new threats exceeding the military domain. 
The security environment was dominated by issues linking external and internal 
security (like terrorism, illegal immigration, drugs trade and organised crime) 
which required more a police response than a military one.  
Moreover, NATO grappled with the ‘out of area’ problem, largely due to 
presumed German constitutional limitations, and had been unable to act during 
the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1990. For a brief moment that inability 
allowed the WEU to assume operational responsibilities like the mine-clearing 
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operation in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, the embargo flotilla against Serbia 
in the Adriatic and the surveillance of the Danube with police and customs 
officials. The WEU made a conceptual breakthrough with the definition of the 
new tasks as humanitarian, rescue (i.e. evacuation of nationals from a 
beleaguered city), peacekeeping and “the role of combat forces in crisis 
management including peacemaking” (i.e. in current jargon peace 
enforcement). These so-called ‘Petersberg Missions’ entered the EU vocabulary 
in 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam at the initiative of Finland and Sweden, 
but this did not say much about the conditions under which they would be 
implemented. 
Without much preparation the Treaty of Maastricht called into existence the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the successor of the European 
Political Cooperation. In the monetary sphere the momentous decision was 
taken on a timetable for the introduction of the Euro. In spite of these 
milestones, one could doubt whether the resulting framework deserved the title 
of Union. The CFSP and the judicial co-operation remained purely 
intergovernmental, without the communitarian characteristics of initiative by the 
European Commission, budgeting and control by the European Parliament and 
jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice. The most glaring shortcoming of 
the CFSP was its inability to include hard security within its scope. Again it 
proved impossible to square the circle between Atlanticists and European 
advocates. The result was a series of convoluted formulations, leaving military 
matters to the Western European Union. At Maastricht the WEU members 
issued a declaration containing the following elements: 
- WEU members agree on the need to develop a genuine European 
security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on 
defence matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process 
involving successive phases. 
- WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the 
European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
- WEU member states agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer 
term perspective of a common defence, compatible with that of the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
- WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union 
and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 
In the Maastricht Treaty itself Article J.4 contained the following wording in its 
first two subparagraphs: 
1.  The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related 
to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. 
2.  The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an 
integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement 
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decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The 
Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the 
necessary practical arrangements. 
At the time it looked rather complicated, particularly as the promised practical 
arrangements were not forthcoming. The monthly meetings of the Political 
Committee of those days, bringing the Political Directors of the member 
countries together, strangely enough had little affinity with defence matters. In 
any case it would have been better to talk about ‘security implications’ instead 
of defence. It was also unclear what the European identity and the European 
pillar of the Alliance would mean. NATO looked askance at these innovations 
and attempted to create a “right of first refusal” when operations had to be 
undertaken. A very artificial construct, which bore little resemblance to reality, 
for in a crisis all existing organisations would be consulting among themselves 
about possible responses, including mandates from the UN Security Council. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 removed the double conditional of 
Maastricht about the road towards a common defence and its article K.7 simply 
said that the CFSP “shall include all questions relating to the security of the 
Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy … which 
might lead to a common defence should the European Council so decide”. This 
treaty entered into force in May 1999, one year and a half before it was 
amended again by the Treaty of Nice, which entered into force in February 
2003, when the Convention drafting a Constitution had already been going on 
for a year. 
This acceleration was due to the Franco - British summit at St Malo where 
Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac agreed that the EU “must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide 
to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises”. This led to the Helsinki Headline Goals, a capability of 50-60,000 
personnel, available within 60 days and sustainable for at least a year. In fact, it 
remained a catalogue of forces from which an operation could be mounted, but 
without an organised structure. A deadline of 2003 passed with the conclusion 
that many shortfalls existed. In the meantime NATO had organised the NATO 
Response Force of some 25,000 men, largely from European countries, ready 
to act within a few weeks. But again, this force has never been used except for 
humanitarian support after an earthquake in Pakistan. The next move was for 
the EU in creating 19 battle groups of some 1,500 personnel, two of which are 
standing on guard able to move within a week. This was mirrored on the 
successful Artemis operation in Bunia in the DR Congo where serious 
disturbances could be stopped before a larger UN force was assembled. Yet 
again the battle groups have not been used, which raises the question of the 
wisdom of keeping forces in reserve while an ongoing operation – as in 
Afghanistan – is short of support.  
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Much of the talk about a European identity or pillar within the Alliance 
lapsed after the Treaty of Nice had absorbed the functions of the WEU into the 
EU and extended the CFSP with a European (later under the Lisbon Treaty: 
Common) Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).3 In response, the NATO 
summit of Washington in 1999 coined the Berlin plus formula which made 
NATO assets (primarily Headquarters and communications facilities) available 
to the EU for operations in which NATO as a whole was not engaged. 
Unfortunately, this arrangement was only implemented in Bosnia when the EU 
took over the SFOR operation from NATO under the name of Althea. But CSDP 
became the acronym under which the EU would deal with military matters. High 
Representative Javier Solana assumed responsibility for both CFSP and CSDP, 
the EU Military Committee took over from the WEU (with in most cases 
concurrent appointment with the function of NATO MilRep), the WEU Planning 
Cell became the EU Military Staff and military uniforms became a common sight 
in the Justus Lipsius building in Brussels. 
The Treaty of Lisbon did not change much in the proposals which the 
Defence Committee of the European Convention had drafted under the able 
chairmanship of Michel Barnier. The first paragraph of Article 24 came to read: 
“The Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy 
shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the 
Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy that might lead to a common defence.” 
The CFSP would be put in effect by the High Representative (who would be 
double-hatted with the function of Vice President of the European Commission 
and would chair the Foreign Affairs Council) and by member states. The 
European Council would “identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the 
objectives of and define general guidelines” for the CFSP including those 
having defence implications (Article 26). Article 42 repeated that the CSDP 
would be an integral part of the CFSP and then continued: 
“It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian 
and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union 
for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international 
security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities 
provided by the Member States.” 
Member States also undertook “progressively to improve their military 
capabilities”. The Council may entrust the execution of a task to a group of 
                                          
3
 In the spring of 2010 notice was given of the termination of the Modified Brussels 
Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty included a solidarity clause, albeit weaker than Article V of the 
WEU and particularly Britain did not want to spend money on the WEU Assembly which 
brought national parliamentarians together in a “consensus building” environment, 
including the non-EU European members of NATO. Thus the intergovernmental side of 
the EU will lose a parliamentary dimension. 
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Member States and the treaty opened the possibility of “permanent structured 
cooperation” among those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil 
higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another 
with a view to the most demanding missions. It is still unclear whether this 
French idea will be followed up, for the smaller countries are weary of being 
excluded from common tasks. 
Article 43 expanded the definition of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ which the WEU 
had listed in 1992 and which had been incorporated into the Union treaty in 
1997 at the initiative of Finland and Sweden. They now read: joint disarmament 
operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance 
tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in 
crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All 
these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting 
third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. 
In spite of the fact that the CSDP was part of the CFSP, the matter has not 
been fully clarified. The word security appears in both. Moreover, the CFSP is 
shared by all, while in the CSDP Denmark abstained and Cyprus and Malta did 
not fully participate. Meetings between the NATO Council and the EU Political 
and Security Committee were held, but usually without much substance. They 
mainly served to inform the NATO countries which did not belong to the EU 
about ongoing activities. These were not unimportant for the EU possessed 
instruments which NATO lacked, but the operations were small scale and 
(except for three of them) not of a military nature and oriented towards police 
action and security sector reform. Hopefully the new High Representative / Vice 
President of the Commission, Baroness Ashton, will be able not only to improve 
the coherence of EU policies and actions, but also to establish a constructive 
relationship with the Secretary General of NATO. A solution of the Cyprus issue 
should be a priority. 
 
 
The New Security Agenda  
NATO's new strategic concept should clarify its future role in terms of threats, 
force planning and policies, and at the same time serve as an instrument of 
public diplomacy. With France back into the integrated headquarters and 
president Obama adopting multilateral policies the time has come for a new 
look. After all the last concept dates from 1999, well before the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 and the first ever invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 
1949. At the time of writing the ambitions of the Alliance seemed subject to 
some tuning down. More emphasis on the consultative processes of Article 4, 
dealing with threats which were directed at most members and acting only if 
other organisations could not cope with a crisis (i.e. the opposite of a right of 
first refusal), better relations with Russia, and some contingency planning but in 
general terms in order not to be provocative. 
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Those trends are reinforced by the increasing connection between internal 
and external security in dealing with terrorism, organised crime and illegal 
immigration, but also by the link between security and development. Following 
important work by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) it is now generally recognised that, without a basic level 
of security, development money will be wasted. Both trends underline the need 
for close cooperation between the military and the police and civilian authorities. 
They also stress the need for a process of security sector reform which follows 
an integrated sequence of intervention – post conflict stabilisation – rebuilding 
of institutions and a ‘whole of government’ approach. For these aspects the EU 
is better equipped than NATO, particularly at a time when defence budgets are 
under pressure. 
 Conversely, no large military operation can be undertaken without 
participation of the US. In fact, that does not only apply to the security sphere, 
but to virtually every problem in our globalising world. When the US and the EU 
see eye to eye on issues like the financial crisis, fighting protectionism, climate 
change and global warming, there is a chance of making progress. If not, our 
efforts are doomed to fail. This means that consultations with the US have to be 
organised on a broad front of issues, perhaps through new institutional devices. 
NATO as a security organisation will not be able to cover them all. 
On our side, Europe will have to organise itself better. The EU now has the 
task to update the so-called Solana strategy of 2003 in order to match the new 
NATO Strategic Concept.4 In the current financial crisis the critics argue that 
without a political union the Eurozone will fail, but they usually do not indicate 
what that Union should entail. Both in economic policy and elsewhere we 
should prioritise our ‘minimalia’ which are sufficient for meeting our objectives. It 
is an illusion to think that we will ever be able to organise a European foreign 
policy on the pattern of national ministries of foreign affairs with the thousands 
of messages and information flowing in and out. Similarly we will need to 
preserve some flexibility in economic and tax policies. But we will have to agree 
on our priorities and on binding rules to achieve them together. The Greek 
deficit case was so bad because it shook our confidence in the trustworthiness 
of a partner. The same loss of confidence occurred with regard to the financial 
rating agencies and the risk management of the banks. So there we need 
control mechanisms which do not kill initiative and hamper growth, but can work 
effectively without unnecessary regulation. Otherwise the disconnect between 
voter and government is bound to grow. 
In NATO we see a divergence between the old members, who look at new 
tasks like peace support and security sector reform, and new members who 
focus on the old NATO of Article 5 and collective defence. Solving that problem 
is closely connected with better relations with a Russia which currently passes 
                                          
4
 The Report on the implementation of the European Security strategy of December 
2008 fell short of an update. See ISS Report No. 05 of February 2009. 
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through a nationalistic phase. The leaders in the Kremlin should be made aware 
of the fact that their Western border is the best they have, which we will never 
attack and could become an area of mutually beneficial trade, provided they 
stop heavy-handed attempts at political pressure in domestic affairs. 
Finally, Europe will have to do more in the security field, if we want to be a 
reliable player. Still, equipment programs are lacking in meeting shortfalls. 
Together, the European countries have more soldiers under arms than the US, 
but too few of them are capable of deployment outside our borders. The 
possibilities for task specialisation should not be exaggerated. In past 
experience this often amounted to doing less and shifting burdens to others. 
Yet, there is scope for pooling of assets and maintaining a certain autonomy in 
their use. The European Defence Agency (EDA) has had some success in 
making the defence market more transparent and has composed a number of 
strategies. Yet, the objective of bringing together the supply side, research and 
development, and acquisition into a joint effort has not yet been reached. 
Hopefully, the current financial crunch might overcome some national 
sensitivities. 
The Netherlands have conducted an intensive analysis of the foreseeable 
security situations over the next twenty years and defined a number of force 
patterns to cope with them. They range with increasing intensity from protection, 
to intervention, to stabilisation, and a multiple role combining the previous three 
strategic functions. For the short term the consensus seems to be that 
maintaining the current levels of effort will require more funding. As money is 
short everywhere, the only solution seems to be a better combination of funding 
both development money and part of the operational cost of the stabilisation 
effort, thus freeing funds within the defence budget  
Over the past fifteen year Peter Volten’s brainchild, the Centre for European 
Security Studies (CESS), has been leading in the field of security sector reform 
and democratic civilian oversight over the armed forces. CESS has established 
a niche for itself in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, many of which 
in the meantime have joined NATO and the EU. Much remains to be done and 
its emphasis is likely to evolve. Reform will switch to governance and oversight 
over the police and internal security services will gain in relative weight. Much of 
what our military are doing abroad can be compared to what the police is doing 
at home. Yet, the police work closer to the average citizen and have to gain his 
trust as an impartial and honest service. In the new triad of Defence, Diplomacy 
and Development – which should properly be Security, Governance and 
Development – the mantra of CESS – Reveal, Explain and Justify – will remain 
an essential element of democratic society. Ultimately the role of CESS should 
extend to a ‘whole of government’ concept. 
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Chapter 7. The European Defence Community and NATO. A 
Classic Case of Franco-Dutch Controversy 
 




In March 1954 the Dutch army major Feije Spits published an extensive survey 
- under the auspices of the European Movement in the Netherlands - entitled 
Naar een Europees Leger (To a European Army).5 At the time, it was the most 
detailed account - also for international standards - of the European army 
discussions taking place in Paris. Spits wrote his piece at a moment that the 
concept of a European Defence Community (EDC) was still alive, its treaty 
being subject to approval in the national parliaments. In his book Spits showed 
ambiguous feelings about the direction the European army debate was taking. 
He blamed the United States and Britain for giving inadequate support to 
France in ‘its legitimate quest’ for security against the possible threat of a 
reviving German military danger. Spits also asked for more sympathy for French 
ambitions to strengthen their position in the Atlantic framework of NATO (Spits 
1954, 10). In the early 1950s, EDC and NATO issues were closely intertwined. 
NATO had just been created and was still in the process of developing itself into 
a proper military organisation. Many observers wondered to what extent the 
EDC could develop into a rival to the incipient Atlantic framework.  
The EDC story is a curious one, full of inconsistencies and paradoxes. It 
also serves as a classic example of Franco-Dutch controversy in the European 
political domain. The positions of the two countries could hardly have been 
more apart. In October 1950 France launched the plan for a supranational 
European army, but four years later it was the French national parliament being 
responsible for the EDC’s tragic demise. Conversely, the Netherlands 
manifested itself as the fiercest opponent to the French European army plan, 
but in 1954 the Dutch parliament was the first of the six to ratify the EDC treaty.6 
France and the Netherlands feature as the extremes in the EDC saga and 
hence deserve special attention in this chapter. The main questions to be 
considered are: how to explain the original French and Dutch positions on EDC, 
as well as their subsequent U-turns? How do we relate the European policies of 
the two countries to simultaneous developments in the Atlantic framework of 
NATO? And (in the concluding remarks) what are the EDC’s lessons for today’s 
attempts at European cooperation in security and defence matters? 
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The Pleven Plan for a European Army, 1950-1952 
The European Defence Community, or European 'army' as it was initially called, 
concerned a French initiative to make German rearmament acceptable within 
the framework of an integrated European military force. Paris had become 
alarmed following an American proposal aimed at rearming the Germans in the 
context of NATO. The US initiative was prompted by the outbreak of the Korean 
War in the early summer of 1950, Washington fearing the emergence of similar 
calamities in central Europe, in the form of a Soviet-led invasion of West 
Germany. The French government was in an awkward predicament: it had to 
worry about the communist threat, but the simultaneous US-induced re-
emergence of neighbour and long-time enemy Germany was perceived as a 
much more imminent and direct danger. Paris apprehended an independent 
development of the German army, without adequate control and supervision 
from the allies. It was only five years after the Second World War, and neither 
government nor public were convinced of a total disappearance of the German 
danger.  
To cope with this predicament, the French government sought to apply the 
successful Schuman plan concept (launched in May 1950 to organise the 
production and distribution of coal and steel in Western Europe) to military 
matters. A proposal was drafted to supranationalise the management of 
European defence, by merging national - including German - army units into a 
unified European army. Regarding the required member states’ commitment 
this was a considerable step further than the Western Union (founded by the 
Brussels Treaty in 1948) and NATO, both purely intergovernmental institutions 
with no obligations concerning delegation of national sovereignty.  
The initial reactions to the Pleven plan (named after the French prime 
minister of the time) were distinctly negative. The US government preferred its 
own scheme for German rearmament within NATO. The United Kingdom, for 
reasons of principle, disliked supranational ‘adventures’, as demonstrated some 
months earlier by the government’s negative response to the Schuman plan. 
Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin also felt that Britain could “not afford to allow the 
European federal concept to gain a foothold within NATO and thus weaken 
instead of strengthening the ties between the countries on the two sides of the 
Atlantic” (Trachtenberg 1999, 117). The Germans were appalled that the French 
proposal heavily discriminated against them; some restrictions imposed on the 
German army did not apply to France or the other participants. The Netherlands 
anticipated that the Pleven plan would needlessly delay German rearmament. 
The Netherlands strove for a ‘forward defence’ on the river Elbe in Germany to 
repel a possible Red Army attack away from the home country’s territory. The 
ready deployment of German soldiers was an absolute condition for 
implementing such a defence strategy, and NATO was seen as the appropriate 
instrument to achieve this. And military authorities Europe-wide felt that the 
proposed method of integrating national army units in European divisions was 
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grossly impracticable and would never work on the battlefield, given existing 
differences in language, culture, habits, etcetera (Fursdon 1980, 92). 
Faced with so much opposition, the Pleven plan was bound to fail. Even the 
French military were against, preferring the NATO solution for German 
rearmament instead (see Guillen 1983, 3-33; Vial 2000, 135-158). Bearing in 
mind such widespread reticence, it is no small wonder that the European army 
plan soon did get a firm place on the international agenda and indeed would 
dominate the discussions in the European capitals and in Washington for the 
next four years.  
The principal reason was that during the first half of 1951 the US 
administration changed its position on the European army. From initial 
opponents, President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
converted themselves into supporters of the French plan, for the following 
reasons. 
Firstly, ever since the Second World War, Washington had been looking for 
ways to promote peaceful integration on the European continent. To her 
disappointment the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation 
(predecessor of the OECD) – created for the distribution of Marshall aid – had 
not succeeded in achieving a supranational leap. In the summer of 1950, the 
Americans hailed the Schuman plan as – finally – a step in the right direction. 
The Pleven plan was now seen as the next stage in a process that would – 
hopefully and preferably, as far as the Truman government was concerned – 
lead to some sort of united states of Europe on a federal basis (Dwan 2000, 69; 
Schwartz 1991, 222-225). 
Secondly, after the Second World War the USA had maintained a 
substantial number of troops in West Germany and this number was even 
expected to increase after the start of the Korean War. The question raised in 
Washington was for how long such a large-scale deployment overseas would 
be sustainable, both in domestic-political and financial terms. As a matter of 
fact, the secret hope was that the European army would lead, in the short run, 
to a fairer method of burden-sharing and provide, in the longer run, an 
opportunity to bring American soldiers back home (Cresswell 2000, 222).  
Thirdly, the French government refused to accept any other solution than its 
own European army plan and Washington realised that French collaboration 
was indispensable for a credible build-up of post-war continental defence, in the 
context of a politically marginalised Germany and a reluctant Britain. French 
diplomacy, guided by the Monnet lobby in Washington (Harryvan and Van der 
Harst 2008, 152-153), emphasised that the Pleven plan would help to tackle 
several problems simultaneously: it would bring about German rearmament, 
develop European integration, increase the chances of a responsible French 
policy on the continent and, last but not least, contain German power 
aspirations. 
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The American change of mind in the summer of 1951 proved decisive. 
From then on, the NATO solution for German rearmament was put on ice and 
the European army plan was the only concept left on the discussion table. The 
same six countries involved in the Schuman plan deliberations also convened 
for negotiating the Pleven proposal, at a conference held in Paris. For some of 
them, this was hard to accept. The Netherlands, for one, joined the 
negotiations, but reluctantly and under overt US diplomatic pressure. In 
February 1951, at the start of the discussions, The Hague sent only observers 
to the conference and it was not before the autumn of the same year that it 
upgraded the delegation in Paris to the status of full participant (Van der Harst 
1990, 143-147). Britain refused to become involved at all, due to their 
fundamental dislike of supranationalism, especially in highly sensitive areas as 
security and defence (Ruane 2000, 30). 
On the other side, and contrary to British and Dutch scepticism, Germany 
increasingly came to embrace the French initiative. During the negotiations 
some of the most discriminating elements had been mitigated or even 
eliminated. France made concessions on important dossiers and Germany 
gradually obtained the position of - almost - equal partner in the army 
discussions (Gauzy 2000, 39) Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was known 
for his support of European integration (Westbindung) and encouraged his 
national delegation to adopt a constructive approach at the conference. Italy’s 
interest in military integration became more and more linked to its striving for a 
federal-political organisation of Europe. This was a long-held preference by 
Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, who advocated the creation of a 
European Political Community, functioning as a political ‘roof’ for ECSC and 
EDC (Varsori 2000, 182). 
Curiously enough, the most reticent country was the one generally reputed 
for its federalist inclinations, namely the Netherlands.7 The Drees government 
was strongly in favour of economic and commercial integration on the European 
continent, but highly sceptical as far as political and military issues were 
concerned, preferring the valued Atlantic link with the United States instead. 
Dutch opposition to the European army failed to have the desired impact. In the 
first half of 1952, with the French and Germans in charge, and with a supportive 
America, European defence integration slowly but surely became a reality. In 
May 1952 the six countries involved proceeded to signing the EDC treaty.  
 
 
French and Dutch U-turns, 1952-1954 
The Treaty had been signed, but the real battle, the ratification procedure in the 
national parliaments, was yet to begin. As indicated in the introduction, the 
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French parliament - following protracted negotiations and endless shilly-
shallying – decided to reject the treaty in August 1954. This meant effectively 
the end of the EDC, given the widely shared conviction that a continental 
defence community would not be workable without French participation.  
How could this U-turn be explained? In the rich amount of literature on the 
EDC, many arguments have been provided for clarifying the French decision 
(see, i.a., Lerner and Aron 1957, Fursdon 1980, Militärgeschichtliches 
Forschungsamt 1985, Dumoulin 2000, Ruane 2000). One explanation is that 
Paris felt uncomfortable about London’s stubborn refusal to enter the EDC, 
because in case of a reviving German danger French territory would be 
exposed directly and unilaterally, without British support on hand (e.g. Young 
1998, 74, 76). A similar argument was put forward by Feije Spits, as referred to 
in the introduction. The main problem with this line of reasoning is that in reality 
the French never showed any sign of enthusiasm about Britain’s membership. 
With the British involved, France would lose the privilege of steering the 
Community and moulding it according to its own preferences. Ruane (2000, 
178) rightly observes that “even if the British had signed up to the EDC, there 
was no certainty that French ratification would have followed”. Another less 
convincing explanation is the one that holds that in 1953 the Cold War had 
entered a period of relaxation (‘thaw’) after the death of Joseph Stalin and the 
end of the Korean War, and that as a result, German rearmament was no 
longer an urgent requirement. In other words, the original motive for creating the 
EDC - the mobilisation of German manpower to counter the military threat from 
the East - had become obsolete. If this is true, how could we explain that the 
Federal Republic did become rearmed, and even very quickly, after the defeat 
of the EDC treaty in August 1954? In the immediate aftermath the country 
entered both WEU (successor to the Western Union of 1948) and NATO, 
followed by a rapid remobilisation of the Bundeswehr, all of which were signs of 
considerable urgency.  
Hence, we should look at other and probably more plausible explanations, 
mostly concerning domestic developments in France. Firstly, there was the 
advance of Gaullism in French national politics. Until late 1952, the pro-
European Mouvement Républicain Populaire (the Christian-democratic party of 
Schuman and Pleven) still played a leading role in the government, but this 
changed abruptly after the elections of late 1952 when the Gaullist and 
eurosceptic RPF (Rassemblement du Peuple Français) gained a substantial 
part of the popular vote at the expense of the MRP. The incoming Mayer 
government would depend on Gaullist support for its political survival. From 
then on, the momentum in the domestic debate on Europe worked against the 
integrationists and in favour of (Gaullist and other) anti-integrationists. 
Simultaneously, the standing and influence of Jean Monnet – the spiritual father 
of the Schuman plan and Pleven plan – eroded. By early 1953 Monnet had 
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become, as Alan Milward once phrased it, “politically speaking a dead person”.8 
Moreover, at the same time France was confronted with new proposals, such as 
the European Political Community (De Gasperi’s brainchild) and the Beyen 
plan, which were seen as potentially harmful for the country’s position in 
Europe. The latter plan, named after Dutch Foreign Minister Jan-Willem Beyen, 
was meant as a blueprint for extending trade liberalisation and creating a 
customs union among the Six, and as such became an integral part of the 
discussions on EDC and EPC. France, fearing the lack of competitiveness of its 
business sector, looked askance at any initiative aimed at opening the domestic 
market (Vernant 1957, 112-113). The contrast between German economic 
strength and French stagnation “reduced French readiness to proceed further 
with the Six-Power organisation of little Europe”, as was asserted by the British 
Foreign Office (Ruane 2000, 177-178)..Secondly, the French showed increasing 
reluctance to sacrifice national sovereignty for the sake of keeping the Germans 
in check. We already referred to the results Adenauer booked in lifting 
discriminatory measures against Germany and securing a largely equal position 
for the German army. This provoked uncomfortable feelings in France: given 
the gradual disappearance of provisions favouring France, the remedy – a 
supranational European defence mechanism – became worse than the disease 
– German rearmament. For the Gaullist-dependent governments the delegation 
of power from the national level to Europe was unacceptable, especially so 
where the position of the venerable French army institution was at stake. 
Obviously, coal and steel were less sensitive than military matters, the latter 
touching the core of the nation’s independence and pride (Large 1993, 394). 
France also worried that the leeway for military operations outside Europe (in 
Africa and Asia) would be curtailed by obligations evolving from EDC 
membership. In case French forces were needed overseas, German manpower 
could easily dominate the European army, at least in quantitative terms.  
Thirdly, a lesser known argument concerned French fears of allowing fellow 
Europeans to have control over the national programme for nuclear research. At 
that time French scientists were conducting advanced studies on developing a 
national nuclear force (both for civil and military use) and the early 1950s 
witnessed considerable progress in this area. The EDC treaty had provided for 
a powerful role by the central Board of Commissioners (a supranational 
institution comparable to the ECSC’s High Authority) in the spheres of scientific 
research and development. Paris apprehended that the Board’s activities might 
very well interfere with the nation’s nuclear programme. In other words, the 
Board’s substantial authority in controlling research activities in the member 
states was in striking contrast with French unilateral ambitions in the nuclear 
domain (Goldschmidt 1967, Scheinman 1965).  
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For all these reasons, the EDC became increasingly unacceptable for both 
the French government and parliament. On 30 August 1954, the latter decided 
to get rid of the treaty. By then, France had manoeuvred itself in a completely 
isolated position. The parliaments of the three Benelux countries and the 
German Bundestag already had taken the decision to ratify the treaty, whereas 
Italy was about to ratify (Varsori, 2000, 183). 
How was it possible that the Netherlands, originally the most reluctant 
participant, became the first of the Six to approve the EDC treaty (in January 
1954)? Only to a small extent, this had to do with a more positive EDC 
approach by the Dutch government. The greater part of the Cabinet still 
considered the European army an unattractive phenomenon, an instrument to 
delay German rearmament. They kept prioritising the Atlantic solution for 
rearming the Federal Republic. So, how can we explain the Dutch change of 
mind? 
Firstly, even though the majority of Cabinet members remained sceptical, 
there was one important exception. The pro-European Jan-Willem Beyen had 
been appointed Foreign Minister in September 1952. He came to see the EDC 
as a useful tool in the development of Europe, especially if combined with 
integration in economic matters.9 Beyen strove for a continental customs union 
and sought to further this aim by promoting EDC and EPC. Within the EPC 
framework Beyen had launched his own plan for regional trade liberalisation 
and he hoped that ratification of EDC and EPC would boost his own 
economically oriented goals. Hence, Beyen was by far the most disappointed 
Cabinet member when the EDC treaty was rejected in August 1954. He had to 
wait until the Messina conference of 1955 before his liberal trade concept was 
picked up again - in fact, it would prove, successfully. 
Secondly, although his cabinet colleagues supported Beyen in his striving 
for trade liberalisation, they were by no means convinced of the need of 
combining this with having an EDC.10 Their pushing for a quick ratification 
procedure in the national parliament was done predominantly out of pragmatic, 
if not to say: opportunistic, considerations. The Hague noticed that from early 
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1953 – after the coming to power of the Mayer government in France – Paris 
was looking for ways to rid itself of the treaty. Part of the Dutch policy 
establishment sensed that from that moment on the EDC was virtually speaking 
‘dead’. Seen from that perspective it was not harmful at all to speed up 
ratification at home, which, as a concomitant advantage, helped to portray the 
Netherlands as a reliable partner in the international arena. Connected to this 
was the outspoken US support for ratification. Acheson’s successor John Foster 
Dulles had made clear that he would reward a cooperative stance by the 
European partners, and punish non-compliance. The continued need of US 
support - in the form of army equipment and offshore orders - for the country’s 
defence build-up and economic reconstruction provided the Dutch government 
with an extra motive to welcome a positive decision on EDC by the national 
parliament. Another potential benefit was that it would help to keep the Beyen 
plan on the negotiating table (Weenink 2005, 338-341). But, as said before, 
when the French Assemblée took its ultimate decision to bury the EDC there 
was hardly any regret in the country. Neither did The Hague show overt signs of 
panic or nervousness about the vacuum the aborted EDC left behind. Unlike the 
British government, which showed serious concern about the possibility of an 
American retreat from Europe (Ruane 2000, 175), the Dutch never really 
believed that Dulles would enforce his threat of agonising reappraisal upon the 
continent (Van der Harst 2003, 304).  
At the end of the day, after four years of delay and confusion, the NATO 
solution for German rearmament carried the day, eventually with French 
support. At about the same time Europe underwent a far-reaching re-launch at 
the conference of Messina, where the Beyen plan (in a new version) was 
brought back to the negotiating table and, as would turn out later, with 




In the early 1950s, attempts at High Politics integration via the EDC utterly 
failed. In retrospect, this was no surprise because ever since, the countries of 
Western Europe have been reluctant to throw in their lot together in the 
sensitive areas of security and defence policies. The problems nowadays 
connected to a strengthening of CFSP and ESDP are telling examples. These 
issues, touching the core of the nation state and national independence, 
hamper the willingness to make decisions on the basis of intergovernmental – 
let alone, supranational – means and methods. In that respect, the EDC was an 
instructive experiment, because the usual and traditional problems surrounding 
defence integration manifested themselves clearly during the early 1950s.  
The EDC saga serves as a classic case of the deep-ridden Franco-Dutch 
controversy in the areas of defence of security. France liked the idea of having 
an EDC for exactly the reasons why the Netherlands disliked it. Paris was 
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looking for ways to establish a leadership’s position on the European continent 
and to reduce the American hegemony over European political affairs. In the 
longer run - as the French anticipated - the EDC could take over the main 
responsibilities of NATO. For the Dutch government of the time, this was a 
horror scenario. To their conviction, the Atlantic link with the United States was 
sacrosanct: the Netherlands preferred the hegemony of a geographically 
remote superpower to what was perceived as a less credible leadership and 
more immediate domination by France, Germany, Britain, or any combination of 
them, in a militarily autonomous Europe. The Dutch government therefore 
rejected the French European army proposal and changed its mind only after it 
came to realise that Paris was looking for ways to abandon the EDC. 
Eventually, the Dutch diplomatic strategy turned out to be successful: when the 
EDC treaty was rejected France received unilateral blame for the failure, while 
the Netherlands could portray itself as a reliable partner in international politics. 
Moreover, in line with Dutch preferences, German rearmament was achieved 
through NATO, rather than the unloved European alternative.  
To a large extent, the Franco-Dutch controversy is still present today, 
France being the main champion of an autonomous European defence 
structure (although at times president Sarkozy - more than his predecessors - 
shows affection for NATO) and the Netherlands acting as the spokesman of 
Atlantic relations. Whenever the occasion arises, the Atlantic reflex still 
pervades Dutch policy-making, as shows the Air Force’s choice for the Joint 
Strike Fighter (as the successor of the F-16) and the support for NATO-guided 
peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan. At the same time, circumstances 
have changed dramatically since 1990. The United States has withdrawn the 
greater part of its forces from the European continent and reoriented its foreign 
policies to the Pacific and other parts of the world. After the Cold War, Europe is 
no longer a strategic priority in American security policy and NATO has 
apparent difficulty to find a new and proper role for itself. As a consequence, 
even the staunch Atlantic ally the Netherlands has been forced to adapt its 
traditionally reticent position on European security, especially after the British-
French agreement at St. Malo in December 1998. Shortly afterwards, the 
Atlantic primacy was seriously put in question by the self-willed international 
policies of the American president George Bush jr., leading to a deterioration of 
US-Dutch/European relations.  
However, the decisive turn to a new European defence orientation has not 
really occurred, so far. Despite the launching of ESDP (after the treaty of Lisbon 
called CSDP), some small EU-led peace-keeping operations on the Balkans 
and elsewhere and the undeniable intensification of contacts between military 
experts at the European level, a development into the direction of a European 
army force has failed to materialize. At the Helsinki summit of 1999, the EU 
leaders agreed on the deployment of a rapid reaction unit of 50,000 to 60,000 
men, to be sent within sixty days to theatres all around the world. Today, ten 
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years later, the EU member states have not come any further than the creation 
of small battle groups of 1,500 men and women each. The EU, described by 
some as the “good cop by default” (Van Staden 2010), relies more on soft than 
on hard power. As a consequence, the European military dependence on the 
US has not really decreased in the last two decades. For most important military 
matters, NATO is still the only game in town.  
Yet, it would be unwise to think that the Atlantic priority in Dutch defence 
policy has remained untouched. The US no longer considers NATO an absolute 
precondition for maintaining their global position. At the same time, the political-
military role of the Netherlands – like many other European countries – is 
affected by the continuing post-Cold War tendency to economise on national 
defence expenditure. In the longer run, this could lead to a (further) 
marginalization of the Dutch and European position internationally, at least in 
the view of the US military. 
There may be a way out of this cul-de-sac. In the 1980s, Peter Volten 
published a booklet on, what he saw as, the necessity of taakspecialisatie (task 
specialisation) in the defence organisation of the Netherlands. He argued that 
the future international presence of the Netherlands in NATO could only be 
safeguarded by focusing on certain key sectors of domestic defence, at the 
expense of other, less productive or urgent tasks. Volten pleaded in particular 
for intensifying army cooperation with Belgium (or Germany), while 
simultaneously economising on fighter planes and frigates (Volten 1987, 1988). 
Although taakspecialisatie is a controversial issue and in practice hard to 
realise, it could be challenging sense to translate some of Volten’s notions – 
ventilated during the Cold War – to what is happening in the post-Cold War 
Europe of today. In a situation of smaller defence budgets, the best way to 
guarantee a future role for the EU would be by combining and streamlining the 
military efforts of the member states through a far reaching process of 
taakspecialisatie. In such a division of tasks, some countries would have to 
focus on the modernisation of their army, others on naval and/or air force 
duties, while sacrificing superfluous activities. It would produce increasing 
efficiency, more ‘bang for the buck’, or as Volten (1987) himself phrased it: 
“voor hetzelfde geld meer defensie” (“more defence for the same amount of 
money”). Task specialisation forces European countries to work closer together 
and become dependent on each other’s input and commitment. The 
(unintended) by-product of such a development of creeping integration could be 
a supranationalization of the member states’ security and defence policies. After 
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In March 1986, the Groningen Institute for Peace Research held a symposium, 
titled ‘The Future of the Peace Movement’. The feeling was that the church-
based peace movement’s NATO-critical, anti-cruise missile campaign of the late 
1970s and early 1980s had failed politically. At the symposium, Peter Volten, 
top-advisor of the Dutch Ministry of Defence, argued that the peace movement, 
influential as it had been nationally and internationally, could still continue to 
play an important role. However, Volten explained, the peace movement’s 
major contribution to politics is to function as an intellectual hornet, rather than 
to operate as a mass movement or quasi-political party. Quantity should give 
way to quality (see Tromp 1988, 195-197). 
Has the peace movement since acted on Volten’s advice? This essay offers 
a short analysis of the post-Cold War attitude towards NATO of the leading 
Dutch peace organizations Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (IKV) and Pax Christi, or 
the single organization IKV Pax Christi from 2007. Thus, it will critically 
comment on two cases: first, the position of IKV Pax Christi regarding the 1999 
NATO intervention in Kosovo; second, IKV Pax Christi’s attitude towards the 
recent international discussion about the future of nuclear weapons, particularly 
NATO’s role in it. 
Church-based organizations such as IKV and Pax Christi – to be called 
mostly IKV Pax Christi below – have consistently intended to offer authoritative 
guidance to political choice. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to understand 
Volten’s challenge, with its emphasis on qualitative intellectual improvement, as 
one of meeting standards of political ethics (cf. also IKV/Pax Christi 2000, 18; 
Van Den Berg 2006, 155-161). ‘Political ethics’ entails empirical-ethical 
reflection on decision-makers’ choices, assuming that politics, domestic and 
international, is a domain of moral choice, not of pure necessity (Hoffmann 
1999). Its ‘standards’ will be taken here to include the adequate use of two 
points of attention: ‘(philosophical or theological) ethics’ and ‘policy’. ‘Ethics’ 
aims to offer principal moral guidelines for action; ‘policy’ looks to what is 
desirable within the limits of what is possible. Taken together, these attention 
points express the insight that an adequate political ethics accepts that political 
action can almost never be entirely ‘good’ and that using ‘evil’ means may be 
justified at times (cf. Amstutz 2008; Walzer 1973). The use of ‘ethics’ may be 
called adequate if a position taken is based on clear and precise moral 
guidelines, which, moreover, are politically relevant by an employment of 
empirically based consequentialist arguments for the establishment of the 
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goodness and badness of policy forms. The use of ‘policy’ may be called 
adequate if a position taken rests on a sound empirical-political analysis of 
feasibilities and infeasibilities and good and bad action consequences, whereby 
serious attention is paid to power relationships and economic, historical, and 
cultural realities (Gustafson 1988; Krueger 1988). Thus, IKV Pax Christi’s 
attitudes in the two selected cases will be evaluated by both these standards. 
 
 
IKV Pax Christi and NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo 
During the 1990s, IKV Pax Christi began to reflect upon the theory and practice 
of ‘humanitarian intervention’. It came to believe that, whereas humanitarian 
intervention is not necessarily the means to end a conflict, it should at least be 
conducted in order to achieve the short-term goal of protecting citizens and 
creating safe havens. Designing good solutions for conflicts is important, yet a 
longer-term affair: ‘First things first!’ In January 1999, IKV Pax Christi argued for 
a strong international military presence in Kosovo in order to protect the 
Albanian citizens. In the spring of that year, it spoke out its disapproval of the 
way NATO operated, pleading, unsuccessfully, for ground troops instead of air 
bombardments (Van Den Berg 2006, 54-56, 63). 
Important here is the IKV Pax Christi report Humanitaire interventie 
(Humanitarian intervention; 2000, especially 3-20, 45-47). Its guiding idea is that 
in the post-Cold War context the justification of armed forces lies in 
humanitarian intervention, rather than in traditional national defence. The UN 
involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1992, the NATO interference there 
since late 1995 (UN mandated), and the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo (not 
UN mandated) suggest a development in which not only competition and power 
but also justice and law – notably human rights protection in foreign countries – 
motivate political and military action. Hence the actuality of using military means 
‘for the sake of justice’. Accordingly, the Netherlands must clarify why its 
defence organization should integrally be in service of the broader international 
community, and why Dutch military women and men, together with colleagues 
from other countries, should be willing to risk their own lives in conflict areas. 
Such questions require the development of just war criteria that offer normative 
guidance to military intervention for humanitarian goals, that is, for creating 
‘justice’, ‘peace’, and ‘participation’. The report then suggests that the Dutch 
defence organization should be grounded in: security partnerships (NATO, but 
also EU and pan-European); building of mutual trust between peoples; 
strengthening of pan-European security structures; replacing power 
relationships by law relationships; accepting co-responsibility in the international 
community’s military performance; contributing to reconciliation and civil society 
building in conflict areas; supplying humanitarian aid. The backing criteria are to 
be derived from an ‘actualized’ religious view of the use of violence: just cause 
(against aggression or gross basic human rights violations); right intention; 
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urgent necessity; lawful authority (principally the UN Security Council, or 
mandated regional arrangements: OSCE, OAU, OAS, etc.); truth; 
comprehensiveness (use of armed forces as part of a broader diplomatic, 
economic, social, and cultural framework); last resort; reasonable hope of 
success; proportionality; discrimination. The use of violence, also for the sake of 
justice, should be judged according to such just war criteria, as a juridical 
legitimization of humanitarian intervention is no sufficient condition for its 
political-ethical legitimization. Accepting to risk one’s own soldiers’ lives for 
halting genocide and protecting civilians will demand the utmost of political 
creativity and responsibility – including the afterwards justification of decisions 
taken – as well as care and appreciation regarding the military concerned and 
their home base. In humanitarian intervention, the role of the UN (competent 
authority) as mandate giver (but not necessarily executor) remains important 
and most desirable. Even if the UN is internally divided by countries’ political 
self-interests and thereby paralysed, there should still be widespread 
consensus through international, regional committees. Participating countries 
should avoid following their own national agenda, the report insists. 
IKV’s general secretary and undisputed peace movement leader Mient Jan 
Faber, who condemned the pacifistic (and anti-NATO) sentiments prevailing in 
the Dutch churches at the time, was supportive yet critical of NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo (Faber 1999; cf. 2004; IKV/Pax Christi 2000, 40-42). In 
his view, indeed, the justification of armed forces was to be found in 
humanitarian intervention: the ‘global village’ needs armed forces capable of 
conducting interventions in situations where massive violations of human rights 
occur. In 1998 and early 1999, Kosovo was ethnically cleansed by Yugoslavian 
President Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. NATO tried to stop this cleansing by 
starting an air campaign against Yugoslavia. However, according to Faber, 
NATO should not have declared at the outset to employ no ground troops for 
protecting the Kosovo Albanians. As bombardments cannot make the 
difference, NATO’s announcement effectively ruled out a humanitarian 
intervention. Politicians and generals should have stepped over their fear of 
‘body bags’ and accept that soldiers could get killed. Worse still, Faber held, 
NATO’s air actions led exactly to what should have been avoided: ethnic 
cleansing of the Kosovo Albanians as Milosevic’s response. True, there were no 
victims on NATO’s side, and the air actions succeeded in expelling Milosevic 
from Kosovo and offering a home to the Albanian population. However, NATO 
did not pay any attention to protective measures for the civilian population, and 
its air actions were unjustly presented as a successful and legitimate form of 
humanitarian intervention. Whereas protecting people in distress should self-
evidently take place where they find themselves – on the ground – NATO never 
seriously considered the use of ground troops. NATO saw ground troops as 
ineffective and dangerous, and, especially in the United States, as without 
political support. NATO feared an all-out Balkan war and a breach with Russia. 
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It also expected many victims, on both NATO’s and Kosovar sides. And it felt 
that speculations about the use of ground troops could have undermined the 
trust in the air campaign and would take too much preparation time. However, 
Faber objected, NATO did not really ask whether ground operations could have 
stopped the ethnic cleansing and could have offered protection to the citizens. 
Also, it did not examine the possibility of aimed ground operations with the 




IKV Pax Christi, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons 
Church-based organizations such as IKV and Pax Christi have always had a 
deep aversion against nuclear weapons. In their view, nuclear weapons are 
principally immoral, as they cannot be used discriminatory and proportionally. 
Their answer to the question of how to deal with a situation so immoral is: try to 
get rid of it. Some nuanced differences, however, do exist. Whereas Roman 
Catholic thought has emphasized conditional and temporary moral acceptance 
of nuclear weapons possession, Protestant thought has tended towards 
unconditional moral rejection. After the 1987 USA-USSR Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces agreement, which entailed that no cruise missiles had to be 
installed in the Netherlands, IKV Pax Christi remained worried about NATO’s 
continuing nuclear deterrence strategy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
(Van Den Berg 2006, 43-45). Yet IKV Pax Christi has maintained that a nuclear 
weapon-free world is possible as well as desirable, and that NATO has a key 
role to play in this regard. 
Of key interest is the recent IKV Pax Christi report Een kernwapenvrije 
wereld (A world free of nuclear weapons, 2009, especially 19-43). Many things 
have changed since the 1980s, the report states, but not the principal, moral 
rejection of nuclear weapons: it stays ‘NO!’ More broadly, it bases its plea for 
total banishment on the following arguments: (1) moral and/or religious grounds: 
threatening with and employing nuclear weapons is a morally unacceptable 
violation of the right to live without fear, and actually using them is a gross 
infringement of creation and the right to life; (2) juridical grounds: possessing 
and using nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the spirit of the 1968 Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed by nearly all the world’s states, and also with 
the principles of humanitarian war law; and (3) political and military 
considerations: the threat of ‘mutually assured destruction’ has lost its meaning 
since the end of the Cold War: the logic of nuclear deterrence does hardly 
anything to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the risk of 
further proliferation of nuclear weapons towards state and non-state actors 
(terrorists) has only grown. Therefore, total nuclear disarmament is called for 
within a foreseeable period and in a careful, transparent, verifiable procedure. 
Also because of U.S. President Barack Obama’s positive stance towards 
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nuclear disarmament, the time is ripe for real change. The report, then, is 
particularly concerned with making a case for (3). 
The report surveys and rejects major arguments against abolition. First, 
there is the view of the nuclear weapon as ‘just another weapon’ that could be 
used to win a battle and as a fighting weapon. This view is seen as factually 
incorrect and morally condemnable: nuclear weapons have a much larger, more 
unpredictable, and more destructive impact than other weapons. Also, they 
have proven to be practically unusable, precisely because of their enormously 
dangerous effects. Second, there is the argument of nuclear weapons as 
deterrent – the most common view, also within NATO, which, logically, has 
refused to deliver a ‘no-first-use’ declaration, as that would undermine its 
deterrence strategy. Whereas after the Cold War NATO briefly spoke of 
‘weapons of last resort’, it now prefers to see nuclear weapons as an ‘insurance 
policy’ against an uncertain future, thereby allowing for far-reaching reduction 
but excluding wholesale abolition. This view is regarded as dangerous for a 
post-Cold War world facing an increasing number of potential nuclear enemies 
and chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists. Third, 
there is the view of the nuclear weapon as weapon of terror. The backing idea is 
that using it may demoralise and demote the population of an enemy state, so 
the enemy can be defeated faster – typically the reasoning of contemporary 
non-state terrorists. The problem here, the report claims, is that terrorists have 
more chance to acquire nuclear weapons (in politically weak nuclear states 
such as Pakistan); and, if they succeed in doing so, they will not be as reluctant 
as states in actually using them. Fourth, there is the view of the nuclear weapon 
as political symbol. Especially the no longer great powers Great Britain and 
France derive status from nuclear weapons possession. Here the problem is felt 
to be that the strive for power of non-nuclear states through nuclear weapons 
possession will only become stronger if established nuclear states refuse to 
give up their nuclear arsenal or decrease it drastically. The report concludes 
that more and more policy-makers have come to doubt the most popular 
(NATO) argument of deterrence, thinking that the chance is small that under 
current circumstances deterrence will function as a step towards progressive 
disarmament. All quarters point out the growing danger that they will be used. 
The call to abolish nuclear weapons is becoming louder. 
Aiming at universal NPT compliance, and believing that only international 
cooperation in striving equally for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament 
may lead to the removal of nuclear weapons, the report applauds the Middle 
Powers Initiative that advocates: drastic and verifiable reduction of the number 
of nuclear weapons, especially by the United States and Russia (decrease of 90 
percent in these countries is a prerequisite for a truly positive development); 
immediate cancelling of the ‘hair-trigger alert’ (the ability of the United States 
and Russia to launch, respectively, 1,600 and 1,000 nuclear warheads within a 
few minutes); starting negotiations on a treaty forbidding production of fissile 
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materials intended for explosions; implementing the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty; regulating the production of nuclear fuels and the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy; strengthening negative security assurances and introducing 
a no first use declaration (if all nuclear states signed such a declaration, 
following China’s lead, the door to abolition of nuclear weapons would be open); 
and strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, the 
report opts for nuclear weapon-free zones in: the Middle East (more than ever 
in the security interest of Israel); Africa, Asia, and Europe.11 Such a European 
zone demands that: NATO ends any role for nuclear weapons in its security 
strategy; the U.S. view that the Americans have the right to supply NATO allies 
with nuclear weapons is rejected as legally unsound; and U.S. nuclear weapons 
are removed from Europe, as these have lost their military significance with the 
end of the Cold War and could technically be put into operation from the United 
States, and the threat from the Middle East is too vague and indirect to militarily 
justify their presence. 
In its report, IKV Pax Christi acknowledges that nuclear disarmament 
requires a ‘realistic strategy’, one that contributes to a feasible change of course 
that is politically and militarily acceptable. Needed is courageous political 
leadership, particularly by the current U.S. President, to make the world nuclear 
weapon-free. A spearhead of European countries, including the Netherlands, 
can already take steps that will move nuclear weapon states, primarily the 
United States, to keep their promise to achieve a world-wide reduction and 




The first question is whether the positions taken are based on clear and 
precisely formulated moral guidelines, which also are politically relevant by a 
use of consequentialist arguments regarding the goodness and badness of 
policy forms. 
As regards the NATO and humanitarian intervention case, it should first be 
noted that IKV Pax Christi could have good reason to rely on just war thought. 
After all, the tradition of just war is long-standing and, in contrast to the pacifist 
one, commonly regarded as having guiding force for political action (Amstutz 
2008). Yet IKV Pax Christi is vague about the applicability of just war to 
humanitarian intervention. Thus, it does not clearly define the advanced key 
principles of ‘(for the sake of) justice’, ‘peace’, and ‘participation’. And while IKV 
Pax Christi plausibly demands an analysis of why, actually, Dutch military 
women and men should be willing to risk their own lives for humanitarian goals, 
it fails to offer, or even suggest, a straightforward answer itself. But it is anything 
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 The Middle Powers Initiative is a coalition of eight non-governmental organizations that 
by putting pressure on ‘middle power’ governments attempts to encourage nuclear 
weapon states to disarm. 
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but self-evident why soldiers should be ready to die for purposes with which, in 
contrast to national self-defence, they can hardly identify, even if they somehow 
voluntarily choose to pursue an army career (cf. Achterhuis 1999, 54-56). Next, 
it is unclear how NATO could even in principle have conducted a humanitarian 
intervention in Kosovo, if the competent authority criterion demands a UN 
mandate or at least some regional consensus (within the OSCE). Actually, it is 
unclear why a UN mandate should be emphasized so much, or even at all. 
Indeed, ethically, it is unclear why legal notions are important, and why the UN 
is to be seen as a competent authority if the Security Council is in fact a political 
body and an internally divided one at that (cf. Walzer 1999). Thus, it seems 
incoherent of IKV Pax Christi to criticize the way NATO operated in Kosovo if 
one does not supply an ethical defence of the use of ground troops oneself and 
is at best vague about NATO as somehow a competent authority. 
Concerning the NATO and nuclear weapons case, while IKV Pax Christi 
seems consistently and sufficiently clear about its condemnation of nuclear 
weapons and NATO’s possession of them, it is vague about the political 
relevance of this principled rejection. No systematic ethical analysis is provided 
about potentially good (say, lesser wars or global stability) as well as bad 
consequences of nuclear weapons possession or proliferation. IKV Pax Christi 
simplistically assumes that stating principal moral or religious objections to 
nuclear weapons is sufficient for an ethics relevant to a politics of nuclear 
weapons. One may ask why people, states, and NATO, who believe that 
nuclear weapons possession is bad yet morally justified in view of the on 
balance positive consequences (‘lesser evil’) fail ethically and even 
theologically. IKV Pax Christi tends towards dogmatism: nuclear weapons 
should be abolished, also by NATO, whatever the consequences. 
Both positions taken do not rest upon ethically adequate foundations. In 




The second question is whether the attitudes rest upon a sound empirical-
political analysis of feasibilities and infeasibilities, and of good and bad action 
consequences, whereby serious examination is conducted of power 
relationships and economic, historical, and cultural realities. 
Concerning the NATO and humanitarian intervention case, the IKV Pax 
Christi policy analysis fails for at least two reasons. First, it includes no evidence 
or argument in favour of the feasibility of a ground war. It is not shown that it is 
somehow realistic, and particularly in the Kosovo case, to expect countries’ 
readiness to sacrifice their soldiers’ lives out of solidarity with victims of 
oppression if there is no direct national self-interest involved. Indeed, the 
organization (Faber) itself observed a lack of domestic support in the major 
NATO ally, the United States, in the Kosovo intervention. Second, no evidence 
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or argument is provided for the use of ground troops as having a reasonable 
hope of success in the Kosovo case, without (also) having certain unexpected, 
undesirable consequences. Again, the organization (Faber) itself pointed to the 
possibility of conflict escalation resulting from the employment of ground troops. 
Thus, IKV Pax Christi’s advocacy of NATO ground troops amounts to little more 
than wishful thinking. 
As regards the NATO and nuclear weapons case, here, too, the analysis 
provided fails because of at least two defects. First, in heavily depending on 
juridical as well as principled moral arguments, IKV Pax Christi provides no 
systematic and historical examination of power relationships in international 
relations, particularly of why states possess, or want to possess, nuclear 
weapons in the first place. It is not made plausible that a world, or even a 
Europe, free of nuclear weapons is now suddenly feasible, having long been 
virtually impossible. Indeed, several observations and arguments to the 
contrary, ones that are not obviously weak, are not considered (De Wijk 2009). 
Thus, countries such as Israel, Pakistan, and India (no NPT parties) feel 
threatened in their existence without nuclear weapons, and will not abandon 
these if there will be no equal security guarantees – which are absent. And 
when other countries want to keep nuclear weapons, America and Russia will 
want to keep some behind as well. Moreover, conflicts in the Middle East 
strongly suggest that the concept of deterrence is not dead. During the First 
Gulf War in the early 1990s, Israel threatened with nuclear retaliation if Saddam 
Hussein would harass that country with chemical, biological or nuclear 
weapons; America did the same. For Iran, a potential nuclear confrontation with 
Israel is now an important reason for becoming a nuclear power itself. More 
generally, that deterrence is no longer valid is only partially true for the United 
States/NATO-Russia relationship, disputable with regard to China, and false 
between Pakistan and India (so that no first use declarations may remain self-
undermining). Also, no NATO member states where American nuclear weapons 
are stored – the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Great 
Britain – really dares to ban those, if only because they do not wish to be seen 
as bad allies within NATO. The point, then, is that IKV Pax Christi makes no 
serious effort to address, let alone refute, such counter-claims, expecting the 
NPT, Obama’s anti-nuclear weapons position, and declarations by European 
countries to do most of the work. 
Second, IKV Pax Christi’s proposals, many as they are, are not 
systematically defended concerning their desirability as well as their feasibility. 
For example, there is no discussion of International Relations scholar Kenneth 
Waltz’ influential – albeit controversial – ‘more may be better’ argument about 
the spread of nuclear weapons. Waltz argues that (gradual) nuclear weapons 
spread, very hard to prevent anyway, may (continue to) promote peace and 
global stability, because these weapons are great deterrents. Certainly, the 
United States should by all means prevent acquisition of nuclear weapons or 
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materials by terrorists (as it already does somewhat by subsidizing Russia to 
enable it to partially dismantle and partially guard its nuclear weaponry), 
although even they will not be irrationally inclined to use these (see Sagan and 
Waltz 2003; for a recent update see Sagan and Waltz 2010). If Waltz is correct, 
NATO could have good reason to keep nuclear weapons.12 Thus, dogmatism, 
rather than broad and systematic analysis, typifies IKV Pax Christi’s nuclear 
weapons abolition view. 
None of the positions taken appears to be based on an adequate policy 





In the cases examined, IKV Pax Christi’s positions fall short political-ethically, 
as its analyses do not include extensive and rigorous attention to the discourses 
and demands of ‘ethics’ and ‘policy’. Indeed, moving unduly hastily from 
principled visions to policy proposals, IKV Pax Christi offers too little supporting 
analysis in between: its theological- or philosophical-ethical standards are 
insufficiently elaborated and its attention for empirical data and insights from the 
disciplines of political science and International Relations remains 
underdeveloped. References to the relevant academic literature are rather 
scarce or even absent. Unfortunately, the Dutch church-based peace 
movement’s post-Cold War views of NATO discussed in this essay do not seem 
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Chapter 9. NATO and Humanitarian Organisations: bien 






Humanitarian aid is ‘in fashion’ nowadays. Since the fundamental geopolitical 
changes of the early 1990s it is easy to understand why. Firstly, the global 
stalemate between the West and the East has disappeared abruptly. It has 
resulted in a considerably widened space for actors interested in the 
international (legal) order, amongst which goals are alleviating human suffering 
wherever it occurs in the world. Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) like the 
United Nations, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (DG 
ECHO), willing states like, until recently, The Netherlands, and a mushrooming 
number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) all have deemed it 
possible to profit from the so-called peace dividend after the Cold War (Dijkzeul 
and Herman 2009, 9). Secondly, the seemingly rising number of humanitarian 
crises and ensuing suffering has caught the attention of the ‘broad masses’ in 
the Western world. Exuberantly and explicitly broadcasted by the global media, 
public opinion has made moral appeals to their governments, IGOs and NGOs 
to act, to stop the suffering of fellow human beings. As a result, humanitarian 
aid has become trendy big business, with an estimated turnover of 9 billion 
dollars annually, and with the capacity of uplifting one’s organisational profile 
considerably (Herman 2009, 73-79). 
The military have not been quick to catch up with these developments. 
Having outgrown their Cold War usefulness the military around the (Western) 
world have tried to redefine their right of existence. None the more so than 
NATO and its members. Since the early 1990s NATO has engaged in so-called 
‘out-of-area-operations’, driven by a new interpretation of globally projected 
humane values and the dwindling importance of state sovereignty. Kosovo 
(1999) and Afghanistan (as of 2003) are the best known examples in kind 
(Minear, Van Baarda and Sommers 2000, v). The military’s window of 
opportunity has arisen due to the development of the (UN) concept of complex 
Peace Support Operations or integrated security and aid approaches in post-
conflict areas. From a one-dimensional approach before 1991 (Peace Keeping 
Operations) in which the military were to keep the peace by (passively) standing 
in between conflict-fatigue warring parties the UN and like-minded countries 
have developed the integrated approach, Peace Support Operations – in 
NATO-speak Comprehensive Approach.13 In this approach the general military 
task of up keeping a secure environment has been coupled to wider tasks such 
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 In the following, Peace Support Operations, Comprehensive Approach, Integrated 
Approach and a 3-D Approach (see below) will be used interchangeably. 
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as dispensing humanitarian aid, generating favourable conditions to sustainable 
development, helping set up the rule of law, stimulating good governance and 
winning the hearts and minds of the locals. The overall aim has been to re-
secure and fully reconstruct countries and put them on an irreversible road to 
normalcy. As a consequence, the military have come into much more frequent 
contact with NGOs that as of old fulfilled the civilian tasks of reconstruction with 
which the military now also started to meddle (Homan 2009, 262-63). 
NATO’s Comprehensive Approach thus has intensified civil-military contacts 
in (post-)conflict areas characterised by human suffering and the need for its 
alleviation. Despite apparent common goals, these contacts have increasingly 
turned into misapprehension, conflicts and turf fights. From the viewpoint of 
traditional humanitarian principles (neutrality, impartiality, humanity and 
independence) cherished by the civilian actors, questions can be raised 
whether the military by definition are partial and biased and therefore unfit to 
fulfil humanitarian roles. However, from the viewpoint of the post-1990 conflict 
situation with its fragile and failed states, with its deliberately targeting of 
civilians by rebel groups for political and economic gains and with its use of 
global terror abusing the position of the most vulnerable populations one can 
also ask whether the military are quite useful, if not essential, for contemporary 
humanitarianism in an integrated approach. Do civilian and military parties, 
united in their aim to alleviate human suffering, listen to one another or do they 
only claim to do so? Do they appreciate each other’s role or are they quite 
annoyed to find themselves in the same humanitarian arena which before 1991 
was so exclusively civilian?  
In the following sections, the development of civil-military relations in the 
humanitarian arena will be outlined after which an attempt will be made to 
assess the compatibility of the military and humanitarian-civilian interpretation of 
this relationship against the background of parties’ mandates and ‘inner beings’ 
in the present day complex crises around the world. Although impossible to 
generalise, for the purposes of this text, NATO will be used as a representative 
of the military, while the humanitarian organisations are in reality a multitude of 
various NGOs with diverse ideas on civil-military relations. Such an approach, 
however, does not do damage to the ongoing principled discussion on the 
generic relationship between civilians and the military. A few words on the 
situation in Afghanistan since 2003 will be used to highlight both the military as 
well as the civilian position. 
 
 
Dawn of a New Era: NATO’s Humanitarian Cloak 
Since the early days after the Cold War NATO has sidelined with the UN and 
like-minded member states such as The Netherlands to plead for an integrated 
approach in crisis areas and post-conflict situations. Whereas the Dutch have 
labelled their approach the 3-D approach (Diplomacy, Defence, 
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Development),14 NATO has dubbed its policy the integrated or comprehensive 
approach (AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine 2003, par. 102.1). 
Basically similar to the Dutch, NATO sees present day Peace Support 
Operations as an effort to (re)stabilise post-conflict areas through an 
amalgamated use of tools concerning security building, democratisation and 
development. As such it has been envisaged that the military would at a 
minimum facilitate reconstruction and development, but at a maximum would 
engage themselves in humanitarian-like operations such as the delivery of aid. 
Exactly because of their institutional characteristics the military would be 
capable to perform such tasks in unstable environments (Jansen 2008, 192). 
Rightly so, NATO, like other actors, has realized the changing conflict 
setting. Contemporary conflict occurs mainly inside states that are fragile, on 
the brink of collapsing or have failed already. This may be one of the reasons 
why these conflicts and their aftermaths are so much characterised by extreme 
human suffering. A properly functioning state is absent, the state monopoly on 
violence from which should result a safe environment, respect for human rights 
and a policy of development is undermined by the presence of rebel groups, 
outlaws and other groups that use violence as a self-serving tool. Interference 
on behalf of the international community in these cases cannot be a mere 
traditional (static peacekeeping) military operation. A multidimensional approach 
encompassing military, political, humanitarian and economic elements is called 
for in these circumstances. Otherwise the fragile/failed state in question is prone 
to lapse back into conflict with humanitarian agony as a result.  
On top of the realisation that NATO would be involved in a comprehensive 
approach, it soon has become apparent that the military are almost 
indispensable in every aspect of present day complex Peace Support 
Operations. Throughout the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first 
century international operations – whether in the former Yugoslavia, the Horn of 
Africa, Iraq or Afghanistan – have been characterised by increased input from 
and heightened visibility of the military in every aspect of Peace Support 
Operations. Such has been in line with the recommendations of UN-diplomat 
Lakhdar Brahimi, who in 2000 reported to the UN Security Council that, were 
future Peace Support Operations to be successful, the role of the military and 
the use of their unique asset – force – had to be greatly enhanced in all phases 
of these operations. 
Indeed, taking a closer look at the interference in the (post-)conflict areas 
mentioned above, one can see the validity of Brahimi’s recommendations. All 
missions have been characterised by international action in conflict-ridden 
countries where the situation has been neither peace nor war. The delivery of 
                                          
14
 Originally, former minister for Development Cooperation Jan Pronk already in 1993 
developed the idea of an integrated approach in his policy paper ‘Een wereld in geschil’ 
(A conflictuous world). One of his successors, Agnes van Ardenne, further developed his 
thoughts, leading up to the 3-D approach in 2005. 
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humanitarian aid and the commencement of reconstruction and redevelopment 
activities have occurred where local ill-disciplined rebel forces and criminal 
groups continuously have defied the pro forma cease fire arrangements or 
peace agreements. Gross human rights violations for political or criminal gain 
have been in abundance, resulting in massive internal displacement of the local 
population and human misery. All international actors, NATO included, thus 
have come to the realisation that in these areas of operation humanitarianism, 
reconstruction and redevelopment are linked to the permanent provision of hard 
core security (Homan 2009, 260). Moreover, long term military commitment 
would be needed if sustainable peace after armed conflict is the goal. Without 
this commitment experience has shown that countries have a fifty percent 
chance of falling back into conflict within a couple of years (Collier 2004).The 
Bosnia case has shown, for example, that NATO forces have been continuously 
and for a long period of time engaged in fulfilling task that normally come within 
the purview of civilian actors, such as public order, food distribution, 
reconstruction of houses and setting up basic medical care facilities (Zaalberg 
2006, 15). Afghanistan is another example in kind, where NATO members are 
at the core of so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that represent 
the integrated support for security, reconstruction and good governance. Military 
and civilians on the face of it closely cooperate in these PRTs for the 
improvement of the situation in one of the most unstable countries in the world 
(Homan 2009, 273).  
Increased, even intimate contact with civilian actors has thus become the 
new reality for NATO forces. As a consequence, based upon experiences in the 
1990s NATO in 2001 and in 2003 has decided to formalise this new reality in 
two policy documents: the MC 4111/1 document and the so-called Allied Joined 
Publication 9 (AJP-9 2003). In these documents the policy, procedures and 
implementation of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) have been codified to 
serve as guidelines for NATO forces engaged in comprehensive operations with 
civilian actors. 
CIMIC is the military conceptualisation of the perception of civil-military 
relations in the comprehensive approach to Peace Support Operations.15 
NATO’s definition is: “CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation, in support of 
the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national 
population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-
governmental organisations and agencies.” The goal of CIMIC is described as 
“The establishment and maintenance of the full cooperation of the NATO 
                                          
15
 The following paragraphs are based on AJP-9 NATO Civil-Military Cooperation 
Doctrine (Brussels 2003) and MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on Civil Military 
Cooperation (Brussels 2002). In common speak CIMIC is often equated, by the military 
themselves, with Civil-Military Relations, but true to the definitions in the documents it is 
cooperation that is at the core of the philosophy, not so much relations. To create an 
image ‘as civilian as possible’ seems to be the reason for deliberately mangling the own 
definition (Homan 2009, 269). 
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Commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and 
population, within a commander’ s area of operation in order to allow him to fulfil 
his mission.”  
From these definitions the history of CIMIC and its adaptation to the new 
era are to be discovered. Already in the Second World War the Allies used the 
concept of Civil-Military Cooperation to streamline their dealings with civilian 
parties in conflict zones. However, before the 1990s civil-military relations were 
simply seen as a logistical challenge for the military mainly serving two goals. 
Firstly, the military had to make sure that civilian parties would not hinder the 
execution of military operations. Secondly, civilian authorities had to be co-
opted to fulfil tasks in occupied space for which the military had time nor 
capacity to do so. Such an approach clearly indicated the underlying party in the 
realm of civil-military relations: the civilians. In the new reality of the 21st 
century, however, NATO has been at pains to bring more equality in its concept 
of civil-military relations through specifying a more facilitating role of the military 
vis-à-vis civilian parties. 
Taking a closer look at the principles of present day CIMIC, three core tasks 
and ten underlying principles can be discerned. Firstly, NATO aims to cement 
together the military and civilian actors in the area of operation; secondly, to 
support the civilian sector; and thirdly, to facilitate civilians’ operations where 
possible. Key to these three core tasks is, according to NATO, mutual 
understanding and comprehensiveness so as to assure comprehensive 
planning, coordination and implementation. In its documents NATO goes at 
great length to stress the importance of open communication and continuous 
dialogue with the civilians to highlight its desire for equal cooperation and its 
support role in an integrated mission. Time and again it is stressed that the 
military should fully understand the mandate, structure, role, methods and 
principles of civilian organisations (IGOs, NGOs and local authorities) to 
establish an effective relationship with them, since they are the other half of the 
CIMIC equation. Time and again it is accentuated that building bridges of 
understanding is at the core of an effective relationship between the military and 
the civilians for the benefit of the successful comprehensive operation. Military 
execution of strictly humanitarian tasks is even recognised as possible only 
upon the request and approval of the civilian actors present in the area.  
As such, the MC 4111/1 document and AJP-9 seem to radiate the spirit of 
the new era in which the military and the civilians jointly cooperate in 
comprehensive operations aimed at providing security, democratisation and 
development. However, taking a closer look at the underlying principles, 
NATO’s apparent willingness to be equal to civilian parties gives a more 
nuanced impression. In two categories – internal military processes and guiding 
civil-military relations – NATO defines the operationalisation of its idea of 
CIMIC. When it comes to internal military processes CIMIC is subject to the 
principles of mission primacy. It is stated that NATO conducts CIMIC activities 
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only in support of its military mission (emphasis added) and NATO’s 
commanders are admonished to direct CIMIC activities to maintain military 
effectiveness. As a consequence, only minimum resources – if at all available – 
should be used for CIMIC so as not to jeopardise the military operations. In the 
category ‘Guiding civil-military relations’ it is determined that constant and open 
communication is the method to explain and make acceptable the military 
priorities and interests in an area of operation with proper respect for other 
parties’ priorities and goals, without jeopardising the civilians’ willingness to 
keenly cooperate with the military. 
 
 
NATO’s Civil Military Cooperation in Practice: The Afghan Laboratory 
The Afghan conflict since 2003 has proven to be the laboratory for civil-military 
cooperation from the military’s perspective. NATO taking over the ISAF 
operation in 2003 has been keen to ‘use’ Afghanistan as a test case for the 
comprehensive strategy it had developed over the previous years. In its 
broadest mandate ISAF has been assigned to assist the Afghan government to 
create and maintain a safe environment for Afghan society to develop. More 
specifically, ISAF/NATO has aimed to support the Afghan government in 
security sector reform to stabilise society and to help with reconstruction and 
development. Comprehensive indeed, and the first NATO mission outside the 
Euro-Atlantic security area (NATO 2007). On top, civil-military relations have 
appeared to be crucial in NATO’s operations. 
From the start NATO has formulated ambitious goals for itself under the 
comprehensive approach. In a nutshell NATO has assigned itself the task of 
restoring democratic order in a war-torn country, the reconstruction of the social 
and economic infrastructure and the support for operations that can be labelled 
humanitarian. Because of these very targets, cooperation with present NGOs 
has become the core of NATO’s effort, as a consequence of which NATO has 
created PRTs. These PRTs epitomise the principled military support for civilian 
operations through ‘force protection’, specialised help in the fields of 
engineering, public health and public policy (Frerks 2006, 45). However, it is 
clearly stated that the security situation determines whether the military or the 
civilian part of the equation dominates. At first, for a prolonged period of time, 
the military have to take the lead in creating a secure environment as well as 
(temporarily) getting humanitarian projects started, including projects that would 
gain the support of the ordinary Afghan and lure him away from the Taliban; so-
called hearts and minds projects (Dutch Ministry of Defence 2008). The effects 
of this stance will be discussed in the conclusion, but first the attitude of the 





Civilian Response to Military Presence in the Humanitarian Arena 
For a long time, NGOs have considered the humanitarian arena as a kind of 
exclusive zone for themselves in order to ‘do good’. The aftermath of the Cold 
War increased opportunities for civilian actors and boosted this attitude. 
Nevertheless, the NGOs soon discovered that also the military wanted to make 
use of the newly augmented opportunities in the humanitarian field, as a 
consequence of which they, just like the military, have come up with policy 
documents on civil-military relations. 
Being one of the overarching NGO community organisations the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has 
formulated in 2003 the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence 
Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex 
Emergencies. In 2008 this document has been supplemented by the document 
of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (the forum of UN agencies and NGOs 
involved in humanitarian action) on Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for 
Complex Emergencies (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2000). Finally, the 
paper exclusively written by NGOs, Position Paper on the Role of the 
International Peacekeeping Forces in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, 
will be mentioned (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response 2000).  
In these documents the civilians are quite clear in what civil-military 
relations are about. According to them, these relations consist of the “essential 
dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian 
emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid 
competition, minimize inconsistencies, and when appropriate pursue common 
goals”. The essence of civil-military relations is providing NGOs with a secure 
environment to facilitate humanitarian operations. Only on very few occasions 
the military should be allowed to implement humanitarian activities, but always 
under civilian guidance (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response 2000, 
par. 3.2.2). 
The humanitarian community is even more specific in its description of 
when and how to make use of military assets. Already being considered an 
exception the UNOCHA document adds to the distant relationship with the 
military by pointing out that NGOs should always be the ones to file a request, 
that such a request is to be considered as a last resort in order to relief 
intolerable human suffering, and that the military means used will always remain 
‘civilian in nature’. Most important to the use of military assets is thus that the 
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence are visibly 
dominant. Any action on behalf of the military compromising these principles will 
be the cause of severing civil-military relations (Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee 2008, par. 5).  
All the NGO documents on cooperation with the military hence indicate a 
very troublesome if not split position on this type of collaboration. On the one 
hand, given the new types of conflict in which humanitarian workers are way 
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more exposed to targeted violence than in the pre-1991 situation, the 
willingness to accept military hardware for operating in a secure environment is 
clear. On the other hand, assistance based on actual needs and on the 
humanitarian principles almost by definition makes it impossible to allow the 
military a visible role except for in dire emergencies. The danger of politicised 
action (hearts and minds projects) as well as a quickly growing dependency of 
the NGOs on military assets is by definition considered to be overwhelmingly 
present (Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response 2000, par 3.2.1). 
Looking into the Afghanistan experience once more, but now from a civilian 
perspective, the effects of the NGOs attitude to civil-military cooperation will 
become clear. Being a very insecure environment Afghanistan poses a great 
humanitarian challenge to the NGOs. Responding to the enormous 
humanitarian needs in the country most NGOs do accept their position as 
implementing partners of governments that operate according to NATO’s 
comprehensive approach. This results in an automatic relationship with the 
NATO forces present under ISAF-colours and within PRTs. Although in the 
short run beneficial in terms of a secure theatre of operation, in the long run 
most NGOs have experienced increased hostility vis-à-vis their staff from the 
Taliban and other armed groups, equated as they are with ‘the West’ and their 
military instruments. As a result, NGOs have lost credibility in keeping up their 
sacrosanct humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. This has been 
aggravated by the PRTs use of so-called quick impact projects aimed at 
producing quick results for the benefit of the local population but arousing great 
suspicion amongst the very same Afghan locals. For them these projects mask 
the hidden political agenda of NATO-forces and cooperating NGOs are just as 




The post-1991 situation in the world has increased the level of attention for 
humanitarian crises and the moral obligation to act on behalf of the civilised 
world in order to alleviate human suffering. Due to an increase of human 
suffering in fragile and failed states and a willingness among the public at large, 
IGOs and NGOs to engage in humanitarian action, humanitarianism has turned 
into a multi-billion industry with a ‘sexy profile’ for those delivering it. Although 
as of old, an area for civilians (because of the humanitarian principles of 
neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence) the military, especially so 
NATO, have grabbed the opportunity to adapt to the post-Cold War 
circumstances and have entered the humanitarian field. As a result, military and 
civilian parties have increasingly met in humanitarian action and have sought a 
modus vivendi of cooperation and coordination. Thus, civil-military relations 
have become a hotly debated issue in the field of humanitarianism. This chapter 
has assessed the compatibility of the military and humanitarian-civilian 
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interpretation of their relationship against the background of parties’ mandates 
and ‘inner beings’ in the present day complex crises around the world. 
Both the military as well as NGOs have come up with definitions and 
descriptions of what in their view civil-military relations in the field of 
humanitarianism are. The military have reasoned from existing (historical) 
concepts in which the military mission primacy has been difficult to conceal. 
Although cooperation and coordination with civilian parties in the post-1991 
complex emergencies is heralded (NATO speaks of a comprehensive approach 
to crises) NATO’s guidelines and actual behaviour in Afghanistan through ISAF 
and the so-called PRTs are indicative that civil-military relations in humanitarian 
action are an instrument to facilitate the military (political) goals imposed by the 
respective governments of NATO members.  
The NGO community also has come forward with documents delineating its 
position towards the military in the field of humanitarianism. In fact, the NGOs 
are as split as the military on the acceptance of the new reality on the ground. 
On the one hand, giving the significant rise in danger during humanitarian relief 
operations, the NGOs have properly valued the military assets in terms of 
creating a secure and stable environment in which humanitarian assistance can 
be offered. On the other hand, by clinging on to the ‘old’ humanitarian principles 
of neutrality, impartiality and independence, any alignment with the military 
(fundamentally being a political actor) is in principle impossible. For one, the 
NGOs are equated with the military by the recipients of aid. Secondly, 
participation of the military in humanitarian action more often than not has 
turned out to be so-called quick impact projects. In these projects not so much 
needs-based aid has been given, but more the winning of hearts and minds of 
the local Afghans has been priority number one, a grave infringement of 
humanitarian principles. 
Both the military and the NGOs have tried to adapt to the new reality in 
complex humanitarian emergencies after 1991. If only because they bump into 
one another much more frequently in humanitarian space than before 1991. 
Through conceptualisations they have made an effort to adjust to the new 
circumstances of a comprehensive approach to humanitarian crises. However, 
both parties have formulated their conceptualisations rigidly close to their core 
beings, making their earlier principles dominant over the amalgamation of the 
other party’ s inner characteristics and motivations. Afghanistan is an example 
in kind. Both the military and the civilian humanitarian organisations have 
accepted increased encounters in humanitarian space, but they emit 
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Chapter 10. NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Mechanism 






The end of the Cold War and the enlargement of both the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) profoundly altered the 
constellations of European politics and security (Bebler 2010). A greater 
emphasis was placed on the capacity to address non-military cross-border 
threats that were capable of triggering complex socio-political crises. New 
security challenges such as those presented by natural and technological 
disasters, severe socio-economic problems, mass migration, epidemics, 
environmental issues, threats arising from information and communication 
technology, terrorism and organised crime, demanded new coping strategies. 
Subsequently, urgent calls were made to establish comprehensive and 
consistent approaches to threat-detection, prevention, preparation, response 
and recovery (Brändström and Malešič 2004, 11). In response to these new 
circumstances, NATO, whose future at that time appeared uncertain and open 
to question, began to broaden its security concept to cover many of the above 
mentioned threats, and to find new roles for the military in dealing with them. 
Additionally, NATO started to revive some of its programmes and activities 
which had previously been regarded as less important during the Cold War 
period. 
During the Cold War, NATO was almost exclusively regarded as a military 
alliance and as a political organisation. During the last two decades however, 
NATO has significantly developed its third, so-called social dimension. NATO’s 
social dimension encompasses science programme activities, an environmental 
programme, and civil emergency planning. They all originated more than half a 
century ago, but, as suggested above, the importance of these programmes 
has increased profoundly recently. The 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept 
envisaged a broad approach to security which shifted the emphasis from 
military to political means and introduced cooperation with non-NATO countries 
which had formerly been regarded as foes. The document recognised that 
“security and stability have political, economic, social and environmental 
elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension” (NATO Handbook 
2010).  
NATO’s scientific cooperation programme was enhanced to encourage 
collaboration in civil science between NATO-country scientists and scientists 
from partner countries in NATO’s Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 
This programme of scientific collaboration takes four distinct but interconnected 
forms: Science Fellowships for young researchers; Cooperative Science and 
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Technology, designed to initiate cooperation and develop long-term networks 
between scientists from NATO and partner countries; Research Infrastructure 
Support for NATO member countries to organise research and to create basic 
research infrastructure in partner countries; and the Science for Peace initiative, 
aimed at strengthening applied research and development projects in the fields 
of industry and the environment (NATO Handbook 2010). About 10,000 
scientists from NATO and its partner countries participate in the NATO Science 
Programme each year.  
NATO’s environmental programme was launched with the establishment of 
the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) which was 
created to provide a forum for the sharing “of knowledge and experiences on 
social, health and environmental matters both in the civilian and military sectors 
among NATO and EAPC Partner countries” (NATO Handbook 2010). In recent 
years, the programme has focused on reducing the environmental impacts of 
military activities, conducting regional studies, preventing conflicts arising from a 
scarcity of resources, addressing emerging environmental and social risks that 
could cause economic, social and political instability, as well as addressing non-
traditional threats to security. Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in 
the United States, the most important task of the CCMS has been to identify 
potential threats to society arising from issues of food security, scarcity of 
resources, social bases of terrorism, environmental crime, and media and 
communication.  
This chapter will focus specifically on the development and the current state 
of affairs of civil emergency planning, evaluated through the lens of crisis 
management theory. The theory was developed within the Crisis Management 
Europe Research Programme and over the last decade has formed the basis 
for empirical research on crisis management in more than 20 countries and in 
more than 100 crisis cases (Brändström and Malešič 2004).  
 
 
Civil Emergency Planning 
The primary aim of NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) is “to coordinate 
national planning activities to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in 
collective support of Alliance strategic objectives” (NATO Handbook 2010). Civil 
emergency planning remains the responsibility of the national governments 
involved in the programme, and civilian assets remain under their control. 
NATO, however, plays a strategic role in harmonising and coordinating joint 
capabilities to ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and 
that the necessary assets are available as and when required. CEP addresses 
the fundamental security concerns of the Alliance, namely, supporting military 
defence and crisis response operations, supporting national authorities during 
civil emergencies, and ensuring civilian populations are protected. In the words 
of the NATO Handbook, CEP is intended for use in “war, crises and disasters” 
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(2010). CEP covers several areas of civil activity, such as inland surface 
transport, ocean shipping, civil aviation, food and agriculture, industrial 
production and supply, post and telecommunications, medical matters and civil 
protection.  
Civil emergency planning activities in NATO were originally launched in 
1951 to develop a collective strategy for the efficient use of Alliance civilian 
assets to support its military operations. Consequently, the development of CEP 
was primarily shaped by the development of NATO’s military strategies. For 
instance, the massive response strategy employed CEP in preparation for total 
war to ensure the survival of people, institutions and the economy. The flexible 
response strategy required CEP to serve as an additional tool to dissuade a 
potential adversary from launching an attack against the Alliance. CEP also 
performed necessary crisis management functions. After the Cold War ended, 
however, a changing strategic outlook envisaged a significantly different role for 
CEP: to support peace operations, humanitarian interventions and crisis 
management. In addition, CEP activities were no longer predominantly limited 
to NATO members, but instead, CEP cooperated extensively with Central and 
Eastern European partner countries. 
Civil Emergency Planning today has two main concerns: firstly, the 
employment of civil resources in support of Alliance strategy; and secondly, the 
protection of civilian populations. Specific areas of activity include: planning and 
coordination to improve civil preparedness in the case of (terrorist) attack or 
disaster; civil transportation to military deployments and sustainment; medical 
planning to support civil preparedness for Chemical, Biological and Radiological 
(CBR) incidents and civil medical support to the military; civil communications 
planning; and examining CBR threats to the food chain (NISS 2010). The fight 
against terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) represents a 
comparatively new field of engagement for the Alliance. The Military Concept for 
Defence against Terrorism was adopted at NATO’s Prague summit in 2002. 
Within the broader framework, the Alliance's activities for CEP in the fight 
against terrorism and WMD follow three complementary activities: reinforcing 
national capabilities to improve the preparedness of NATO members and 
partners; providing a framework for a coordinated response; and employing 
NATO military assets to prevent terrorist attacks and the proliferation of WMD. 
Therefore, on the operational side, the CEP’s mandate has been extended to 
responding to a terrorist attack, however, its structures have not yet been called 
upon in this capacity (NATO 2010). 
The organisational structure of CEP consists of several bodies. The Senior 
Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) coordinates the work of eight 
planning boards responsible for transport, supply, communications and the 
protection of civilian populations. The SCEPC is an advisory body to the North 
Atlantic Council, the highest decision-making authority within NATO. All SCEPC 
decisions are adopted by consensus. The Civil Emergency Planning Directorate 
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(CEPD) is responsible for administrative support. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster 
Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster 
Response Unit (EADRU) are crucial elements of this structure. Important 
elements of the CEP organisational structure are the Rapid Reaction Team 
which evaluates civil needs in a disaster and provides timely expertise, and the 
Advisory Support Team which provides expert advice to nations in assessing 
and developing their preparedness, as well as response and recovery 




The primary area of CEP activity today is arguably the protection of civilian 
populations in various crises, especially in the case of natural disasters. The 
protection of civilian populations has been at the heart of NATO’s mandate 
since its inception, therefore the development of its capacities to assist and 
protect populations in cases of natural disasters would seem a logical step. The 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme enables the Alliance to cooperate with 
its partners within Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in preparation and 
response measures to disasters. The establishment of the EADRCC and 
EADRU in 1998 was a major step forward for the EACP countries in their 
common endeavour to provide assistance to affected populations in the Euro-
Atlantic area.  
Palmieri noted that the decisive moment in the development of the 
EADRCC can be “traced back to 1992, predating the Partnership for Peace 
itself, when the late NATO Secretary General, Manfred Wörner, had the 
foresight to host an innovative conference on international disaster relief” (1998, 
24), where representatives of more than forty countries and several 
international organisations discussed the availability of military assets to tackle 
civil disasters, and the feasibility of new forms of international cooperation in 
this field. In addition to the practical aims of enhanced cooperation in civil crisis 
management, a broader political dimension can also be observed, as this area 
would seem to be “the most conductive environment for dialogue, cooperation 
and confidence-building between former foes” (Palmieri 1998, 24).The 
expectation that some defence resources could “be freed up for civil purposes” 
anticipated a so-called peace dividend. 
The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre has described 
itself as a “focal point for coordinating disaster relief efforts among NATO 
member and partner countries” (EADRCC 2010). Its main function is to 
coordinate the response of NATO and partner countries to natural and man-
made disasters within the Euro-Atlantic area. The centre also functions as an 
information-sharing tool of disaster assistance for NATO and its partner 
countries. Disaster management operations are performed in close cooperation 
with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-
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OCHA), which retains the primary role in the coordination of international 
disaster relief operations. Therefore, the EADRCC is designed as a regional 
coordination mechanism, supporting and complementing the UN in its efforts, 
rather than competing with it. The EAPC’s coordinating role is crucial in this 
matter: based upon the information provided by the EADRCC, the members 
and partner countries decide whether to provide assistance, and if so, what 
level of assistance to provide. 
The EADRCC’s tasks are to inform NATO’s Secretary General of any 
disasters in EAPC countries, to coordinate a disaster response in the EAPC 
area if the afflicted country requires it, to function as a medium for information 
sharing on disaster relief within the EAPC, and to develop the concept of the 
Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Unit. The latter is a non-standing, ad hoc unit, 
a mixture of civilian and military elements. Its structure and strength depend 
upon the nature and scope of the disaster in question, and as a general rule 
such a unit functions within the EAPC area. Joint training and exercises are 
organised for the elements of the unit in order to achieve interoperability. The 
EADRU can be deployed to the major disaster site at the request of the stricken 
EAPC country, although the EAPC members who contribute various elements 
to the unit decide upon their deployment. The cooperation between the civilian 
and military structures of the various countries forms a solid basis to develop 
the synergies necessary to provide an effective disaster response. Military 
assets, such as NATO's AWACS, the NRF and the Multinational CBRN 
Battalion have also been engaged in some of NATO's most recent operations in 
the field of civil emergencies. Two recent operations deserve special mention: 
NATO's intervention in response to Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 
August 2005, and NATO's assistance to Pakistan following the earthquake in 
Kashmir in October 2005. In both cases, NATO's response to a natural disaster 
combined the traditional intervention of the EADRCC with a military component, 
through the use of the NRF in particular (NATO 2010). 
Palmieri saw the EADRCC as a new concept which “puts to practical use 
NATO’s cooperation mechanisms and long experience in civil emergency 
planning” (1998, 24). According to Palmieri, the Euro-Atlantic disaster response 
capabilities enhance the disaster response ability of the international community 
as a whole due to the fact that the countries in the area possess the greatest 
response capabilities. Although the recipients of the assistance are primarily 
affected countries, the mechanism indirectly helps UN-OCHA, the leading 
international agency in the field. The author thinks that the EADRCC 
“institutionalises a third link between NATO and the United Nations, adding to 
the two existing working links in the political and security areas” (Palmieri 1998, 
24).The EADRCC brings a wealth of experience to the field of civil emergency 
planning, including a network of civil experts, standardised and interoperable 
plans, procedures, services and equipment, civil-military cooperation, 
communications and so forth. It is important to stress however, that the concept 
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is developed in such a way that individual countries retain the decision-making 
process, whilst concurrently providing NATO and the EAPC with an identity as 
the public face of civil emergencies.  
The EADRCC performs several tasks that are coordinated with UN-OCHA. 
The EADRCC prepares the plans and procedures for providing assistance, 
taking into account national threat assessments, bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and the capacities of individual countries to provide assistance; it 
also prepares and updates the list of civilian and military forces and the means 
that the countries offer in support of international disaster relief; when the 
disaster occurs, the EADRCC contributes to the prompt organisation and 
functioning of the EADRU; it also plans and carries out the joint training of civil 
protection personnel. 
Taking into account the limited resources, the only way to increase the 
effectiveness of disaster response at an international level is by speeding up the 
process through which the provision of assistance is implemented in order to 
avoid a duplication of efforts and a waste of resources. To support UN 
endeavours in the field, the NATO mechanism should not conflict with the UN 
arrangements and ought to provide added value to the United Nations efforts 
(Palmieri 1998, 25). The UN itself also calls for the International Relief 
Community to coordinate investments in disaster response capacities, improve 
coordination and mobilisation procedures, improve communication within 
regional relief coordination networks, define specific projects to systematically 
improve relief processes, and work collectively to mobilise resources to meet 
the challenge. In other words, the PfP civil emergency planning and UN-OCHA 
mechanisms work in unison.  
The EAPC policy on enhanced practical cooperation in the field of 
international disaster relief is based upon several key principles: the affected 
country is responsible for disaster management; the UN retains the main 
coordination role in providing international assistance to the affected country; 
the EADRCC should not perform the same tasks as the UN and duplicate them, 
but should complement them; the EADRCC should perform the coordination 
role in the EAPC area; national governments alone should decide what level of 
assistance to offer the affected country; and last but not least, the countries 
providing the assistance should cover the costs of the operation. It is important 
to stress that, through the EADRCC, NATO operates according to the general 
principle of subsidiarity: the countries themselves are responsible for developing 
their own disaster management capabilities, whereas the international 
mechanisms are available to support their efforts when the scope and intensity 
of the disaster exceed their national capacities. 
Since its inception in 1998, the functional aspect of the EADRCC during 
disasters has been impressive (EADRCC 2010). The Centre has guided 
consequence management efforts in almost fifty emergencies, most often 
fighting floods and forest fires, and dealing with the aftermath of earthquakes, 
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although it has also dealt with other crises. The following examples illustrate the 
variety and the geographical scope of the crises that the EADRCC has dealt 
with, as well as the role it has played in each case: the floods in Ukraine in 
1998, 2001 and 2008 (collecting and sharing information, coordinating several 
forms of assistance, providing water pumps, mobile electric generators, medical 
equipment, rescue vehicles, food, blankets, clothes); the refugee crisis in 
Kosovo in 1998-99 (cooperating with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
acting as a focal humanitarian information point for EAPC countries, 
establishing air lifts to provide humanitarian assistance); the earthquakes in 
Turkey in 1999 (cooperating with the Turkish crisis centre, the UN-OCHA, 
EAPC countries and NATO delegations, providing search and rescue teams 
and the necessary equipment); the forest fires in Portugal in 2003 (coordinating 
the provision of helicopters and planes from EAPC countries involved in fire 
fighting activities); hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 (providing 
food, medical and logistical supplies, organising air-lifts, establishing on-site 
coordination); the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 (organising 168 NATO flights 
providing 3,500 tones of relief supplies, providing engineers and medical units 
from the NATO Response Force); the massive explosions at an ammunition 
storage site in Albania in 2008 (providing experts in Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal, medical equipment, de-mining equipment, financial support etc.); the 
H1N1 pandemic flu in Bulgaria in 2009 (providing vaccinations); the political 
crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic in June 2010 (the EADRCC received a request to 
provide medicines and medical equipment for use in emergencies -this mission 
is still ongoing at the time of writing). 
 
 
Theoretical Aspects of Crisis Management  
Researchers agree that the phenomenon of modern crises is changing both in 
terms of quantity and quality (Malešič 2009, 80-82). They believe that, in the 
future, more crises can be expected (a quantum jump), and that these crises 
will be characterised by endemicity (i.e. the crises will constitute a logical 
opposition to the increasingly complex systems, which, due to technological, 
financial or political factors, will fail to meet the high security standards and 
expectations), and by complexity (crises will consist of several combinations of 
crisis events and of the causal relations triggering them, meaning that a crisis 
permanently reproduces itself in different forms) (Rosenthal and others, 2001). 
In other words, crises are a result of several causes, interacting over a given 
time span and producing a risk with destructive potential (Boin and others, 
2005). Porfiriev (2001) believes that future crises will be characterised by a 
growing heterogeneity, complexity and insecurity regarding the causes, 
conditions and the directions of crisis development. In contrast, Quarantelli and 
Dror are more cautious in their conclusions. Quarantelli (2001) notes that 
modern crises already exert tangible negative effects on people's lives, and that 
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this will not change in the future. Dror (2001) believes that, as unexpected and 
dangerous events, crises are ontologically present in the historical process; 
from an epistemological perspective, they are an integral part of the human 
mind. Consequently, Dror warns against the introduction of an entirely 'new' or 
'modern' concept of crisis.  
These disagreements notwithstanding, scholars concur that future crises 
will differ at least in part from those we have known and those we are currently 
preparing for. Future crises will become an inherent characteristic of society. 
Nevertheless, their consequences will be fairly conventional; we will continue to 
define them in terms of victims, damage, risk, urgency, uncertainty, stress and 
decision-making dilemmas.  
Inductive reasoning leads us to predict certain driving forces or critical 
trends which will influence the occurrence and the development of future crises, 
understood “as situations, in which basic social values, norms and structures 
are at risk, where the time for decision-making is limited, and which entail 
uncertainty, stress and frequently also the element of surprise.” (Malešič 2004, 
12). Decisive factors include transnationality, technological development, the 
influence of the mass media, and the declining role of public authority 
(Rosenthal and others, 2001). Most future crises will certainly be limited to 
national or even local social systems. However, large-scale crises will have 
international consequences. This can be illustrated by three recent major crises: 
the Chernobyl nuclear disaster; the terrorist attacks in the United States; and 
the tsunami that struck Southeast Asia and part of the East African coast. 
Lagadec (2001) states that global development is subject to considerable 
change in the fields of technology, knowledge, strategic management etc., and 
this results in chains of crises in which the dynamics are no longer regarded as 
an exclusively local-global process, but as an increasingly global-local process. 
This means that, in future, it will not only be a question of how local crises 
expand into national, regional, and even global crises, but also the ever more 
salient question of how global processes occurring in different fields influence 
the emergence of a crisis at a local level. A process supporting this assumption 
is the current financial and economic crisis that is spreading into local 
environments where there are no home-grown reasons for financial and 
economic problems to exist. 
The changing dimensions of modern crises have direct implications for 
crisis management, which can be defined “as the formulation of procedures, 
agreements and decisions which affect the course of a crisis, including the 
organisation, preparation, measures and distribution of resources needed to 
control it” (Malešič 2004, 14). The range of preventative and intervention 
strategies has not been adapted to the character of present and future crises, 
which are, and will continue to be, primarily characterised by a complex and 
intricate structure. The conventional forms of coordination cannot be used to 
organise the work of the increasing number of different organisations and 
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individuals who participate in crisis management, since the role of the state in 
recent decades appears to be in decline, especially in Western countries 
(Rosenthal and others 2001). Moreover, faced with the greater politicisation of 
modern crises, crisis managers are required to satisfy tougher demands and to 
address new ways of thinking. Numerous scholars agree that the available tools 
for dealing with crises are themselves also facing a crisis (Beck 2008). Both 
routine decision-making processes and the political process need to be 
thoroughly upgraded. Building an integrated crisis management calls for a 
broader approach to and a reflection on the policies and the competencies of 
the various authorities. 
Researchers of crises and crisis management have developed a 
methodological tool to explore the topic. One of the important features of this 
tool is the development of analytical themes which should be taken into account 
when exploring crises and crisis management (Brändström and Malešič 2004, 
15-18), i.e.: crisis preparedness, prevention and mitigation (the extent to which 
crisis managers and their organisations are prepared to respond to 
extraordinary events); leadership (the leadership styles and variations as 
understood and displayed by key actors in the crisis); decision units (how and 
where decisions are made in the complex institutional systems that are typically 
engaged in managing a crisis); problem perception and framing (the subjective 
and socially constructed aspects of crisis management); value conflict (the 
potential tension and conflict among the various values at stake in a crisis 
situation); political and bureaucratic cooperation and conflict (the patterns of 
convergence and divergence, parochialism and solidarity among actors and 
stakeholders in a crisis); crisis communication and credibility (the relationship 
between the information available, their timely and appropriate procession, and 
the perception of the crisis and the actions that are taken to solve it); 
transnationalisation and internationalisation (the tendency of crises to spill over 
national boundaries in an increasingly politically, economically, socially and 
ecologically interdependent world); temporal effects (by its very definition as a 
crisis, there is a time limit on responding); and learning (the ability of crisis 
management structures and individuals to learn from their experiences and to 
embed lessons learned into future crisis management behaviour).  
 
 
Conclusion: Practice and Theory 
As stated in the introduction, the conclusion will address some crucial 
theoretical aspects of crises and crisis management with regard to NATO’s 
arrangements for Civil Emergency Planning. As we have seen, NATO 
documents refer to “war, crises and disaster”. Theoretical definitions of crises 
imply that wars and disasters are also crises. However, NATO also identifies a 
broad range of potential new threats to modern society, among them the 
question of food security, the scarcity of resources, social bases of terrorism, 
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environmental crime, media and communication. Empirical data from recent 
CEP interventions confirms these new trends: they range from natural and man-
made disasters to terrorist attacks and contagious diseases. Each of these 
cases could be referred to as a “crisis”. It is important for CEP structures to 
recognise the complexity of a crisis, especially in terms of its social perception, 
dynamics, technological aspects, transnationality and interconnectedness.  
Let us briefly revisit NATO’s efforts in civil emergency planning from the 
perspective of the crucial crisis management analytical themes. Crisis 
prevention, preparedness and mitigation are covered in CEP through threat 
assessment using the same methodology by member and partner countries, 
practising joint training programmes, exercises, and planning. CEP provides 
support to national planning and it is important here to stress the empirical fact, 
that whilst a plan in the form of a document may not be useful in a crisis, 
planning as a process is. The fact that crisis management actors are involved in 
the planning process has shown to be pivotal for their successful response. 
Disaster exercises are designed to practise procedures, provide training for 
local and international actors, build up interoperability skills and capabilities and 
“harness the experience and lessons learned for future operations” (EADRCC 
2010). 
The internationalisation of crisis response is written into the CEP 
programme itself: it involves NATO member countries, partner countries, and at 
the operational level even non-NATO and non-partner countries. It also involves 
the UN, the EU, the Council of Europe, other international organisations and 
NGOs. The decision-making process is in general based upon the will of those 
countries contributing the resources to the mission: they decide which the 
civilian and military elements are to be involved in the crisis response; they 
decide which mechanism will be used to offer assistance to the affected 
country; the affected country makes the decision to ask for assistance; the CEP 
elements are added to the national disaster relief units of the stricken country 
and operate under their coordination. It is encouraging that the EADRCC has 
managed to overcome strict civilian-military divisions in operative terms: the 
EADRU consists of civilian and military elements and additional military units 
are engaged to support civilian crisis management. Communication in crisis is 
coordinated through the EADRCC as an information-sharing tool, however it is 
often the case that affected countries appear to be unable to provide 
information on the assistance required, hence NATO’s experts must visit the 
area to define the needs. Coordination is provided by various countries within 
the EAPC area and between CEP structures and the UN-OCHA, while special 
attention is given to cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean 
Dialogue countries. Coordination with the affected country is crucial for the 
success of the crisis response. The EADRCC is designed as a regional 
coordination mechanism. CEP documents emphasise that any duplication, 
competition and conflict among international crisis management actors should 
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be avoided. Cooperation between the civil and military structures involved in the 
crisis response should also be free of competition and conflict. 
It is evident from an examination of CEP documents and structures that 
coordination with UN-OCHA is well tailored. Closer cooperation with the EU, 
however, is crucial, due to the EU’s strong civilian instruments. As NATO’s 
Parliamentary Assembly document states: “In the areas where EU and NATO 
initiatives overlap, such as programmes and mechanisms for disaster 
prevention and preparedness, coordination and a clear division of labour 
between both organisations would be highly desirable to avoid duplication. In 
the current context, NATO has proved better suited for large operations, 
including in far-away places, whereas the EU could provide a useful framework 
for intra-EU operations. Moreover, the European project of ‘civil protection 
modules’ could allow for the development of reinforced cooperation between a 
limited number of interested countries. Such types of cooperation already exist 
among several European countries” (NATO 2010).).Cooperation between 
NATO and the EU could be also improved through joint threat assessments, 
joint meetings of decision-making bodies, joint financing of science and 
technology programmes, training programmes and exercises.  
Although some NATO officials are of the opinion that “civil protection” is not 
a core task for the Alliance, the author believes that the entire social dimension 
of NATO, including civil protection, is pivotal for the image of NATO, its 
legitimacy and consequently for its continued development. In the future, 
however, it would be advisable to integrate even more the three social 
dimensions. A number of Science for Peace projects within the Security through 
Science Programme have already been developed in the field of CEP. These 
projects typically bring together scientists and end-users from research 
laboratories, industry, and universities to work on applied R&D projects. One 
group of projects aims at increasing knowledge of natural disasters and 
reducing their impact. Scientific and environmental programmes also have 
many common features. And last but not least, environmental threats and risks 
should be the joint concern of the environmental programme and civil 
emergency planning.  
Therefore, there is considerable room for improvement within the civil 
emergency planning itself, above all in the areas of prevention, preparedness 
and timely interventions, both through integration of the CEP with NATO’s 
science and environmental programmes, and through the improved 
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Chapter 11. Responsibility to Protect in Territories under 
Disputed Rule 
 




Territories under disputed rule are parts of a state that are not under control of 
the ruling governments. Every tenth state in the world falls into this category, 
from Indonesia in East Asia, Azerbaijan in Central Asia, Georgia in the 
Caucasus region, Cyprus in Europe to Colombia in Latin America. In most of 
these cases so called ‘frozen conflicts’ exist. According to Nodia (2004) ‘frozen 
conflicts’ are areas in which ethno-political conflict over secession has led to the 
establishment of a de facto state clone government that is recognized by neither 
the international community nor by the rump state from which the secession 
occurred. As the violence has largely abated, Nodia argues, the conflict has 
become ‘frozen’. This adjective is controversial: not only in itself – because it 
suggests an absence of political activity, whereas in most cases the opposite is 
true (Weir 2008) – but also because secession is not necessarily what the 
respective community is aspiring to achieve. De facto states, however, are 
different, because they build on a complex interplay of endogenous and 
exogenous factors. They are different because a set of interactions between the 
rump state and the local authorities, and between the different ethnic groups, 
which are not completely segregated, may exist regardless of the ongoing 
conflict. 
A good example is provided by a divided city in Northern Ireland. Two thirds 
of the inhabitants call it Derry, while one third insists on the younger name of 
Londonderry. Some people even call it ‘stroke city’, as the name of the city is 
sometimes written Derry-stroke-Londonderry. Northern Ireland has become a 
peculiar entity – not a de facto state yet – although some Unionists might even 
have a preference for this as the second best solution to the contemporary 
status. Despite the gradual progress that has been made since the Good Friday 
Agreement, both the Nationalists and Unionists have retained their discordant 
political preferences. John Hume, the Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1998, said at 
a conference which took place in 2009 in that city and which I attended, that the 
prerequisite for transformation in Northern Ireland has not been a common 
political will on the part of the political stakeholders for resolving the national 
conflict, but mutual respect for difference. He added that if respect for the 
existing difference does exist, institutions and mechanisms have to be created 
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that respect the differences too. He pointed to a creative European Union, 
which has allocated a regional fund jointly to the Republic of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, while the money has been sent directly to the local authorities 
in Northern Ireland. I refer to this surprisingly impressive EU flexibility because it 
encourages to apply similar creativity to other cases where people live with and 
under disputed rule. 
Of course, it may legitimately be argued that each case is different and that 
any effort to find a catch-all approach on the international level entails the risk of 
immediately getting stuck in fruitless debates over legalistic interpretations. But 
there is another message which gives reason for cautious hope. Most of the 
rump state/de facto state constellations are characterized by the inability or 
reluctance of the stakeholders to alter the status quo. Ironically, most of the 
almost twenty rump state/de facto state constellations in the world, of which 
seventeen have a clear ethno-political background, are relatively stable with 
regard to internal security and the given state of power-sharing. More 
interestingly, two thirds of these conflicts root back to times long before the Cold 
War ended. Hence, they are not a product of the communist implosion. If a long 
stalemate lies behind, and an ongoing stalemate in terms of the existing political 
status can be predicted, addressing the daily fate of the people living under this 
status is legitimate, at least from the perspective of humanity.  
Analytically – but also from a policy perspective – the interplay of external 
and internal actors in intrastate conflicts, especially if these have an ethno-
political dimension, is complex. Rogers Brubaker (1996) proposed a triadic 
nexus approach to explain the interplay between national minorities, 
nationalising (host) states and international homelands. But these analytical 
tools (developed for explaining transformation and nationalist conflicts in 
Eastern Europe) are debatable because they start from the premise of a 
distinction between ‘western civic’ and ‘eastern nationalizing’ states. Taras 
Kuzio (2002), for example, argues that all states possess an ethno-cultural 
dimension, rendering futile any difference between civic or ethnic states. More 
comprehensive approaches suffer from another deficit of Western prescriptive 
perspectives: it uses the additional dimension of international organizations as a 
pretext for projecting normative expectations onto the actors within the states, 
and their neighbouring proxies. 
External intervention remains a sensitive issue though. For rump state 
actors it is sensitive because they often fear that external support may either tip 
the balance of power in favour of the actors not under their control, or even 
encourage these actors to push further for secession. The local or territorial 
rulers, on the other hand, do not necessarily hope for external assistance, even 
from a kin state or other supporter states. They might fear that they will become 
dominated by external actors and policy agendas which are not theirs. Besides, 
from their perspective an external intervention could also end up being used by 
rump state actors as a welcome legitimacy for choosing hard power against 
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them in order to protect sovereignty. International actors, states in particular, 
are afraid of lending unintended support to secession through providing 
resources to the local authorities. But sometimes, however, the same state 
actors are even interested in preserving the status quo for their own strategic 
reasons, as happened with Russia in the cases of Transnistria, South Ossetia 
and Nagorno-Karabakh. The economic sector might also not be interested in 
letting political actors intervene, for they are concerned about the profits gained 
from the existing partition.  
And the locals? Who does seriously care about them? The slogan of the 
‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) – according to the equally named report of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001) – 
or ‘responsibility to prevent’ as the Quaker’s League FNCL (2004) in the US has 
rephrased it, seems often to end where the sovereignty of rump states is at 
stake. The core message of R2P was the predominance of humanity and 
human rights over interests and state sovereignty. But the reality is different. 
R2P interventions are rare, and if they occur, the interveners usually have own 
interests in the case. Fighting poverty, or more basically: achieving the 
Millenium Development Goals,–is not top-ranked on their agendas. The 
question is what the international community can and should do in terms of 
good service and in compliance with the Millenium Development Goals for 
people who are living in underdeveloped territories that are not under the 
control of central governments – without being confronted with a debate over 
the legal and political status and without putting the life and security of the 
ordinary people in these territories at risk? To start with I would like to call the 
’three dilemmas’ of a pervasive phenomenon: 
1. the dilemma of isolation; 
2. the dilemma of territory, and 
3. the dilemma of responsibility. 
 
 
The Dilemma of Isolation 
A close interrelation exists between territories that are administered like states, 
but whose rule is not recognized internationally, and fragility. In a nutshell, we 
are facing a very specific and often neglected type of fragility. From an outside 
perspective, states with divided rule in the territories under their jurisdiction are, 
according to international law, usually considered fragile – especially because 
of a lacking or at least endangered monopoly of force, and because of a 
protracted dispute about the legitimacy of rule and about territory. This does not 
mean that the administrative structures of the territories in question are not 
functional or are not functioning. On the contrary, as we have learned from 
cases such as Lebanon, but temporarily also from the OPT in Palestine, 
territorial governance structures may compensate well for existing deficits of 
central state administration. Local structures may function even comparably 
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better than the malfunctioning administration of a weak, and often also corrupt 
central state. Ironically, sometimes the people in territories under local 
administration seem to be better off than they would apparently be if they were 
under the administration of a failed state with ethno-politically dominant rule. But 
the sense of fragility that is implied by divided rule may become a cause for 
both internal and external isolation of the ruling groupings and the ordinary 
people in these local territories. 
The internal isolation originates from the legally contested legitimacy of the 
rule. The central governments try to weaken what they consider a challenge to 
their power. On the other hand, as we can see in cases like Cyprus or Nagorno 
Karabakh, the balance of power distribution is often relatively stable, i.e., the 
central governments or the kin state rulers do not dare to risk restarting an open 
conflict, and nor do the local rulers. As said before, assistance and even military 
backing by external actors may help to freeze an existing standoff. 
What makes such cases comparable, however, is that the direct access for 
external actors to bring aid directly to the people in territories under disputed 
rule is extremely difficult and risky, both for the deliverers and for the recipients. 
Most studies on the interrelation between fragility and development in the last 
decade have either ignored or underestimated this dilemma. This applies to the 
prominent World Bank (1999) and OECD/DAC (2001) commissioned studies on 
war and economy, and on development and security, but interestingly also to 
others, such as the most recent Human Security Report. 
The point for discussion is – against the background of a foreseeable 
ongoing status quo of divided rule in many cases – what kind of assistance can 
be provided to the local people without changing the status quo (in the sense of 
just good services). To put it more precisely and positively: how can external 
assistance improve the chances for peaceful conflict transformation in both the 
local and the overall territory of a divided state? 
 
 
The Dilemma of Territory 
While not territorial conflicts by definition, most of the relevant cases under 
investigation are also cases where disputes over territory matter. Territory is an 
important principle of organizing social interaction, or as Sack (1986) has said: 
an element of social coordination and combination of area, power, and rule. As 
Goertz and Diehl have pointed out, territory has both immanent and relational 
importance. Immanently, territory provides the basis of resources and the 
starting point for self-determination.  
In terms of relational importance, territory matters as a geopolitical 
alternative in comparison to a different territory within the same state. The 
political focus on territory may at first glance imply the idea of competing state-
building, or even secession, but the primary interest of the actors in most cases 
is rather, according to Holsti (2004), the legitimacy of rule and self-
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determination. With Kratochwil (1986) we can therefore assume that territory for 
these actors has, in the first instance, a functional importance. It provides a 
framework for the control, use, and distribution of resources for their own 
community and constituency.  
It can be concluded that the territorial conflict is only a secondary 
consequence of the primary political conflict. That is why the territorial conflict 
cannot be resolved as long as the causes for the political conflict are not 
eliminated. On the other hand, the rump state actors may be afraid that any 
recognition, i.e., also implicit recognition, of the divided territorial rule will 
undermine their authority, increase the fragility of the state, and, moreover, may 
even strengthen the moral conviction and political strength of local rulers. But 
for the local rulers, giving up control over their territory would inevitably disrupt 
the organic coherence of social interaction. Therefore to them this would be 
tantamount to political surrender. 
Territorial cohesion which is motivated by functional reasons and which 
seeks to protect the integrity of a determined community, implies at the same 
time almost inevitably that the governing actors risk increasing segregation and 
isolation from the people in other parts of the country. Segregation, moreover, 
may make territorial integrity dysfunctional because difficulties emerge for the 
isolated part to get access to vital resources beyond the bordering lines, which 
then puts additional strains on the local living conditions. 
The points for discussion here relate to how to access the territory and how 
to assist the local people without unwillingly contributing to further segregation 
or even secession? 
 
 
The Dilemma of Responsibility 
The Western declaratory development policies undisputedly refer to many, 
extremely positively connotated, aims, such as: the strengthening of human 
security; the protection of human rights; peaceful conflict resolution; the 
reduction of poverty; the mitigation of climate change risks; sustained economic 
development; a just social order, etcetera. These general aims reflect what the 
eight Millennium Development Goals are also all about: to improve the capacity, 
ownership and ability of developing societies to deal constructively and 
peacefully with the challenges of social, economic and environmental 
transformation.  
During the last decade development policy has for many states become a 
recognized instrument also for crisis prevention and conflict management. 
Already in the early 1990s a common understanding had emerged globally that 
Development and Human Security policies (UNDP 1994) should first address 
people rather than states.  
The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD fuelled this debate 
with the Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and a 
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great deal of subsequent studies gave substance to an intensive debate on this 
shift in policy focus.17 But all papers about the nexus of development and 
security either address the restoration of legitimate central rule or the protection 
of oppressed people against dictatorship and autocratic rule. The case of state-
like actors whose legitimacy may not come from written law but from the people 
whose support they enjoy and who they are a part of, has not been dealt with 
adequately in these studies. Certainly, it cannot be ignored that states primarily 
deal with other states.  
But as described above, the world of states has changed, as have the 
attitudes of states vis-à-vis state actors who ignore fundamental principles of 
human and minority rights. Rwanda and especially Srebrenica stand for a moral 
turn in the community of States towards concepts such as the R2P, which some 
legal experts already consider to be an ’emerging norm’ (Schorlemer 2007). At 
the same time, however, intervening in states for humanitarian reasons with 
non-military means (such as aid) has been criticized time and again for 
potentially conflicting with the aims of counter-insurgency policies. 
Empirically it can be proven that especially in multi-ethnic countries with a 
longstanding history of wars over resources, poor governance coincides with 
signs of ethno-political rule and ethnic oppression. But the international 
community has for a long time been reluctant to open this Pandora’s box for 
conflict resolution, not only because of the collective memories of the potentially 
mobilizing role of ethnicity in many past wars, but also because many states 
feel constrained by their own ethno-political agendas. Some fear that they will 
be affected by spill-over effects. 
Whereas the responsibility to protect is not a fixed legal entity and is 
disputed as such, especially among the Permanent Five members of the UN 
Security Council, it has helped to establish legitimacy for collective missions of 
humanitarian intervention, such as those in Kosovo, East Timor and Darfur. But 
why should a humanitarian intervention be considered primarily in military 
terms? The record of military intervention is, roughly speaking, not very 
impressive, nor is the ratio of investments and outcomes. $4.5 bn were spent on 
the ongoing military intervention, $1,6 bn were spent on the Chapter VII mission 
to Somalia, $450 mn on Rwanda. The military personnel sent to only the three 
aforementioned countries amounted to 50,000. Other cases may teach different 
lessons: Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, Gagauzia, Macedonia – to mention a 
few. 
Against this background, the search for alternative options for ‘intervention’ 
seems to be overdue. Humanitarian assistance and development aid could be 
easily understood as an optional form of proactive and early intervention, thus 
matching the two other, often forgotten, but in the Report equally stressed, 
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 See, i.a., Welsh and Mendelson Forman (1998); Ball (1998); World Bank (1999); Uvin 
(1999); Chalmers (2000). 
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aspects of the threefold ’Responsibility Concept’: in addition to the responsibility 
to protect, the responsibility to prevent, and the responsibility to rebuild.  
The core idea of the UN Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992), that rapid 
growth and poverty reduction can contain and eliminate conflicts, does comply 
with that concept. When development succeeds, countries become safer and 
less prone to violent conflict. As Balls and Cunliffle (2007) have pointed out, 
rebuilt economies create prosperity and so aid progress towards a viable 
political agreement in the given country. Or more precisely: the illiteracy of 
populations, fragility of educational systems and longstanding inequities can 
have a structural impact on the ability to cooperate in conflict, for example on 
the attempts at empowering people, communicating very basic information, or 
impeding the rational conflict transformation approaches. 
Most recent cases of ‘humanitarian intervention’ have hardly shown an 
impressive and, more important, sustained outcome. What has become visible 
though, is that rump states may not have the best concepts at hand if they are 
more of a problem of than a solution to the challenge. In case of a corrupt 
regime rather instead of, the international community faces the challenge of 
primarily protecting the people who suffer under that regime or the sovereignty 
of the state. If the disputed territory, however, is ruled by clientele groupings 
who care more about their welfare than about that of the people, the 
international community would also have to take care of the oppressed people 
first, before addressing the political status quo of the country.  
De facto states are a phenomenon of states in transition. It is not the fault of 
the people if they have to live and to survive in divided parts of their home 
country. But the way how the international community accepts or does not 
accept the responsibility of support will have a great deal of influence on the 
future of the country, whether or not there will be one or more states, 
dictatorship rule or participatory governance. Fighting poverty is a matter of 
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Chapter 12. Can Defence, Development and Diplomacy Go 
Hand in Hand? A Practitioner’s Thoughts on the Challenges 
of Security Sector Reform 
 




These days, it is common for NATO and Western governments to stress the 
need for defence, diplomacy and development policy to go hand in hand. The 
idea is that they need shared goals, common guidelines and coordination in 
action. No one is saying that soldiers, diplomats and development workers must 
stand shoulder to shoulder in all their endeavours, but there is wide agreement 
that they need close coordination in several important fields. One of these is 
preventing and fighting terrorism. Another is helping other countries to improve 
their military, police and justice establishments, making them more effective and 
accountable. The jargon for this is Security Sector Reform (SSR). 
In this article, I will look at the common doctrine for SSR developed by the 
Western donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC). I will 
argue that some of the sound and sensible principles of Western SSR policy are 
hard to reconcile in the real world. There are paradoxes in the policy and 
practice of SSR support that limit its effectiveness and transparency. I will 
suggest ways to overcome these paradoxes. These comments will have a 
bearing not only on SSR policy in the narrow sense of the word. They will also 
apply to efforts by NATO member states to foster the development of 
democratic defence institutions in the Partnership for Peace (PfP). 
The idea of a comprehensive approach to defence, diplomacy and 
development is not entirely new. It has long been common to regard military 
and defence policy as a tool of foreign policy, and war as a continuation of 
politics by other means. However, it is only in the last few decades that Western 
countries have begun officially using the term ‘security policy’, which 
encompasses defence and diplomacy, and goes beyond both. It implies an 
approach to security that is not limited to national security or regime security, 
but also takes other dimensions of security into account. There is a strong and 
widespread desire among policy-makers to adopt a comprehensive approach to 
security. Many believe that the fundamental goal of security policy must be 
human security, meaning freedom from want and freedom from fear for each 
individual citizen: children, women and men.  
The other main novelty of the ‘Three Ds’ (defence, diplomacy and 
development) lies in the perceived nexus between security and development. 
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Security and development, we are told by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the European Union, depend on each other. Security 
provides an enabling environment for development, and development improves 
the capacity of the state and society to provide human security. It also 
contributes to human security by reducing poverty, ill health, marginalisation 
and injustice (OECD DAC, 2001). As Willy Brandt used to say: “development 
policy is peace policy”. 
If they are to tackle these related challenges in a comprehensive and 
consistent fashion, governments must carefully coordinate the efforts of all 
relevant state agencies. The OECD calls this the ‘Whole of Government’ 
approach, while the British prefer to speak of ‘joined up’ government. In 
Germany, government and civil society strive for greater ‘coherence’ in ‘civil 
crisis prevention’. This means coordinating all government-led efforts to prevent 
violent conflict and promote international peace and security by non-violent 
means. Contrary to what one might expect, the armed forces, development 
agencies and non-governmental organisations play important roles in the 
German policy of civil crisis prevention. The Federal Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development runs a programme similar to the US Peace 
Corps, called the Civil Peace Service (Bundesregierung, 2004). 
It seems churlish to resist these notions. How can one reasonably object to 
governments taking a wider view of security? Who would seriously maintain 
today that security is the exclusive job of diplomats, soldiers and police officers? 
Could anyone be against closer and better cooperation between the people 
working on security and those working on development? The holistic approach 
to security and development is appealing. However, it has its problems, some of 
which we will discuss below. 
 
 
What is New about SSR? 
There is nothing new about governments transforming their military, police and 
judicial establishments, and receiving aid from other countries for that purpose. 
Since 1945, hardly a year has passed without security establishments 
undergoing fundamental changes in several parts of the world. The causes or 
triggers include the gaining or loss of independence, changes in political 
regime, changing military postures, state-building, democratisation and the 
aftermath of violent conflict. All these are likely to lead to changes in a country’s 
defence and security policies and therefore in the state bodies that carry out or 
oversee these policies. In 2010, we are witnessing fundamental changes in the 
security sectors of Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Timor-Leste, Kosovo and several countries formerly 
under communist rule. 
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The establishment of security forces in West Germany during the 1950s is 
an interesting historical example of security sector reform or security sector 
development. At the time, German rearmament was a highly emotive issue, 
both at home and in the countries that only a few years earlier had been under 
German occupation. Rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany was 
made acceptable by tight integration into NATO, restrictions on the weapons the 
FRG was allowed to field, rigorous oversight by the parliament in Bonn and a 
new democratic ethic that sharply distinguished the Bundeswehr from its 
predecessors. Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, is often said to 
have described the purpose of the alliance, established in 1949, as “keeping the 
Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down”. It is uncertain that he 
ever spoke these words, but the quotation has nonetheless become a famous 
adage. The nineteenth-century Prussian notion of the army as ‘school of the 
nation’ - a concept ascribed to Lieutenant-General Hermann von Boyen, a 
contemporary of Clausewitz, who as the Prussian minister of war first 
introduced conscription in 1814 - was discarded. From now on, soldiers were to 
be considered ‘citizens in uniform’.  
The conditions under which West Germany established military forces were 
partly imposed by the Allied powers. NATO needed German forces to defend 
the Central Front, but there was a general agreement that Germany should not 
re-emerge as an independent military power. The government of the FRG, 
based in the provincial town of Bonn, did not resist the constraints imposed by 
the Allies. On the contrary, it embraced them and incorporated them into the 
new German state that it was building: a democracy with a modern and liberal 
constitution, a powerful parliament and an army whose only official purpose was 
to contribute to NATO defence. In the following, we will see that the 
establishment of the Bundeswehr followed the principal guidelines of SSR 
doctrine avant la lettre. 
What, then, is new about Security Sector Reform, as currently advocated 
and supported by the OECD, the European Union and their member states? 
 
 
A Developmental Approach 
Western SSR doctrine takes a developmental approach to security. It is worth 
noting that when the donor governments decided to develop a common strategy 
for supporting SSR overseas, they did this at the OECD in Paris. The OECD 
comprises 30 leading industrialised democratic countries.19 Its work mostly 
consists of studying and monitoring the economic, social and environmental 
activities of its member states and making recommendation on growth and 
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development. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD is 
an important body for consultation and coordination amongst donor 
governments regarding development aid. The OECD is neither a global nor a 
security-oriented organisation. Rather it is a club of rich and democratic 
countries (Mexico is a bit of the exception here) who are also the main providers 
of development aid. The Network on Conflict, Peace and Development 
Cooperation (CPDC) of OECD DAC produced a ‘reference document’ on SSR 
that was endorsed by the members of the organisation in 2004 (OECD DAC, 
2005).  
The donor doctrine on SSR developed at OECD DAC is developmental in 
the sense that it aims to “promote peace and security as fundamental pillars of 
development and poverty reduction” (OECD DAC, 2005: 12). Besides, it places 
heavy emphasis on notions that are held dear by the development community, 
such as local ownership and sustainability, but were until recently quite 
unfamiliar to the people who make and carry out security policy. 
 
 
A Broad Concept of Security 
Another new characteristic of the donors’ approach to SSR is that it defines 
security very widely. It calls SSR “a key component of the wider human security 
agenda, developed with leadership from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP).” The concept of human security, elaborated in UNDP’s 
Human Development Report of 1994, has two principal features. First, it 
focuses on the safety of each individual child, woman and man. Second, it 
comprises every conceivable aspect of safety, from physical security, via 
economic and social security to environmental security. Quite rightly, OECD 
DAC points out that this goes beyond the scope of Security System Reform 
(OECD DAC, 2005: 11). However, OECD DAC itself defines security very 
broadly, as “an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities 
live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; 
enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the 
basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment that is not detrimental to 
their health and well-being” (OECD DAC, 2001: 38). 
The omnibus definitions of security and development favoured by 
organisations like UNDP and OECD DAC are problematic from an analytical 
and conceptual point of view. They are an open invitation to circularity, 
question-begging and other forms of muddled thinking. If, like OECD DAC, we 
assume at the outset that security and development are Siamese twins, then we 
cannot go on to argue they are connected at the hip. This is meaningless, like 
saying that husbands and wives are related by marriage. The other conceptual 
problem is that when a term is bloated to the point that it encompasses 
everything, it ends up meaning nothing. For analytical discussions of security 
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and development, we need true definitions, that is to say clear demarcations of 
meaning.  
Of course, if security is an all-encompassing condition, it cannot be the 
exclusive responsibility of state security agencies. This is why OECD DAC 
prefers the term Security System Reform to Security Sector Reform. The 
security system ranges from the security forces to the state organs managing 
them, the official bodies that oversee them, the judicial and penitentiary system, 
up to and including civil-society and media organisations that monitor the 
security sector of the state. 
 
 
Building Capacity and Integrity 
The next distinctive feature of SSR doctrine according to OECD DAC is the dual 
purpose of SSR. Obviously, it should improve the delivery of security and justice 
services by enhancing the professional capacity of the security sector. Like the 
United Nations, OECD DAC stresses the need to ensure freedom from fear 
(OECD DAC, 2007: 21). However, OECD DAC argues more forcefully than the 
United Nations that the security sector must also be transparent, accountable 
and respectful of the rule of law. Therefore SSR must help to improve the 
integrity of the security sector and the quality of its governance. Indeed, OECD 
DAC attaches such importance to governance that the word was attached to the 
title of its 2005 reference document on SSR. Here the message is bold and 
clear: Improving capacity and building integrity goes together; you cannot pick 
and choose. If an international support programme only serves to make a 
country’s security sector more powerful or effective, but fails to remedy a lack of 
transparency and accountability, then, according to the Western donors’ 
doctrine, it is not SSR. We cannot say this with equal assurance about the UN’s 
SSR policy. 
The OECD’s heavy emphasis on accountability is all the more important 
because in practice, the de facto objective of international security assistance 
tends to be to improve operational capacity. Generally speaking, the 
governments of the host countries are much more interested in making their 
security forces stronger than in making them more accountable. The priorities of 
the donors are not always the same. They may have sound reasons to fear that 
making the host country’s security forces more powerful without improving 
control and oversight will result in greater insecurity for the population. When 
the authorities of a host country and their overseas sponsors disagree on the 
priorities for an SSR programme, this is not merely a political problem between 
them. It is also a clash between two hallowed principles of Western SSR 
doctrine: on the hand the need for a balance between building capacity and 
building integrity, and on the other hand the need for local ownership.  
There is no simple solution for these problems. However, in a true 
partnership, an attempt will be made to accommodate the wishes and concerns 
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of both sides. Ideally, this would yield a compromise that both fits local needs 
and is in line with OECD DAC’s guiding principles for SSR support. 
It would be unfair to disqualify the OECD doctrine for being a donors’ 
doctrine. The donors deserve praise for having stated their priorities in SSR 
support clearly and frankly, and for admitting that these do not necessarily apply 
to countries receiving SSR assistance. However, we must realise that this 
limitation makes the quest for local ownership all the more important. If as a 
result of donor pressure, SSR results in enhanced security for the population, 
then it is a good thing for donors to exercise pressure. However, in practice, it 
remains to be established whether programmes labelled SSR really follow these 
principles, and whether they succeed in achieving the desired outcomes. 
 
 
Local Ownership and Sustainability 
The next novelty in the Western SSR doctrine is its insistence on local 
ownership and sustainability. The restructuring and reforming of the security 
system is the responsibility of the country concerned. The process must be 
driven and led, indeed ‘owned’, by the government and society of the country in 
question. “Donors don’t do SSR, they support SSR”, says the OECD DAC 
Handbook on SSR of 2007. Its authors do admit that local ownership is a hard 
requirement to meet, because the country in question often lacks the capacity to 
design and run such a programme, even with foreign advisors. Another 
common complication is that beneficiaries and donors may fundamentally 
disagree about the goals of reform. The government that is to receive the aid 
may be only interested in improving the professional capacity of the police 
through operational training and re-equipment, whereas in the opinion of the 
donor governments (who are themselves answerable to their parliaments and 
voters) the main goal of SSR support should be to enhance the accountability 
and integrity of the police. The proposed solution to such problems is to make 
increased local ownership a goal of SSR assistance programmes, and to build 
political support for their ambitious objectives. 
Local ownership is important for its own sake. Without it, an SSR 
programme is unlikely to fit local needs and conditions and operate in a way 
that is culturally, economically and politically appropriate for the country 
concerned. There is, however, a longer-term consideration that is equally 
important. If an SSR programme does not fit the country well, if local 
stakeholders do not support it whole-heartedly, and if it continues to require 
massive external assistance, it will not be sustainable. Any gains it achieves are 
likely to be short-lived. The country may then revert to a situation hardly better, 
or even worse, than the conditions that the SSR assistance programme sought 
to improve. Therefore this insistence on local ownership and sustainability is a 
valuable contribution of the development community to the making and 
execution of security policy. 
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Unfortunately, the quest for local ownership is complicated by a paradox 
that is difficult to avoid or overcome. The providers of SSR aid expect, 
encourage and exhort the recipients to take the programme into their own 
hands. But a programme that is locally driven and managed will reflect local 
goals, concerns, sensitivities and ways of working. To be more precise, it will 
reflect what powerful local stakeholders want. It will not be fully in line with the 
priorities of the donors. Indeed, it may not meet conditions that the donors have 
set for SSR support. 
Here is an example from the real world. In 2008 a country recovering from a 
civil war agreed on a security sector development programme with a Western 
donor state. At the insistence of the donor, the plan, with an appended list of 
activities to be undertaken, was drawn up by the government of the host 
country. So it came as no surprise that the document is specific and detailed 
when it comes to the supply of money, trucks, computers and operational 
training for the military and the police, but short and vague as regards improving 
oversight. For the most part, such subjects are tucked away in a final section 
called ‘cross-cutting subjects’. The activities concerned were supposed to have 
been tackled in the first two years of the programme, but this period has 
passed, and to my knowledge nothing has been achieved. 
This leads me to think that there may be an inverse relationship between 
the local ownership of SSR programmes and the importance they attach to 
improved accountability. The stronger the former is, the weaker the latter is 
likely to be. Governments seeking foreign aid for their security sector usually 
want to enhance their power, not curtail it. The solution to this problem may be 
found in reflecting carefully on the role and responsibility of various 
stakeholders in SSR programmes. 
When donors support a Security Sector Reform programme, they become 
stakeholders. Foreign stakeholders, to be sure, but stakeholders. The success 
of the programme becomes important to them. They want to make sure it will 
make a good contribution to their security policy, their foreign policy and their 
development policy. They want to demonstrate this success to their 
parliaments, their media and their voters. They should be frank and resolute 
about their interests when negotiating an SSR support programme. At the 
general level, OECD DAC has clearly laid out what donors expect to achieve by 
supporting SSR programmes and what the requirements for success are. 
Individual donors engaging in a specific support effort for SSR should be 
equally clear and insistent about the conditions under which they can help. This 
will set limits to local ownership, but it is necessary nonetheless. 
Now let us consider local stakeholders. To its credit, OECD DAC avoids 
speaking of ‘national ownership’, perhaps because this term (favoured by the 
UN) suggests government ownership. OECD DAC stresses the important and 
essential contribution of civil society to the improvement and oversight of the 
security sector. Often, the priorities of civil society with regard to the security 
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sector are different from those of the government. For instance, civil society 
may be more concerned about the violation of human rights and civil liberties by 
the security forces, and more eager to put in place institutions and mechanisms 
that will watch over the security forces and hold them to account. If such civil 
society groups are officially included as partners in an SSR programme, this will 
provide foreign donors with legitimate local partners with an equal interest in 
accountability. 
The fourth and last guiding principle for SSR in the OECD DAC approach is 
sustainability, which to some extent is a function of local ownership. This is 
probably the least researched and least understood aspect of SSR and SSR 
assistance. Development studies have identified some of the requirements for 
sustainability in other fields, and we now need to do the same for SSR. 
Having reviewed the four guiding principles of SSR, we can now see that 
the birth story of the Bundeswehr illustrates their relevance. Some 55 years 
ago, the FRG was able to acquire modern armed forces with the acquiescence 
and the help of its allies because its military build-up went hand in hand with the 
development of democratic institutions and a culture of accountability. In this 
particular case, the complete integration of the Bundeswehr into the North 
Atlantic alliance was also an essential requirement. Notwithstanding external 
constraints and assistance, the process was owned and driven by the West 
German government and adequately supported by West German society. Had it 
been dictated by the senior NATO powers (the occupation forces, France, UK 
and USA) it would probably have been less well adapted to local needs and 
conditions, and its results would therefore have been less durable. In the event, 
the Bundeswehr has proved successful and sustainable. Rather than serving as 
a war-fighting force, it provides military support to a security policy rooted 
mainly in diplomacy and development.  
 
 
Whole of Government Approaches 
The last distinctive feature of SSR policy is the call of interagency and 
multidisciplinary cooperation. When donors support SSR in developing and 
post-conflict countries, they are committed to carefully coordinating the policies 
and activities of the government agencies and non-governmental organisations 
involved. This coordinated mode of operation is called a ‘Whole of Government’, 
‘joined up’ or ‘coherent’ approach.  
There are many difficulties associated with the Whole of Government 
approach. It is easy to prescribe, but hard to put in practice. Experience shows 
how fiercely and tenaciously government agencies resist working closely 
together. Their operational goals, their institutional interests, their cultures and 
their methods are often quite different. The solution commonly proposed for 
such problems is training. Indeed, good and sustained training programmes can 
help to combat prejudice, myopia and ignorance. But even if such obstacles can 
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be eliminated, there may be rational and valid reasons to avoid close 
cooperation between diverse agencies and organisations. 
For instance, people from various organisations cannot work together 
fruitfully unless their policy-makers have provided them with clear and specific 
objectives and guidelines for joint action. In practice, these are often lacking. It 
is not unusual to find inconsistencies and even contradictions between the 
goals and activities of various organisations supposedly serving the same 
strategic purpose. Sometimes, close interagency cooperation may be 
counterproductive or even dangerous. Several of the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams in Afghanistan require close civil-military cooperation between ISAF 
forces and development workers. But as desirable as this in some ways, a close 
association with foreign soldiers may jeopardise the public image, the 
effectiveness and even the safety of NGO workers. Now let us assume, for the 
sake of discussion, that all the diplomats, soldiers, police officers and NGO 
people working on behalf a donor country to support SSR support have 
synchronised their watches and are all on the same page. How will the 
stakeholders of the host country respond to this concerted approach?  
By the same logic that calls for the coordination of the donors’ efforts, the 
policies and activities of the host country should also be in unison. In practice, 
they are not. The countries engaging in SSR at home have no doctrine like the 
OECD DAC approach. The relevant United Nations policy document does say 
that “successful reform of the security sector needs political commitment, 
consensus and coordination among national actors” (UN SG, 2008:11), but that 
is a statement of fact, not a prescription. Developing and post-conflict countries 
are not committed to Whole of Government approaches. Even if they wanted to 
adopt such an approach, they would find this more difficult than the donor 
countries.  
Besides, the government of a country engaged in SSR may not necessarily 
be happy to see donor countries tightly coordinating their efforts, especially if 
they are doing this on an international level. This limits the opportunities of the 
aid recipients to play donor countries off against another and exploit the 
differences between, for instance, ministries of overseas cooperation and 
ministries of defence. By the same token, it makes the donors more effective 
and influential. For instance, the better the EU member states, the European 
Commission and the Council of the EU coordinate their separate and joint 
efforts to support SSR in developing and post-conflict states, the more they will 
be able to make a difference. If better coordination on the donors’ side makes 
host countries follow suit, in order to respond more effectively to the united front 







In 1995, Peter Volten established the Centre for European Security Studies 
(www.cess.org) a think tank that many associate with the Netherlands 
government and the University of Groningen. In fact, it is independent from 
both. With Peter Volten as its director, CESS has initiated and run programmes 
to promote democratic governance in the security sector of countries that were 
once allied with or part of the Soviet Union. During the Netherlands presidency 
of the EU in 2004, Volten also launched a similar programme in Turkey. Shortly 
afterwards, I joined CESS as its executive director. In the last fifteen years, we 
have run programmes to promote transparency and accountability in the 
defence and security establishments of young democracies. Countless CESS 
seminars, workshops, training courses and research projects have stimulated 
thinking and debate on democratic security policy, and helped local 
stakeholders to begin putting it into practice. 
Bearing in mind the questions raised above, it is relevant to ask whether an 
organisation based in Western Europe and working with donor money can 
make a useful and durable contribution to democratic reform. Are its 
programmes not ‘donor-driven’? If host country governments are really 
interested in what these programmes have to offer, why do they not more often 
pay for such projects? And if they are not really interested, what is the point of 
these projects? 
In trying to answer these questions, it is useful to distinguish between two 
stages in the political development of a transition country, before and after the 
revolution. ‘Revolution’ is taken here to mean the moment at which the 
government fully commits itself to the pursuit of democracy. Before the 
revolution, there will be considerable ambivalence in government circles of the 
host countries regarding activities to promote democratic governance in 
sensitive areas like the military, the police and the intelligence agencies. Under 
these conditions, host country governments will rarely seek foreign aid for such 
activities, though it may acquiesce in them, perhaps to please the West. CESS 
programmes launched under such conditions will necessarily be donor-driven, 
but not entirely. Our programmes are designed and implemented in close 
cooperation with local NGOs and think tanks in the host country. Unlike their 
governments, these NGOs are committed to democratic change. They ensure 
that the programmes are suited to local needs and conditions and will improve 
the chances for civil society to advocate democratic reform in their country. This 
is an important element of local ownership. Advocacy, debate and capacity-
building can help make it attractive, or indeed unavoidable, for governments to 
engage in serious democratic reform. This is how CESS programmes can help 
pave the way. 
After the revolution, conditions become more favourable. The host country 
may still need foreign money and expertise to push through reforms, but its 
political commitment to democratic change will be strong and clear. The 
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programmes proposed by CESS and its local partners are likely be regarded as 
instrumental to achieving the government’s goals. The scope for local NGOs to 
organise such activities will improve. Local ownership will expand and improve, 
despite the continued importance of donor aid. 
So I do believe that CESS programmes make a useful contribution to 
democratic security policy in transition countries, even when these programmes 
are largely driven by donor money and donor priorities. In fact, one can argue 
that we are most useful before the revolution, despite the low level of local 
ownership. 
CESS began working in Moldova in 2003, under a communist government, 
when political conditions were difficult and donor interest was much lower than 
today. The Netherlands and other donor countries enabled us to work with 
government and civil society. With the Institute for Public Policy and other local 
partners, we established the first project ever to support Moldova’s parliament in 
its task of overseeing the security sector. In 2009, everything moved towards 
change. Parliamentary elections brought a coalition of non-communist parties 
into power in Chişinău, and this government has clearly committed itself to 
democratic change. Foreign aid abounds. Naturally, CESS is continuing its work 
in Moldova, with increased and improved opportunities. However, I sometimes 
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Chapter 13. NATO Interventions in the Balkans. History, 
Perceptions and Analogical Reasoning 
 
Sipke de Hoop  
 
“Statesmen frequently turn to historic analogies for guidance when 
confronted with novel foreign policy problems … they usually pick 





Western Interests and Balkan Notions 
The internationally renowned Albanian writer Ismail Kadare once stated that the 
Balkans have always been incapable of solving their own problems and 
therefore always need external intermediaries. From a historical perspective 
one could even argue that West European powers contributed to the Balkans as 
a powder keg in the nineteenth century and the first half of twentieth century. 
These powers had their own agendas when intervening in the affairs of the 
Ottoman Empire and continued a policy of self-interest after the Balkan states 
became independent. In most cases Western powers did not contribute to 
stability and security and maintained quasi-colonial relations with the young 
Balkan states (Glenny1999). 
The creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the First 
World War, renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1927, illustrates the 
influence of Western powers in the past. Yugoslavia was formed because the 
Western powers needed a large country as a counterweight against future new 
German territorial ambitions. Yugoslavia also served as a buffer against the 
communist Soviet Union that just arose in the East.  
Yugoslavia was an artificial construction where peoples with different 
political, economic, cultural and religious backgrounds had to deal with each 
other. A central or a decentralised state was a constant factor in their political 
discussions, leading at certain moments to national movements in Croatia and 
Kosovo striving for autonomy or even independence. These wishes were 
counterweighted by the Serbs who were in favour of a centralised state. In the 
Second World War as well as in the 1990s these differences culminated in civil 
war, and Yugoslavia became the stage for ethnic cleansing. In the Western 
world journalists and even some politicians were inclined to analyse the 
Yugoslav wars of the 1990s in a historical pattern of ethnic hatred, with 
disregard for other factors like the leadership vacuum, economic crises and the 
absence of liberal political traditions or changing international circumstances 
(Ramet 2005, 70). The Yugoslav peoples themselves also referred to old 
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empires, historical animosities and past events to explain their behaviour and to 
back up their territorial contemporary claims.  
Winston Churchill once said that the Balkans have more history than 
Europe can deal with. Almost fifty years later that statement still seemed 
accurate. Both the Europeans and the Americans had difficulties understanding 
what was really going on in the Balkan region. There was a general lack of 
knowledge and the Western powers had different views on the nature of the 
conflict. Was this a civil war were all parties were guilty or was it a Serb war of 
aggression? Was it a war for self-determination, a failed transformation process 
or an explosion of ethnic hatred? When the war in Bosnia was prolonged, the 
Western partners were not able to reach consensus on the strategy.  
The purpose of this chapter is to show the linkages between the decision-
making process whether to intervene or not and the role of history and historical 
arguments in this process, by making use of the theory of analogical reasoning. 
Specifically, this chapter focuses on the (mis)use of history by policy-makers by 
comparing contemporary events with past events.  
 
 
From EU to NATO 
The Europeans took the lead when the problems in Yugoslavia started. The 
European Community (EC, in 1993 the EU) wanted to design an independent 
foreign policy and regarded Yugoslavia as a test-case. The chairman of the EC 
claimed in 1991 “this is the hour of Europe” (Poos, 1991), but the Europeans 
could not prevent the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The self-interest of the 
Europeans was stronger than their capability for conflict resolution. The best 
illustration of this is the installation of the Badinter Commission that had to draw 
up a list of criteria for recognition when the disintegration went further. The two 
main conditions for recognition that the Commission agreed upon on were 
control over their own territory for the new states and provisions for minority 
rights in their constitutions. Under these criteria Macedonia should be 
recognized, but Croatia could not meet them since the Serbs occupied parts of 
Croatian territory and there were, in contrast with Macedonia, no solid 
regulations on minority rights. However, the opposite happened. The Germans 
were strongly in favour of recognition of Croatia, and Greece blocked the 
recognition of Macedonia. Because of the ambitions for a common foreign 
policy the Europeans closed ranks. Their policy again contributed to instability in 
the region and was neither credible nor effective. 
During the first phase of the war in Bosnia the Europeans and later the 
United Nations came up with several peace plans that all failed. A European 
diplomat sighed once that perhaps one should build a wall to surround the 
Balkans and wait until the warring parties are done fighting. The Europeans 
were divided and indecisive, but they could not afford to stay at the sidelines. 
The main reason was of course that the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 
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backyard of Europe could lead to instability in Western Europe as well. Western 
values and human rights were at stake and an intervention seemed a 
humanitarian and moral obligation when more and more reports on ethnic 
cleansing became known.  
The policy of the US government in the early 1990s towards any kind of 
intervention in Yugoslavia can be characterised as reserved. All their attention 
was directed to the first Gulf War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
Concerning the Balkans, American politicians and diplomats asked why the 
United States should fight “Europe’s yesterday’s wars”. In their opinion 
Europeans should solve their own problems. However, in Bosnia in 1995 and in 
Kosovo in 1999 the USA eventually became the decisive force. The US-led 
NATO Operation Deliberate Force bombed the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 to the 
negotiation table, and in 1999 history repeated itself when Operation Allied 
Forces was launched against the Serbs to enforce them to accept the 
Rambouillet Accord.  
Of course there were differences between the two: the first operation was 
already successful after two weeks and was based on UN Security Council 
resolutions; the second operation lasted 77 days and was undertaken without a 
mandate from the Security Council. What Bosnia and Kosovo had in common 
was that the Europeans could not act decisively without the USA and that in 
both cases it took quite a while before the Americans entered the stage. One of 
the reasons is that they perceived the war in former Yugoslavia as an ethnic, 
religious, tribal war. 
George Kennan, a well-known American historian and influential diplomat 
wrote in 1993 in a report on the Balkan wars: “the Nationalism on the Balkans 
drew on deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal 
past … and so it remains today.” (Kennan 1993, 11). Robert Kaplan also 
favoured the notion of ancient Balkan hatreds. According to him, the region is 
so non-European, a region where people are deeply immersed in their bloody 
history: “a time-capsule world: a world upon which people raged, spilled blood 
...” (Kaplan 1993, xxi). Ivo Banac, another American historian and Yugoslavia-
specialist concluded in 1994 that “Western aloofness and indifference to the 
area itself and to any action or involvement” came from the perception that the 
Balkans differed too much from Western civilization as a consequence of 
century long dominance by the Turks (Banac 1993, 181). Richard Holbrooke, 
the famous American peace-maker for Bosnia, concluded in his book To End a 
War that “misreading of Balkan history” was one of the reasons for Western 
failure in Yugoslavia: the idea that ancient hatreds made it impossible for 
anyone outside the region to try to prevent the conflict. According to Holbrooke 
(1999, 21), US president Clinton and also Lawrence Eagleburger, the American 
ambassador in Yugoslavia and later Minister of Foreign Affairs, were influenced 




The theory of analogical reasoning, or Khong Theory, states that humans look 
for guidance to the past (Khong, 1992). This is not a deliberate process, based 
on any bias or conscious choice. People just rely on some 'sort of simplifying 
mechanism' to cope and to process massive amounts of information. These 
mechanisms are analogies and lessons learned from historical events (Khong 
1992; Houghton 1996, 524). It seems that analogies are “selected from more 
recent events rather than more similar events” and the available evidence 
“strongly supports the notion that decision-makers use analogies poorly” (Khong 
1992, 36). According to Khong (1992, 7), within the category of international 
policy makers US officials are “particularly predisposed to analogizing”. There is 
plenty of evidence that US foreign policy has been dictated by “warnings from 
history” (Hehir 2006, 73). Since the NATO interventions only took place 
because of the American leadership, this chapter will analyse the statements 
and ideas of US officials.  
The findings suggest that especially in the USA the hesitation or reluctance 
to develop an active policy concerning the Yugoslav disintegration in the early 
1990s had to do with analogical reasoning. The decision to become actively 
involved for the sake of the Kosovar Albanians in 1998-1999 also had to do with 
the so called 'lessons from the past'. In the case of Bosnia four analogies can 
be identified: The Viet-Malia analogy; the ethnic hatred analogy; the Balkan war 
analogy; and the Holocaust analogy. The first two did not encourage an active 
stance, but they were gradually replaced by the other two. In the case of 
Kosovo there were four analogies that encouraged an interventionist approach: 
the Bosnia analogy; the Munich analogy; the Dayton analogy; and the 
Operation Deliberate Force analogy. The Viet-Malia analogy, moreover, was 
also still influential. This analogy did not prevent a US-led intervention, but 
heavily influenced the chosen military approach. 
 
Bosnia and analogies 
The Viet-Malia analogy is based on the Vietnam syndrome, which is a dominant 
theme in US foreign policy, and the US experiences in Somalia in 1992. An 
influential factor in Washington was the fear that intervention in the Balkans 
could result in either a new Vietnam or a disaster akin to the intervention in 
Somalia (where eighteen US rangers were killed and the US pulled back its 
troops). The use of American ground troops in far away countries is not a 
popular theme. There was another complication: Americans do not care about 
foreign affairs. Presidential historian Michael Beschloss revealed that “from the 
beginning of 1993, President Clinton was very affected by this view”.(Redd 
2005, 137) Therefore Clinton was not eager to risk new military action and was 
not inclined to push heavily for the use of force. The degree of public support for 
such actions was limited and there were no direct national interests at stake. Ivo 
Daalder, in the mid 1990s a White House specialist on Bosnia and currently the 
153  
US ambassador to NATO, stated that the Clinton Administration believed that 
Somalia demonstrated conclusively that you cannot have any casualties (Redd 
2005, 138). 
The other analogy that in first instance deterred the Americans to undertake 
action was the ethnic hatred analogy: the suggestion that contemporary events 
in the Balkans were analogous to eruptions of ostensibly endemic ethnic hatred 
throughout Balkan history. In the first paragraph it was already made clear that 
this notion also influenced Clinton.  
These two analogies were replaced by two others when the incapability of 
Europe and the UN to address the problems in the Balkans became more and 
more visible and pictures of concentration camps and ethnic cleansing led to 
more pressure from public opinion and media in the US. The Holocaust analogy 
– we should never again allow ethnic cleansing in Europe – became popular. 
The US pleaded from 1994 for a lift and strike policy and airstrikes by NATO to 
halt the Serbs. The Europeans were against it because both would lead to 
escalation on the ground where they had stationed their military forces as UN-
troops. In 1994 and 1995 it became painfully clear that the UN could not prevent 
that the Safe Areas came under attack. The media compared the international 
policy with the appeasement politics in the 1930s towards Hitler, and the 
credibility of the international community was at stake. In 1995, after the fall of 
Srebrenica and continued shelling of other Safe Areas, NATO, backed by the 
UN, launched an attack, leading to the defeat of the Serbs and finally to the 
Dayton peace accord. 
The general tendency of the US and the EU to take a more active stance 
was also justified by the Balkan war analogy. The West has to prevent the 
Yugoslav conflict from engulfing the wider region or leading to global escalation. 
In this context the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 by a 
Bosnian Serb (leading to the First Word War) was cited as a justification for 
intervention. In reality there was not much risk for such a regional escalation. 
Already in 1992 the UN stationed peacekeeping units in Macedonia to deter the 
Serbs, but Belgrade had no intention to become involved in another war, 
especially since there was no large Serb minority to support as was the case in 
Croatia and Bosnia. In Kosovo, the Albanian majority (90%) was heavily 
suppressed by the Serbs. They chose a non-violent strategy and hoped for 
pressure from the international community. The Albanians had resisted 
incorporation in Yugoslavia in 1913, 1918, 1945 and in the 1970s they protested 
with success against their subordinate status; they received autonomy in 1974. 
Their autonomy was revoked by president Slobodan Milosevic in 1990 and 
since that time they strove for independence. 
  
Kosovo, motives and analogies 
After the peace accord of Dayton was enforced on the Serbs in 1995 the 
Albanians were very disappointed that there were no arrangements made for 
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their future. Young Albanians turned to armed resistance and the situation 
escalated. The Kosovo Liberation Front (KLA) attacked Serb police stations and 
the Serbs retaliated. After a major KLA offensive in February 1998, a Serb 
counteroffensive in June drove the KLA back, burning rebellious villages and 
displacing more than 200,000 persons.  
NATO ambassadors issued the threat of bombing to Milosevic in the 
summer of 1998, but in spite of an agreement for a ceasefire and a withdrawal 
of Serb troops (the Belgrade Accord, October 1998) fighting continued. 
Unarmed UN observers could only stand by, watch and write reports about the 
ongoing escalation. In January 1999 the massacre of 45 Albanian civilians in 
Racak (Kosovo) demonstrated to the public opinion the lack of political will of 
the West to carry out their June 1998 threat. Indeed, as Susan Woodward 
(2001, 333) stated, “disagreements among NATO states over the most effective 
military action (only air operations or also ground operations) and over the legal 
basis for intervention caused delay”. Daalder en O'Hanlon (2002, 164) 
concluded in this context that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana “kept 
insisting on the importance of getting NATO involved ... not only in the air but 
also on the ground”. The United States refused to consider a deployment of 
ground troops, whereas the European allies were sceptical about a bombing 
strategy. 
In Kosovo, history seemed to repeat itself: new ethnic cleansing while the 
West was issuing powerless warnings. Although the Albanians interpreted these 
messages differently, their expectation that escalation would lead to intervention 
were probably based on the earlier intervention in Bosnia. Alan Kuperman 
(2008, 69) even supposed that the Albanians switched from pacifism to 
rebellion and pursued a strategy of provoking Serb retaliation against citizens 
because they believed they could provoke humanitarian intervention. Another 
encouragement, according to Kuperman, was the Western habit to devote extra 
resources to the Balkans whenever violence escalated. The message of Dayton 
that only with violence one can achieve goals and draw international attention, 
was not only believed by the disappointed Albanians in Kosovo, but according 
to Kuperman (2008, 70), also encouraged by Western officials.  
Kuperman's implicit human intervention analogy is from a different 
perspective also mentioned by Woodward. She argues that the Western 
intervention in Kosovo, that was launched on 24 March 1999, was the logical 
outcome of a long process that started during the 1990s in response to the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and cases compared to it, such as Somalia 
and Rwanda (Woodward 2001, 331-333). 
Before the NATO operation started, the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians 
were ordered by the Americans to Rambouillet to reach a settlement. The 
Americans had already designed a peace plan with far-reaching autonomy for 
the Albanians. The agreement provided democratic government, peace and 
security implemented and supervised by NATO. After a three-year transitional 
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period, the mechanisms for a final settlement for Kosovo should be determined, 
including the possibility for a referendum on this matter. These conditions were 
not acceptable to Milosevic and after the final rejection in March, NATO started 
its intervention by air-assault.  
Before I turn to the analogies which played an important role, I first briefly 
analyse the motives for intervention. President Clinton addressed the nation on 
the night of the first airstrikes with the following words: “we act to protect 
thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We 
act to prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that 
has exploded twice before witch catastrophic results … let a fire burn here in 
this area and the flames will spread” (Clinton 1999). 
The first reason mentioned was to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. This 
had to be achieved by strategic and precision bombing on military targets 
(initially in Serbia) to reduce the capability of Serb forces to continue their 
violence. There was of course, as Michael Mccgwire (2003, 1-3) rightfully 
addressed, “a contradiction between the stated military objective of degrading 
Serbia’s military capability (a slow process) and the immediate political objective 
of halting the forced expulsions and associated killings in Kosovo”. The 
airstrikes did not prevent a crisis from becoming a catastrophe. On the contrary, 
the bombing led to an escalation strategy of the Serbs on the ground which 
could not be prevented without the use of ground forces. 
The second reason was the fear that an escalation in Kosovo would lead to 
regional escalation, drawing in countries like Albania, Turkey and Greece and 
destabilizing the fragile inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans. However, this was 
exactly what happened after the interventions. The ethnic cleansing politics in 
Kosovo caused huge flows of refugees in the region and the impact of the 
Kosovar Albanian influx in Macedonia had an impact on the radicalisation of the 
Albanians in this country. 
The third reason had to do with the growing pressure to get Kosovo sorted 
out before NATO’s 50th anniversary summit. The summit was intended as a 
powerful affirmation of NATO's continuing relevance in the post-Cold War world 
and the credibility of NATO was at stake after almost a year of threats to use 
force against Serbia. In this respect we should not underestimate the pressure 
of the media to act on behalf of the victims of violence. A last reason is the will 
not to repeat the mistakes of Bosnia and Rwanda. In this sense the intervention 
of NATO was not only a response to the violence in Kosovo, but also to the 
failure by Western powers and international organisations to protect civilians in 
Bosnia in 1992-1995 and in Rwanda in 1994.  
Apart from the humanitarian reasons, security interests and credibility 
concerns, there was according to MccGwire (2003) “a certain willingness to war 
among political leaders from NATO”, reflecting the opinion that Milosevic was 
“the root cause of the Balkan tragedy”. This idea was coupled with a “sense of 
revulsion and guilt” over Srebrenica, where 8,000 Bosnian Muslims were 
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murdered in 1995. Mccgwire (2003, 13) further argues that because of this 
willingness and because there was not much room for negotiation there is a 
“widespread impression that Rambouillet was set up to fail”. Aidan Hehir (2006) 
and Sébastian Barthe & Charles-Phillippe David (2007), who researched the 
role of analogies in decision-making, nuanced this view. In the words of Hehir 
(2006, 71): “The use of analogies steered the negotiations down a course that 
made it impossible to reach an agreement.”  
The key foreign policy players in the Clinton Administration were veterans of 
the policy debates that culminated in the US-led NATO intervention in Bosnia. 
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, became “the single driving force” behind 
a coercive diplomacy policy. President Clinton was preoccupied with the 
Lewinski Affaire and his defence against prosecution. One of his advisors later 
said that he “could hardly remember Kosovo in political discussions. It was all 
impeachment, impeachment, impeachment, there was nothing else” (Redd 
2005, 141). After the Racak massacre, Albright pushed forward the Rambouillet 
peace plan with elements that were not acceptable to the Serbs.  
In the decision-making process there are four new analogies that had a 
major impact. First of all the Bosnia analogy and the Munich analogy. Albright 
advocated the use of force from the beginning. Already in March 1998 when the 
problems in Kosovo began to resurface, she wrote: “we are not going to stand 
by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get 
away with doing in Bosnia” (Redd 2005, 142). She believed that Milosevic 
wanted regional domination, and the experience of Bosnia learned that only 
force could stop him. Negotiations, compromises and the quest for diplomatic 
solutions were akin to the failed policy of appeasement used at Munich in 1938 
to contain Hitler. Albright had fled Czechoslovakia following the German 
invasion. She advocated a hard stance to foreign threats and admitted that in 
her approach to Milosevic her “mindset is Munich”, and that “most of her 
generation's mindset is Vietnam” (Albright 2003, 27). Albright compared the 
Serb politics to the Nazi genocide of the Jews. Milosevic rejection to sign the 
Rambouillet accord was in her eyes “genuinely evil”, and her analysis was that 
he “only will listen to force”'. This vision is of course debatable. Looking at 
Dayton one could also conclude that Milosevic could be reasoned with and that 
he was susceptible to external pressure and economic inducements. 
In the Dayton analogy Milosevic was a man who would in the end see 
sense and broker a peace deal if offered enough incentives and threatened with 
enough intent. According to this analogy he would not risk NATO airstrikes and 
back down. Holbrooke, who played a key role in the negotiations both with 
Dayton in 1995 and in 1999 supported a robust uncompromising approach, 
because he believed Milosevic would give in: “it's obvious that Milosevic only 
responds to force or the absolute credible threat of the use of force” (Hehir 
2006, 75). Hehir concluded that key policy makers believed that Milosevic's 
commitment to Kosovo “was as malleable as his support for the Bosnian Serbs 
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proved to be at Dayton”. They never understood the historical and emotional 
importance of Kosovo for the Serbs. Kosovo was, unlike Bosnia, a recognized 
province of the Former Yugoslavia and was regarded as the cradle of Serbian 
civilization. The political success of Milosevic has been built on the Serbian love 
for Kosovo and giving in at Rambouillet would have been political suicide. 
The Operation Deliberate Force analogy, the last analogy that was used in 
favour of an intervention, referred again to Bosnia. If no agreement could be 
reached, then the Serbs would back down after a brief military campaign similar 
to the two week airstrike campaign in Bosnia. What has been neglected in this 
analysis is that in 1995 the air campaign was carefully coordinated with the 
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, who attacked the Bosnian Serbs at the 
same time with their ground forces. The concept of troops on the ground was in 
1999 excluded because the Joint Chiefs of Staff resisted the concept of sending 
US troops into Kosovo as part of a multinational invasion force. Their fears were 
directly linked to the still widespread Viet-Malia analogy (Barthe and David 
2007, 90-91). Another omission in the analysis and the comparison with the 
1995 operations was the supposed target of the airstrikes. In 1995 the Bosnian 
Serbs, who were dependent on external support from Belgrade, were the target, 
in 1999 the well-trained and well-equipped Serb army had to be defeated. The 
stakes were also much higher. Belgrade did not give in because they were 
fiercely against the deployment of NATO troops in their sovereign country.  
The Serbs themselves also had an analogy. The Yugoslav army believed 
that the bombing would not last long, because they saw the situation as being 
like Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in 1998 when the USA an Great Britain carried 
out a four-day bombing campaign, without getting new commitments from 
Hussein and with the alliance consensus withering away very soon (Barthe and 
David 2007, 78). Military advisers told Milosevic to hold out against what they 
assumed would be a similarly short campaign, but they underestimated that 
credibility forced NATO to go all the way. The refugee flows, the media attention 
and the public aversion towards the unfolding events in Kosovo made early 
suspension of the campaign politically impossible.  
The paradox in the Kosovo case is that ethnic cleansing and the massive 
refugee problem in the region were a direct consequence of the NATO 
airstrikes. The coercive diplomacy, without the use of ground troops, prolonged 
the war, aggravated the humanitarian situation, threatened the security in the 
region and as a consequence damaged the credibility of NATO. Barthe and 
David (2007) conclude that “the reliance on the images of Bosnia prevented the 
Clinton administration from seriously discussing the ground option”. This option 
was at last seriously considered in May 1999 when the air campaign proved to 
be ineffective. Only when the Western threat of a ground invasion became 
highly credible, Milosevic was prepared to negotiate.  
To be aware of history and the role it plays in international conflicts should 
be the lesson of this case study about NATO's interventions in the Balkans. 
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David Houghton (2001, 222), who studied the role of analogical reasoning in 
many US foreign policy situations, concluded on this topic: “Inevitable we will 
almost always be misled by analogy; nevertheless we are compelled to use 
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The Lisbon meeting in February 1952 stands out as one of the most important 
moments in the early history of the alliance. Based on the recommendations of 
the Temporary Council Committee measures were taken to improve the build-
up of balanced collective forces. A huge increase in defence forces was 
accepted for planning purposes. It called for the creation by the end of 1954 of a 
total of 42 ready divisions and 48 reserve divisions to be mobilized within thirty 
days. At the same time the Council decided to organize a yearly review of the 
military requirements of the alliance and the political and economic capabilities 
of the member states. Reconciliation of the defence requirements with the 
politico-economic capabilities lied at the heart of the process. In the 1950s and 
early 1960s the Annual Review (AR) was one of the most important tasks of the 
alliance and certainly of the International Secretariat. As Lord Ismay stated in 
his book about the first five years of NATO “the two words ‘Annual Review’ are 
probably heard more frequently in the offices of NATO Headquarters than any 
other combination of words in the English language” (Ismay 1955, 89).  
The AR process involved a continuous and intense dialogue between the 
central bodies of the alliance and the member states. The procedure was kept 
into being until 1966 when it was followed by the Defence Planning Review, 
which underlies the planning cycle of the alliance until today. This chapter will 
present an analysis of the Annual Review 1952 and 1953 and come up with 
some preliminary conclusions on the role of the various actors involved in the 
process with references to discussions in later years.  
 
 
Annual Review 1952 and 1953 
In Lisbon it had been decided to change the organizational arrangement of the 
North Atlantic Treaty and create a permanent body of national representatives 
to the organization, the Council Deputies. An International Secretariat headed 
by a secretary-general was also established and he and his staff moved to a 
new headquarters in Paris. Staff work had to be planned to cover the 
requirements of Annual Review. Military experts, specialists in equipment 
planning, statistical clerks and experts from defence ministries with experience 
in budget and finance matters were hired. Material and technical facilities had to 
be arranged too. 
To conduct the AR the Council established a special committee comprising 
members of the International Secretariat, representatives of the fourteen 
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member states and a member of the liaison office of the Standing Group in 
Paris The Annual Review Committee was chaired by Henry Vredenburch, 
Deputy Secretary General at the International Secretariat. The AR committee 
was charged with a threefold task in the process. Firstly, a continuous review of 
reconciliation was needed including political, economic and other obstacles in 
the way of achieving firm goals. They also needed to take care of the carry 
forward of the programme. Last but not least the committee needed to discuss 
the long-term implication of the military build-up and its maintenance.20 
 The AR Committee met for the first time on 9 May 1952 and discussed the 
principles underlying the AR further. It had been agreed that there should be 
“comprehensive Annual Reviews of the requirements for building and 
maintaining adequate defensive strength on a realistic foundation of politico-
economic capabilities” (Ismay 1955, 89). Immediately a discussion emerged on 
how to conduct the review. Should the force goals accepted at Lisbon in 
February of that same year serve as a starting-point or was there a need for a 
revised assessment, as the Canadian and Belgian representative argued. 
During one of the first meetings of the AR Committee the US Representative, 
L.T. Merchant, stated that the ultimate purpose in his opinion was the 
achievement of maximum combat-ready balanced collective NATO forces. 
Other representatives, notably the French member of the committee, 
emphasized the need to discuss an equitable distribution of the defence 
burden.21 The British representative Eric Roll pleaded for a different approach 
and wanted to take the national defence programmes as a starting point (Roll 
1985, 86-90). The committee also learned from the Standing Group Liaison 
Officer, rear admiral R. Dick, the Standing Group did not intend to scrutinize the 
military programmes of the member states as this was a responsibility of the 
Council.22  
In May the Standing Group formulated new force goals beyond 1954 and 
noted that based on new intelligence estimates an increase to 98 divisions for 
1955 was a military prerequisite. They considered the agreed forces goals not 
sufficient in the light of the trends in Soviet policy and overall security threat to 
the alliance. The situation was even more urgent because German contingents 
to the allied defence effort had not been agreed upon because ratification of the 
European Defence Community was still pending. In a meeting of the Council 
Deputies US ambassador Draper expressed his serious reservations on the 
feasibility to achieve the force goals proposed by the military authorities. 
Preliminary American analyses revealed a gap between the forces proposed by 
                                          
20
 Record meeting Annual Review Committee (ARC), 9 May 1952, AC/19-R/1. NATO 
Archives Brussels, Annual Review Committee AC/019. See also Council memorandum 
on committees, CM(52)15, 31 May 1952. 
21
 Record meeting ARC, 16 June 1952, AC/19-R/3(revised)4. NATO Archives. 
22
 Record meeting ARC, 16 June 1952, AC/19-R/3 (Revised); Statement by SG Liaison 
Officer read out at the meeting ARC 16 June 1952. Annex to AC/19-R/3 (Revised). 
NATO Archives. 
161  
the Standing Group and the prospective resources available to meet them. In 
particular the costs for major materiel equipment could not be met by the 
defence budgets. He argued it was therefore of utmost importance during the 
AR to analyze the most effective way to reduce this gap. “The balance between 
the size of the forces and the levels of equipment must be explicitly dealt with, 
as must also the problem of estimating the continuing maintenance and 
replacement requirements and providing for them both production-wise and 
financially.”23 The aim should be to arrive at a firm force plan for 1953, a 
provisional goal for 1954 and a planning goal for 1955, which were in the range 
of feasibility.  
This would become the starting point for the Annual Review procedure. A 
questionnaire was submitted to the member states on 9 July and consisted of 
two parts. In part A countries were asked to give an overview of the military 
efforts. All information had to be presented in tables completed with an 
explanatory note. Detailed information was requested concerning the military 
forces available and provisional planning figures for forces planned to be 
available for NATO at a later date. Supplementary tables called for information 
on military requirements, the availability of equipment and infrastructure. Part B 
demanded information on the economic situation of the country and an outline 
of the definition and classification of defence expenditures.  
The member countries had difficulties to come up with the information 
requested and the country replies to the questionnaire, which should have been 
presented by 31 August, were not received till 15 November. The procedure 
was postponed and had be revised several times during the process. The delay 
was partly due to inexperience and inadequate facilities. The receipt and 
distribution of the material for instance required over a million pages to be run 
off, assembled and distributed, as each country reply comprised at least 300 
pages.24 And only in November it was decided to establish technical teams 
within the International Staff to study the country submissions. Apart from the 
military considerations team, there were four separate teams dealing with 
defence expenditure, equipment, infrastructure and economic capabilities.25  
The Annual Review disclosed other political, economical and military 
problems too, both within the countries and among the member states. The 
British pleaded in favour of a reduction in armament as nuclear weapons would 
reduce requirements for conventional weapons. The US had difficulty to come 
up with information as the American government had initiated a review process 
that would ultimately result in lower ground and air force goals than the Lisbon 
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goals or the Standing Group goals (Condit 1988, 382-383).The French were 
tenacious and adamant when they insisted during the meetings on timely and 
adequate information about American force strengths and military expenditures. 
The Dutch minister of Defence, Cornelis Staf, in a report to the ministerial 
council in The Hague told his colleagues that the French sabotaged the 
process.26 When the Americans were pushed to the wall, the outgoing Truman 
administration did not have enough perseverance to enforce decisions and had 
to leave final decisions to the new Eisenhower administration.  
In November the reports of the technical teams were ready whereupon two 
weeks of intense discussions followed in which all country reports were 
discussed by the AR committee, two or three at a time. All in all there were eight 
meetings. At every meeting national delegations comprising four 
representatives from the countries under discussion were present as well as 
representatives of the national delegations to NATO and the staff members of 
the technical teams. There was a great interest from the national delegations to 
NATO for this process of collective scrutiny of national defence efforts. A year 
later the procedure would be elaborated. Each delegation now studied the 
replies of a number of countries and attended the interviews arranged with the 
countries for which they had responsibility.27 Although not every delegation 
attended every examination, they had the right to be present.  
Due to the delays the first report on the Annual Review 1952 was presented 
as an interim report. The Annual Review Committee would continue its work 
and submit a final report in the Spring.28 The interim report had three parts The 
first part was a progress report on the developments in 1952, the prospects for 
1953 and of problems that needed to be solved. The second part of the report 
were team reports and technical studies, while the third part were the country 
studies. The special studies comprised reports on military technical issues such 
as the standard of readiness, major equipment deficiencies, operational 
reserves but also studies of a more general character like the study of the spare 
part problems. An analysis of the plans for 1953 revealed that these plans 
appeared to be within the economic capabilities of the countries, but additional 
funding was required for improvements in defence such as improvement in the 
standards of readiness, formation of operational reserves for 30 days, logistical 
support and infrastructure. The report demanded guidance on a number of 
issues both in regard to possible increases in resources available for defence 
and regarding possible changes in planned effort.  
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At the North Atlantic Council meeting on 18 December the ministers 
accepted the report and adopted agreed decisions.29 Prudently the document 
insisted on measures to maintain and if possible to increase resources devoted 
to defence. The recommendation on the necessary adjustments in force plans, 
however, was cast in clear language. “Where resources are inadequate to meet 
in full the military desirable force plans, emphasis should be given to the 
effectiveness of the forces rather than to numerical increases in units 
inadequately supported.”30 This is indicative for the value assigned to the advice 
of military authorities. It was also a conclusion that would set the stage for 
further discussions in the years to come. 
Early January 1953 the AR committee discussed the programme of future 
work to finalize the work of the Annual Review 1952 and tried to elicit more 
information from SHAPE for the standards of readiness for land forces. The 
committee emphasized full participation of military authorities was essential for 
the work of the committee.31 So when the Standing Group proposed to submit 
the reports and recommendation only to the country concerned the Belgian 
representative, R. Ockrent, emphasized the multilateral approach of the Annual 
Review. “Some departure from the strict multilateral approach had to be 
accepted, because of the time factor. But he felt that the very limited distribution 
of information proposed by the Standing Group would tend to rob the Annual 
Review of all real value.”32 In the end it was decided to discuss the 
recommendations of the military authorities and their recommended firm goals 
for 1953 in the committee and include them verbatim in the final report on the 
Annual Review 1952.33 Accoriding to the military authorities deficiencies for air 
forces were most seriously, in particular for interceptor fighter and all-weather 
fighter aircraft. Armed forces were hampered by inadequate training and an 
insufficient number of regular personnel as well as shortages of equipment.  
The resolution on the AR 1952 adopted by the North Atlantic Council in 
April 1953 noted with satisfaction that many recommendations of the military 
authorities had been accepted by countries and urged governments to take all 
steps necessary to attain the firm force goals for 1953.34 Simultaneously the 
Council considered the agreed force goals not adequate and required a 
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progressive build-up of the size and effectiveness of NATO defence forces. It 
was followed by a long list of considerations, recommendations and requests to 
the national governments on a variety of issues such as the importance of the 
European Defence Community, improving combat readiness of forces, financial 
and economic factors, standardisation and defence production..  
 
 
The Annual Review Procedure 
A second resolution adopted by the North Atlantic Council in April 1953 gave 
guidance for the AR 1953 and called for a simplified procedure. The request 
would be repeated in the years to come. All the same, the procedure would 
become even more complicated in the following years mostly because there 
was no previous international experience in this field and sometimes because of 
simultaneous requests of higher authorities. In regard to the AR 1953 for 
instance the Council demanded special consideration for the annual recurring 
costs and, in addition to the goals for the next three years, also asked for 
guidance for 1957 as needed for long-range planning of equipment.35  
A working group on procedure had been created a couple of months earlier 
under the chairmanship of J.K. Horsefield of the Finance and Economic division 
of the International Secretariat.36 Discussions on the questionnaire in greater 
detail and the timetable for the Annual Review would become the core business 
of this working group. The group discussed and agreed on technical details 
such as the timeframe for the calculations and how to measure the status of 
military units, or defence expenditures for that matter. Some countries used a 
calendar fiscal year, others operated on a different fiscal year. Defence 
expenditures for instance were not measured in the same way by all countries. 
To give but one example: some member states included costs for military 
pensions, others did not. How to present the tables regarding planned forces 
and information of military production capabilities was also brought up for 
discussion. A recurrent issue was how to simplify the procedure and in 
particular to diminish the large amount of figures and huge number of detailed 
information on military equipment. The Dutch representative expressed doubt 
whether “the mountains of papers now submitted are within the powers of the 
International Staff properly to digest” and noted that was certainly beyond the 
powers of the national representatives”.37 Over time a procedure developed in 
which four phases can be distinguished. 
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The initial step in the procedure was to send a questionnaire to all the 
member countries. The questionnaire itself was drafted by the subcommittee. 
Over the years it would change slightly, but generally speaking the document 
asked the countries to submit information on their defence effort as well as on 
their financial and economic capabilities. Apart from the military information the 
questionnaire asked for economic basic data and financial aspects of the 
defence programme. The second stage took place in the capitals of the member 
states where several branches of the government had to cooperate and 
coordinate to provide information to NATO. Special military teams of the allied 
headquarters paid visits to all member states and gave planning guidance. 
When countries had completed and submitted their replies the third and most 
important phase began. The national reports were carefully studied by allied 
civil and military authorities. The latter formulated detailed recommendations for 
improvement from the military point of view. The International Staff studied the 
equipment tables as well as economic and financial figures submitted by the 
countries. A draft report on every country including recommendations was then 
presented and discussed with the national delegation. After these examining 
sessions the Annual Review Committee prepared a report for the Council and a 
draft-statement of defence. The AR reports contain two parts, a general one 
and an analysis of the situation in every member state. The report also 
maintained recommendations to every member state. During the fourth and final 
stage of the process the report was discussed in the December meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council and a resolution on defence adopted. Although the 
procedure developed and changed over time, the basic outline remained the 
same over the years.  
This analysis of AR 1952 serves as the basis for some preliminary 
conclusions on the role of allied civil and military authorities involved. The 
manner in which harmonization was brought about will also be evaluated. 
 
 
Comments and Advice from Military Authorities on National Plans 
The force goals for 1954 as accepted in Lisbon 1952 came under discussion 
while the ink was still wet. As already indicated above the Standing Group 
formulated new force goals in May 1952. The military authorities of NATO also 
started to work on a revision of the strategic guidance which would result in the 
adoption of MC 14/1 in December 1952. In this document too the Military 
Committee maintained that conventional forces available fell short of 
requirements and argued the alliance should use “all types of weapons” for the 
initial air offensive. If weapons of mass destruction should become available in 
greater numbers the re-evaluation of requirements might be necessary (Pedlow 
1998). 
Within the Annual Review procedure the military authorities had to take the 
political guidance by the North Atlantic Council as their starting point and had to 
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work within the limits of the political and economic framework as agreed upon 
by the member countries. Both the Standing Group and the Supreme 
Commanders issued comments and recommendations for improvement to 
individual countries. In the Fall of 1952 the military commanders paid visits to 
the member countries to discuss their contribution to allied defence. Thereupon 
the United Kingdom suggested to include these visits in the procedure. The 
visits had a dual purpose of giving the supreme commanders additional 
information and providing them with a basis on which to make 
recommendations.38 The proposal was accepted and SHAPE started to sent so-
called ‘visiting teams’ to the member countries to discuss the annual 
submissions. The highest military authorities in the alliance, the Standing Group 
on the other hand tried to keep their distance. Vice-admiral R.M. Dick, Standing 
Group Liaison Officer at the International Secretariat, emphasised the visiting 
teams were the sole responsibility of Supreme Commanders and raised 
objections against all attempts of the Annual Review Committee to tie the 
Standing Group into the process. 39  
This is a clear indication of the diverging roles the two military bodies would 
come to play in the Annual Review process. It can be partly explained by 
differences in competences. The Standing Group was responsible to provide 
military advice to the political leaders and considered itself responsible only to 
the North Atlantic Council. In 1952 they focused on the development of a new 
strategic guidance and got deeply involved in a discussion on how to 
incorporate nuclear weapons into NATO strategy. The Annual Review was not 
their first priority and definitely not their main concern. Disagreements over the 
military structure of the alliance prevented that international military advice 
could be developed for the alliance. The SG was composed of military 
representatives of the US, the UK and France. The SG was superior to the 
allied commanders and could issue guidance and direction to them. Formally 
the Standing Group was subordinate to the Military Committee, which had a 
representative of each member state, and during the greater part of the 1950s 
this was the cause of great problems of coordination. Rivalries among the 
members of the SG itself added to these problems. Gradually therefore 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe became the main focal point for military 
planning. According to Douglas Bland apart from the responsibilities and the 
personal prestige of SACEUR, the immediacy of the allied headquarters to 
Europe’s military problems are the main reasons for this (Bland 1991, 148). The 
Annual Review illustrates the latter point. Officials at SHAPE got deeply 
involved in the AR procedure and got intimate knowledge about the national 
planning processes and the problems member states had to deal with in the 
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build-up of their forces. Their mission statement and practical approach to solve 
problems served them well in the end.  
 
 
The Role of the International Secretariat 
When the first AR started NATO’s International Secretariat (IS) was still in the 
making and had to work with an inexperienced staff. Recruitment for the 
Economics and Finance Division for instance was not yet completed and some 
experts were loaned to the International Secretariat (Jordan 1967, 213).40 The 
other two major divisions, the Political Affairs Division as well as the Production 
and Logistics Division also got involved. The IS had to conduct the day-to-day 
coordination of the process and under the chairmanship of Lord Coleridge, 
Deputy Executive Secretary, a steering committee coordinated the activities of 
the various divisions and working groups. This steering committee had only 
limited responsibilities as the Annual Review Committee itself was responsible 
for supervision. Proposals to limit the number of representatives in the 
committee or to create an executive agency met with opposition. The member 
countries wanted equal access to all information and operate on an equal 
footing.  
During the 1950 the role of the International Secretariat gradually increased 
because the review process developed into a routine procedure which required 
the gathering and analysing of detailed information not only on defence 
expenditures, but about economic and financial data as well. The 
comprehensive, time-consuming and routine nature of the collection of data 
contributed to a growing responsibility of the International Secretariat. The 
Report on the 1954 Annual Review claimed that the recommendations in the 
country reports, although discussed in the AR Committee, were the 
responsibility of the International Staff.41 This was a deviation of the procedure 
as agreed earlier and was probably caused by the delay in the submission of 
country replies.42 Apparently no one objected, on the contrary a few months 
later the procedure for this section was adapted and now became common 
practice for this stage of the procedure. Thereafter drawing conclusions and 
recommendations of the country chapters remained the responsibility of the 
IS.43 It was also agreed the IS would prepare a short general chapter on the 
main military problems and other points of general significance to the defence 
effort of NATO. As the delegations did not designate a chairman from their 
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midst the newly appointed Assistant Secretary-General for Economics and 
Finance, Fernand-Didier Gregh, was appointed to that position.44 In his study of 
the administration of the alliance Robert S. Jordan noticed a trend to make 
more use of senior officers of the IS as chairman of Council Committees and 
regarded it as a result in experience in working together and of an increase of 
confidence between national delegations and the International Staff (Jordan 
1967, 290). The examination of the AR procedure demonstrates that it was both 
the nature of the process and the way the procedure was carried out by the 
officials that contributed to a growth in confidence in the International 
Secretariat. The Annual Review process thus contributed to the trust in the 
organization and helped to establish the IS as the centre in the organizational 
structure of NATO. 
 
 
A Truly Multilateral Procedure? 
During the first year the national delegations showed great interest in the 
examining sessions. Allied consultation on war planning in times of peace was 
an innovation in international relations and the main element why the procedure 
qualifies as a truly multilateral one. The multilateral character of the process 
was cherished by many individuals that were involved and some of the smaller 
member states. In particular the Belgian representative R. Ockrent often 
brought it up for discussion in the meetings of the Annual Review Committee. In 
February 1954 he tried, together with his Italian colleague R. Ducci, to increase 
the multilateral character of the procedure by incorporating the military 
representatives of the countries, but their proposal was rejected.45 Internal 
Dutch memo’s in 1954 also point out the unique and productive character of the 
exercise. It was a procedure which would offer an appropriate format to develop 
a sound collaboration with Germany too, the memo added.46 In his memoirs the 
Dutch Deputy Secretary of Defence Calmeyer who chaired the Dutch delegation 
a few years later claims it was one of the most valuable elements in NATO and 
adds: “It was the most difficult exam I ever took, far more difficult than any 
debate in Parliament. The committee basically knew their business and had 
comparable data of other countries. In terms of financial and economic potential 
the committee was better informed about our capabilities than I was” (Calmeyer 
1997, 511, 618). 
The AR process thus served to gain a clear understanding of the national 
contributions to the alliance. It does not automatically follow that ‘harmonization’ 
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or ‘reconciliation’ of national defence plans with the changes considered 
desirable by NATO was brought about. On the contrary, negotiation was at the 
centre of the AR process because defence requirements needed to be 
reconciled with the political and economic capabilities of the member countries 
and NATO as a whole. The aim was to develop target figures for the build-up of 
military forces which were accepted by the national authorities. Differences of 
emphasis were noticeable from the beginning however.  
As the negotiating procedure offered numerous opportunities to influence 
the process many of the parties involved had their own additional purposes for 
the AR. One of the issues that complicated the process was the American 
military assistance programme. The United States used the outcome of the AR 
process as a guidance for planning purposes in their own aid programme. 
National governments in Europe tried to elicit firm commitments from the US, 
promises to speed up the deliveries of military equipment the Americans or 
guarantees that spare parts would be included in the end item programmes. 
Only NATO-assigned units were eligible for military assistance and extending 
the national commitment to NATO increased the prospect for American support.  
I have analysed elsewhere how the Dutch minister of Defence Staf played 
this gamble in two directions to get additional American military equipment 
(Megens 1994,138-147). In the Dutch cabinet he made a parade of the promise 
of American support to convince other ministers to furnish an additional army 
division to the alliance. The Dutch military included corps support troops for this 
division too, but diplomatic representatives considered this to be contrary to the 
defence plan as accepted to the Dutch cabinet. The 7 December division was 
no more than a stripped division with Indonesian veterans. Difficulties within the 
delegation notwithstanding the Dutch succeeded to use the discrepancies to 
their advantage during the examining sessions at the end of 1953. When 
SHAPE accepted the unit as a NATO commitment and the division was 
included in the Annual Review minister Staf also obtained US approval of the 
plan as a basis for aid programming.  
Disagreements within national delegations were not uncommon. Both civil 
and military national authorities tried to use the international process to 
influence decision-making at the national level. In his memoirs Calmeyer writes 
he had to defend the Dutch defence policy in front of the Annual Review 
committee even if he often agreed with the critics and used their points of 
criticism in the Dutch cabinet (Calmeyer 1997, 619). “It resembled a chess 
game with merely horse jumps” another Dutch participant observed (Evers 
1997, 46). National military authorities used the process to underline the 
importance of certain units, specific equipment or other demands.  
For NATO's military authorities the AR also offered the opportunity to 
investigate specific issues that warranted more attention in their opinion like air 
defence. Without any exception NATO officials and country representatives who 
were closely involved in the Annual Review process describe the long 
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discussions and tough negotiations about national contributions to allied 
defence. Lord Ismay was perhaps the most outspoken when he labelled it “the 
long drawn agony of the Annual torture”. When he quoted these words in his 
memoirs Henry van Vredenburch, chairman of the Annual Review Committee, 
added that Ismay thus wisely kept his distance. Vredenburch too labeled the AR 
as “a very time-consuming exercise giving little satisfaction, useful and 
necessary it might be ...” (Vredenburch 1985, 469).  
It is as yet too early to come up with conclusions on the impact of the 
Annual Review as no scholarly literature is available and only scattered 
references can be found elsewhere. In his analysis of the first five years of 
NATO Lord Ismay maintains it was “an efficient means for collecting precise 
information, sifting it, drawing conclusions from it and then acting” (Ismay, 
1955). Dutch ambassador and later Secretary General to NATO, Dirk Stikker, 
argues the AR was “always an incentive to greater efforts” (Stikker 1966, 259). 
In an unpublished memorandum professor Geoffrey Goodwin who studied the 
Annual Review process of 1958 stated by way of conclusion: “the impact of the 
Annual Review (later, biennial) on government attitudes and policies is very 
difficult to measure, and will naturally vary from country to country, but on some 
issues, or on some occasions, a country may be open to suggestions while 
remaining adamant on others.” However, “it can help to focus minds on the 
collective needs of the Alliance, and, in the process, not only to smooth off the 
rough edges of national policies but also to induce a frame of mind not rooted 
exclusively in a narrowly conceived national interests” (Taylor 1978, 202-204; 
Taylor 1990, 35). 
The Annual Review was a complicated bureaucratic process which needs 
to be examined in greater detail by historians as well as IR scholars because it 
provides an excellent opportunity to study the internal performance of the 
alliance. The process may also put another light on the way national and 
international decision making were tied together as it was part of a game that 
was played simultaneously at numerous chessboards. Studying the AR 
applying concepts such as multilateral-level governance we will get a better 
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More than twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall the intensity of the 
debate on European security leads many to believe that the continent’s stability 
is in jeopardy. Numerous strategy papers on European security refer to 
historically unprecedented challenges and threats, such as terrorism, failed 
states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks and 
energy security. Apart from this daunting security environment, strategists point 
to shifting geopolitical balances: with the emergence of new sovereign powers 
we are heading towards a messier, multi-polar world that will no longer be 
primarily dealt with by the current multilateral mechanisms that were inspired by 
the West. All this uncertainty generates uneasy debates among Europe’s 
security establishments. Late 2010, NATO produced a new strategy while the 
alliance is bitterly divided over Russia and its ISAF mission in Afghanistan is not 
going well. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is bogged 
down in institutional turf wars over its external policy, while the currency crisis is 
calling the entire European project into question. The OSCE, the only truly pan-
European security forum, is having a hard time explaining its relevance and 
Russia has tabled a new draft European Security Treaty, because it considers 
itself a strategic outcast. So much for the euphoria that erupted after the end of 
the Cold War about Europe’s prospects. 
However, is it really all that bad? Or is there something virtual about 
considering Europe as a danger zone. Maybe we need to take a fresh look at 
European security. We may get one by zooming in on one of the remedies 
invariably suggested for improving our security: better NATO-EU cooperation. 
At the same time, we should evaluate Europe’s overall security situation and 
NATO’s current position as the most important vehicle for transatlantic relations. 
Finally, we should examine the question whether it is imperative that Europe 
further develops a common foreign and security policy to become a significant 
international player and, if so, how to translate this assignment into a new 
partnership with the US.  
 
 
Tearing Down the Brussels Wall 
Most observers find it nearly impossible to explain why two Brussels-based 
organizations, with their overlapping memberships, find it so difficult to get their 
act together. This act ideally consists of combining the two organizations’ 
unique qualities into a comprehensive approach to crisis management. This 
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concept has become fashionable in the framework of the international 
community’s presence in Afghanistan and amounts to fusing military, 
development assistance and diplomatic instruments into a single, aggregate 
policy. Actually, a comprehensive approach is about everything that the USA 
did not apply in Iraq. In the case of NATO and the EU, this would mean linking 
the former’s hard power tools to the latter’s soft power tools, preferably under 
the aegis of the United Nations. Some observers even consider bringing these 
two primary Western institutions together as a strategic fix to re-establish the 
West’s dominance in the world (Drozdiak 2010). 
 
Cyprus 
The most cited and conspicuous reason for the lack of cooperation is the 
political stalemate surrounding Cyprus. In short: ever since Cyprus joined the 
EU in 2004, NATO member Turkey has been blocking Cypriot cooperation with 
the alliance, while Cyprus prevents Turkey’s access to institutions such as the 
budding European Defence Agency. Thus, the NATO-EU debate is confined to 
the realm of the so-called ‘Berlin plus arrangements’, the mechanism 
hammered out in 2003 that provides for EU-led operations making use of NATO 
assets and capabilities. Cyprus, which for obvious reasons does not have a 
security agreement with NATO, is excluded from these arrangements. In 
practice, therefore, the main topic that NATO and the EU can discuss safely 
together is Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only theatre where Berlin plus – an already 
‘un-comprehensive’ concept since it rules situations that do involve the EU but 
do not involve NATO – is applicable. 
Of course, this political issue is a major obstacle to improving NATO-EU ties 
– and a stark reminder of the sound advice that institutions shall never import 
trouble, the way the EU did when admitting Cyprus without the island’s partition 
being settled. But if by some magic this stalemate would all of a sudden be 
lifted, do we really believe NATO and the EU would together live happily ever 
after? Maybe the Cypriot question serves as a useful pretext behind which more 
structural problems are lurking. Apart from their different scopes, NATO and the 
EU have their own, distinctive characteristics. The former is a US-led and highly 
political military alliance, while the latter is more of a regulatory body under 
alternating lead-coalitions, aspiring towards a more political external role. Next 
to this, NATO’s consensus principle works differently from the EU’s unanimity 
rule that governs its external policies. Is it plausible that these heterogeneous 
entities would manage to agree on some kind of complementary division of 
labour? Probably not.  
 
Different Animals 
Both organizations are engaged in complex transition processes with uncertain 
outcomes. NATO is supposed to be transforming from a classical self-defence 
organization into a more general security organization able to project power far 
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beyond its treaty area. But the intake of former Warsaw Pact countries and 
Soviet republics necessitates reassurance measures against perceived threats 
emanating from Russia, while ISAF, NATO’s most ambitious out-of-area 
mission to date, is straining the alliance’s cohesion. Its new strategy is a 
politically correct, but half-baked compromise between collective defence and 
collective security.  
Hopes for NATO-EU rapprochement ran high when in 2009 France finally 
rejoined NATO’s military structures. But the flipside of this deal was a stronger 
commitment to the EU’s common security and defence policy: a deal that 
mainly concerns London, since Anglo-French cooperation will be crucial in 
fulfilling this ambition which ultimately will have to cause friction with the 
alliance. In 2009, too, the EU adopted its long awaited Lisbon Treaty that would 
pave the way for more concerted policies. But ever since, the Union has been 
struggling how to make the treaty’s complex provisions work in practice, while 
the financial crisis of 2007-2010 has consumed most of the EU leaders’ 
attention, raising even more fundamental questions about Europe than its 
external dimension. To sum up: the current environment seems particularly 
hostile for these two altogether different organizations, both in the process of 
(re)formulating their goals and ambitions, to strike a deal that would position the 
one vis-à-vis the other. In this context, the fact that no fewer than 21 countries 
are members of both NATO and the EU distorts the picture and appears to be a 
liability rather than an asset, given these governments’ talent for institutional 
schizophrenia and separate chains of instruction within their bureaucracies. 
 
 
How Bad is Suboptimal NATO-EU Cooperation? 
Does a lack of NATO-EU cooperation spell the end of the Western world? No, it 
does not. The era of Western pre-eminence on the global stage, which has 
lasted for almost three centuries, is anyhow coming to an end. Estimates 
indicate that by 2025 Asia’s economic output will be on a par with the OECD 
countries’ output, while by that time the United States and Europe together will 
account for only nine percent of the world’s population (Notre Europe 2010). 
The relative decline of the West and the ‘rise of the Rest’ will be dominant 
features in the coming decades. This course of events should not be 
dramatized: ‘our’ decline will not be absolute and only a very gradual process, 
while ‘they’ will encounter many problems of their own, whereas this ‘Rest’ 
hardly constitutes a like-minded caucus. But having NATO and the EU act hand 
in glove will not change this trend. Besides, despite institutional obstacles, 
NATO-EU cooperation is not all that bad. Wherever the organizations meet in 
theatre, whether in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or off the Somali coast, 
practical arrangements work out fairly well. Furthermore, a comprehensive 
approach to crisis management makes sense but does not exclusively hinge on 
NATO-EU cooperation. And given the precarious state of the ISAF operation, 
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the main driver of this approach, it is not a foregone conclusion that this mission 
provides the format for future engagements.  
So, basically, let NATO and the EU do what they are doing right now: work 
together in a bottom-up way as well as they can. With an eye to both 
organizations’ ultimate incongruity, it may be wiser not to waste time trying to 
merge their respective policies but rather to manage them by making use of the 
possibilities for cooperation that present themselves. Since NATO-EU synergy 
is not going to save the world, or Europe for that matter, we should be able to 
live with a less-than-perfect level of interaction. 
 
  
Europe is Not Under Siege 
Another reason why this state of inter-organizational affairs should not keep us 
awake at night is that security-wise Europe is not under threat, at least not to 
the extent that many gloomy forecasts tell us. When in 2003, two years after 
9/11 and nine months after the US-led invasion of Iraq, the EU for the first time 
formulated a security strategy, it came up with a bold first sentence: Europe has 
never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. This statement seems to 
capture the state of the Union surprisingly well. Admittedly, this highly readable 
and concise document, which is still in force today, also invokes the prospect of 
greater threats than we have known, but the elaborations under the headings 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state 
failure and organized crime suggest that these are very serious issues rather 
than existential threats to Europe’s security. Instead of being defensive, the EU 
strategy breathes a fair amount of self-confidence and idealism, viewing itself as 
“inevitably a global player [which] should be ready to share in the responsibility 
for global security and a better world” (EU Security Strategy 2003). 
Still, the myriad of security organizations dealing with Europe; the often 
vitriolic debate about European security, especially when it features Russia; the 
‘frozen conflicts’ imbroglios; the number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons 
deployed in Europe and the controversies related to missile defence systems: 
all this suggests a security situation that needs urgent attention. But are we not, 
to a certain extent, chasing phantoms? It seems we have grown so accustomed 
to regarding Europe as a battlefield, both as an arena for internal European 
strife and as a bone of contention for outside powers, that we find it difficult to 
assess our environment as it is. When it comes to the above-mentioned new 
threats and challenges, some of which are actually not so new, none of these 
require primarily military answers, while all of them are transnational in nature 
and therefore do require international cooperation.  
 
The Russian Federation 
In some European capitals, Russia looms large as a remaining physical threat, 
but this has more to do with the past than with the present. For some reason, 
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we tend to make Russia bigger than it is. It is a nuclear giant but apart from 
being diplomatically isolated it only has one third of the EU’s population, spends 
about one-tenth of what EU countries spend on defence and its economy adds 
up to one-fifteenth of that of the EU. Even if the EU is not capable of wielding 
these levers effectively, it puts Russia’s might somewhat into perspective. 
Russia is managing the current financial and economic crisis relatively well, but 
its exclusive dependence on oil and gas revenues, which mainly come from 
Europe, will sustain its vulnerability to global market trends. And in order to 
upgrade its inefficiently run economy, including its energy industry, Russia will 
need Western technology, know-how and capital. Economic entanglement in a 
globalizing world does not always prevent warfare – it certainly did not manage 
to do so in 1914 – but under current circumstances it seems to bring an appetite 
for stability. Apart from a host of other domestic problems, Moscow will have to 
deal with its restive Northern Caucasus in a more structural way, in order to 
secure the Federation’s integrity. The way Russia is defending its interests in 
neighbouring countries is hardly sophisticated, to say the least, but the fact that 
this ‘near abroad’ represents a zone of interest, and an outlet for its resources, 
should not come as a surprise. Like it or not, power status implies some degree 
of regional dominance. How else is NATO’s enlargement policy or the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership to be interpreted but as efforts to extend a zone of interest 
to our neighbourhood? Even Russia’s 2008 military expedition against Georgia, 
which by the way highlighted serious shortcomings in its armed forces, was a 
post-imperial reflex provoked by Tbilisi’s reckless behaviour, rather than a 
prelude to a series of neo-imperial campaigns. That is why Moscow got away 
with it fairly easily. 
Most likely, all the professed nervousness about European security is not 
entirely justified. Certainly, tomorrow’s world is fraught with risks and dangers, 
many of which are as yet unknown, but it does not appear that these warrant 
the kind of security debate we still have in Europe. We are prosperous, secure 
and free but we prefer to base our views on past experiences. In this regard, let 
us take a look at NATO and examine to what extent the alliance’s endurance is 
instrumental in perpetuating our thinking and keeping us from turning the page. 
 
 
NATO as an Optical Illusion 
At the venerable age of sixty-plus, NATO is very much alive and kicking. Over 
the last decades its agenda has broadened significantly and the alliance is 
operationally more active than ever before. Its membership has grown to 28 and 
there are still a number of aspirant countries in its waiting rooms. For most 
European countries, NATO remains the cornerstone of their security policies. 
Since it was established in 1949, NATO’s original purpose has been twofold: to 
deter the Soviet Union and to allow for European integration. Since at least 
twenty years, almost half of the entire Cold War period, the Soviet threat has 
180  
gone and European integration has resulted in a Union that claims global 
prominence on its own. In this respect, NATO has been a resounding success. 
The sudden demise of the Soviet bloc caught the world by surprise, so no 
wonder at the time the alliance did not contemplate disbanding itself. And given 
its continuation, it would have been politically impossible to reject newly 
independent countries’ wishes for accession. And yes, it took NATO to 
intervene in the Yugoslav civil war, be it belatedly in Bosnia and controversially 
in Kosovo. But it is obvious that the original gist has been taken out of the 
alliance, and judging by the arduous strategy debate it has not been replaced 
by a successor gist. In essence, NATO has been and is changing from a single-
minded military alliance into a multi-purpose platform enabling countries to 
cultivate their bilateral ties with the USA. That is why it will prove impossible to 
erect a European pillar within NATO, as some commentators suggest should be 
done. Why else would recently acceded member states, apparently not trustful 
of NATO’s consensus machinery in Article 5 situations, be lobbying so actively 
with the US for additional security guarantees? And would most allies send their 
units into Afghanistan because they feel their national security is at stake in the 
Hindu Kush or because they want to curry favour with Washington? When in 
February 2010 the Dutch coalition government fell over the extension of its 
Uruzgan mission, the first question raised was whether this implied that the 
Netherlands would be kicked out of the economic G20 forum. 
Of course, it makes sense for countries to ally themselves with the world’s 
foremost power, and only for that reason NATO will continue to exist for some 
time to come. But increasingly, the de facto EU-US-NATO triangle is becoming 
untenable. On the one hand, sustaining US-led NATO as Europe’s primary 
security forum at the end of the day runs counter to EU ambitions in the field of 
foreign and security policy. On the other hand it ties Europe to a more global US 
security agenda that, deep down, it does not subscribe to and that it is certainly 
not willing to shoulder financially. Finally, as long as Europe remains a function 
of US security policy, this will put a curb on its ability to forge comprehensive 
partnerships with third parties. 
 
 
Revamping the Transatlantic Relationship 
The transatlantic relationship, North America’s partnership with Europe, is still 
the world’s most vital economic, strategic and political bond, and will remain so 
for the foreseeable future. The question is, however, whether NATO should 
remain its ultimate embodiment, or whether this relationship should be 
remodelled and based on a broad and new strategic EU-US partnership, 
including provisions on security and defence such as a mutual assistance 
clause. Such a recalibrated partnership would leave room for differences in 
approach and be more informal in nature, while not necessarily always involving 
all 27 EU members, but still important when crises erupt. We have seen 
181  
examples of this kind of cooperation on Iran, with the EU3 teaming up with the 
US, and the Middle East, where the EU sits next to the USA, the UN and Russia 
in the Quartet: both cases that do not allow for direct NATO involvement.  
 
Good Old NATO 
Critics will maintain that we cannot do without NATO’s unique capabilities, in 
terms of joint planning and interoperability. No other organization but NATO can 
conduct an operation like ISAF, the argument runs. But in many respects ISAF 
is a revealing operation. What we really see in Afghanistan is an able and 
willing coalition that runs the demanding southern and eastern regional 
commands, and a host of other countries doing something else in the more 
benign provinces. Out of ISAF’s 46 contributors, non-NATO member Australia 
seamlessly joins combat operations in the South, while NATO member 
Germany is carrying out its national stabilization operation in the north, steered 
by the Bundestag rather than by NATO. None of these countries would be able 
to sustain their operations without US enablers. So it is rather the US, and not 
necessarily NATO, which is pivotal within ISAF. 
Trading NATO for the EU-USA does not mean doing away with the acquis 
atlantique, but it would mean doing away with a top-heavy alliance that served 
its purpose well but increasingly stirs unease in Europe, while becoming less 
relevant to Washington – even if the newest US National Security Strategy 
routinely speaks of NATO as the pre-eminent security alliance in the world 
today. NATO, or Europe, is nowhere as central in US security thinking as many 
Europeans like to believe. When 9/11 occurred, invoking the alliance’s Article 5 
only came as an afterthought. Paradoxically, this trend may be reinforced under 
a less traditionally inclined president Obama, no matter how enthusiastically his 
inauguration was celebrated in Europe. Moreover, building a new relationship 
with the USA which is more balanced than it is now would likely stimulate 
Europe to further boost its post-Second World War integration process. 
 
Third Parties 
Last but not least, a new transatlantic partnership more firmly based on both 
participants’ autonomy would enable the EU, but also the USA, to review their 
relations with third parties. Take, for example, Russia. Among other reasons, 
the EU-Russia relationship, important because of the density of trade, 
investment and energy links but marred by endless negotiations on a new 
strategic agreement, is held back because of Moscow’s frustration that it cannot 
discuss security with the EU, which tends to refer to NATO instead. As long as 
Europe labels NATO as its primary security organization, Moscow is likely to 
regard the EU’s neighbourhood policies as affiliated with the alliance’s 
enlargement agenda, given the expressed synergies between these two ‘Euro-
Atlantic organizations’. More broadly speaking, the outside world will look at 
Europe as a more serious interlocutor as it depends less on US security 
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guarantees. Sticking to the Russia example, the US, lacking the economic 
dimension in its relationship with Moscow, is perfectly capable of concluding 
deals on strategic issues, such as the recent START agreement on nuclear 
arsenals. But many, not all, of the bilateral irritants concern Europe and are 
NATO related. It is probably no coincidence that Russian compliance with 
START has been made dependent on missile defence developments in Europe. 
 
 
Long Term and Big Ifs  
Without any doubt, a process away from NATO and towards an EU-US 
framework, including reserved seats for NATO’s non-EU members, would be a 
long-term affair, more likely to be driven by crises than to evolve in a linear 
fashion. But no matter what, we will have to start preparing ourselves for a 
changing environment, not so much from a European believer’s point of view 
but simply from a realist angle. It looks like fixed alliances have had their day 
and will give way to more informal partnerships. Right now, there is not a single 
operation that NATO conducts on its own, and it is highly unlikely the alliance 
ever will. And the EU is trying to develop its ‘permanent structured cooperation’, 
meant to create core groups of member states sharing higher security and 
defence ambitions.  
It goes without saying that such developments depend on major ifs. The 
most fundamental question in this regard would be whether the European 
project, which does not have a given end state, will proceed. In other words: will 
Europeans trust each other, or themselves for that matter, to the degree that 
they will carry on accomplishing this essentially political project, current 
predicaments notwithstanding? Or does Europe still need the USA as an 
institutionalized security provider to keep it from lapsing back into bad European 
habits?  
These questions defy simple answers. But global trends seem to lead 
Europe towards more integration rather than less. Were Europe to fail in 
mustering the vision and will to seize this opportunity, then at least its much 
debated finalité politique will be known and will oblige us to settle for a more 
modest outcome of the European project. Maybe Europe will survive as a 
glorified economic union protected by the USA through NATO. But alliances are 
not made for eternity, and the chances are that at some point the USA, due to 
conflicting interests and competing distractions, may earmark more worthy 
destinations for its security investments and troop deployments than Europe. So 
the EU had better prepare itself to rise to the occasion. There is no convincing 
reason to assume that in the 21st century Europe can do without more 
traditional instruments of power to protect its interests in the world. If someone 
else will not provide these, Europe will have to do so itself.  
In order to get there, it is imperative that Europe starts thinking and acting 
more politically. Sometimes it does, for instance during the summer of 2008 
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when on behalf of the EU French president Sarkozy jumped in to broker a 
ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia. The EU should then 
overcome its internal divide between those who do conceive of the EU 
principally as a political idea, and those who consider the Union first and 
foremost as a technocratic device, with strict rules that must be obeyed at all 
times. If the latter school of thought prevails, it will keep the EU from doing what 
is politically sensible, such as inviting Turkey to join the Union. Apart from the 
fact that it concerns an economically vibrant energy hub with a young 
population, taking this moderate Muslim country on board will reap huge 
benefits from a security point of view, for instance in dealing with the Middle 
East. The EU, although largely being framed in an idealistic manner, should 
then start engaging more in power politics as well. If one wants to leave a mark 
on the global stage, human rights strategies will not suffice, certainly not when 
national interests will be more brazenly pursued by others. A reconfiguration of 
Europe’s security ties with the USA might just provide the impetus needed for a 
reality check of Europe’s strategic outlook. 
A managed realignment of transatlantic forces would of course be an 
enormous tour de force, for which there seem to be few, if any, historical 
precedents – a reconfiguration of US-Japanese ties may be a case in point. 
Taking into account Europe’s inclination for introversion and a lack of bold 
visions, (e.g., Project Europe 2030, 2010) such a process may very well have to 
be kick-started by the USA. Once this happens, it may provide the blessing in 
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Chapter 16. NATO in 2029: Retired or Rejuvenated? 
 




The fall of the Berlin Wall, the revolutions that took place in many of the 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union all clearly signalled the end of the period of the Cold War. At the same 
time, the epochal events that took place on the European continent in the late 
1980s and early 1990s marked the dawn of an era in which several new 
challenges, for example with regard to the role and membership of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), presented themselves. 
There were many who believed that NATO lost its raison d’être when the 
threat of the communist bloc disappeared and the Warsaw Pact seized to exist. 
With the Soviet empire, or ‘evil empire’ as it was characterized by former US 
president Ronald Reagan, gone, was it not also time for the Alliance to dissolve 
itself? NATO tried to address this concern by developing new strategic concepts 
and becoming involved in out-of-area operations – such as the Stabilisation 
Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. But these missions could not silence those who 
questioned the enduring relevance of the Alliance to a changing world.  
As discussions about the role of NATO were raging, so was the debate 
about its membership. When the Iron Curtain was removed, many of the former 
Soviet satellite states and even some of the former Soviet republics expressed 
their desire to join the Alliance. To the countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe, NATO had lost none of its attraction. On the contrary: it represented the 
best guarantee against renewed Russian attempts to expand its sphere of 
influence. Eastward expansion, however, did not prove to be the definitive 
answer to the issue of membership. The differences between old member 
states and new ones – in terms of military capabilities, structure and 
organization – were considerable, several countries were wait-listed for 
membership and the Russian Federation was increasingly unhappy about the 
presence of NATO in what it believed to be its own ‘near abroad’.  
When taking matters pertaining to the membership of NATO into 
consideration and combining them with concerns about its role, questions about 
the future of the Alliance arise. What will NATO look like in 2029, when it is 
supposed to celebrate its 80th birthday? Will there have been further rounds of 
enlargement by granting membership to countries from the Western Balkans 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or will the process of 
eastward expansion have been halted and perhaps even been reversed? Has 
the Alliance managed to silence those who question its continued significance 
to the post-Cold War world by becoming ever more active in peace-keeping, 
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peace-building and peace-enforcing operations or will the process of finding 
new tasks have come to a full-stop and maybe even been overturned?  
In the underlying contribution, questions regarding the future of NATO are 
addressed by building scenarios. In a scenario-building exercise, the trends that 
are considered to be of special significance in shaping the development of the 
subject-at-hand in the years to come are brought together in a single 
framework, thereby painting a picture of what the future may look like. When 
building different scenarios by making use of different trends, different options 
present themselves; an exercise that allows for the development of a 
perspective that is broader in scope than the one that would follow from simply 
envisioning current trends to continue indefinitely. In short, a scenario-building 
exercise is helpful in creating awareness not of that what is likely to happen, but 
of that what is possible. 
In the scenarios that can be built with regard to the future of the Alliance, 
two trends are of importance: NATO’s role in a changing world and its 
membership. For the purpose of this chapter, these two trends will be used to 
build two different scenarios. In the first scenario, entitled ‘Retirement’, NATO in 
2029 is still struggling to reinvent its raison d’être, to deal with Russia’s quest for 
influence in Central and Eastern Europe and to close the debate on possible 
new waves of enlargement. By contrast, in the second scenario, entitled 
‘Rejuvenation’, NATO in 2029 is without a doubt the world’s most important 
security organization, with a clear sense of purpose and an unprecedented 
appeal to prospective member states. 
 
 
Scenario 1: Retirement 
With hindsight, 2010 turned out to be the beginning of the end for NATO’s 
mission in Afghanistan. The rising numbers of casualties among ISAF’s troops, 
the growing influence of the Taliban in virtually all Afghan provinces and the 
mounting criticism of president Hamid Karzai and his ineffective government 
were all signs that the Alliance’s out-of-area operation was anything but 
successful. The grim picture that had been painted at the start of NATO’s 
involvement in Afghanistan by those Russian generals who had witnessed the 
Soviet Union’s retreat from the country in 1989 was quickly turning into reality. 
The remarks that general Stanley McChrystal made in the July 2010 issue 
of Rolling Stone magazine – while uncalled for and grounds for his immediate 
dismissal as commander of the Allied forces – reflected the unease that many 
within NATO came to feel about the future of ISAF (Hastings 2010). As it turned 
out to be impossible to fulfil the mission’s objectives, it was also difficult to justify 
the loss of lives and convince the public in the participating countries of the 
necessity of fighting a war that had no direct bearing on their own societies.  
From 2011 onwards, talks about the withdrawal of the Alliance from 
Afghanistan intensified and efforts to increase both the quality and quantity of 
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the Afghan security forces were strengthened. Dismantling ISAF, however, 
turned out to be a very difficult and costly affair. With the authority of the central 
government in Kabul in question and corruption running rampant, the country’s 
police force and military apparatus could not be counted upon to keep the 
Taliban at bay and so preserve the achievements of NATO in terms of 
improvements to Afghanistan’s infrastructure, health care and educational 
system. 
In the midst of the complicated process of devising a viable exit-strategy the 
American people in 2016 elected Sarah Palin to succeed Barack Obama as 
president of the United States. A fierce Republican and weary of foreign 
adventures the new president was quick to call for the complete extraction of all 
American troops from Afghanistan. By the summer of 2017 her campaign 
promise became a reality when the presence of the United States in 
Afghanistan came to a sudden and complete end. With the main Allied force no 
longer in play, ISAF also come to a quick and immediate end. Without the 
support of their biggest and most influential member state, the other NATO 
countries rapidly lost whatever justification they still had for participating in this 
out-of-area operation. 
The unilateral decision from the part of the United States to retreat from 
Afghanistan and thus end NATO’s involvement in the region plunged the 
Alliance in the greatest crises it had ever witnessed. With ISAF – the longest, 
largest and costliest mission that the Alliance had ever undertaken – ending in 
disarray, there was little enthusiasm to embark upon new peace-keeping, 
peace-building and peace-enforcing operations. What is more, with Palin in the 
White House, the possibilities for American participation – crucial to the 
successful completion of each and every task – were limited at best.  
In turn, the difficulties that NATO encountered in deciding upon which, if 
any, missions to embark resulted in renewed discussions about its raison d’être. 
After the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the threat of the communist 
bloc had already given cause to much debate about this issue, but it was hoped 
that a solution could be found in the adoption of novel strategic concepts. 
However, when NATO proved incapable of fulfilling the new roles assigned to it, 
the relevance of the Alliance was called into question yet again. 
And there were other problems that still had to be resolved. A prime 
example of this was NATO’s relationship with the Russian Federation. Under 
president Vladimir Putin (2000-2008), president Dmitri Medvedev (2008-2016) 
and once again Putin (2016-2024), Russia manifested itself as a great power; a 
great power moreover that desired to expand its sphere of influence and so 
regain control over its ‘near abroad’. The repeated wars with Georgia over 
Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, the Russian involvement in the Central-Asian 
republics and the attempts to influence the internal affairs of Belarus, Moldova 
and Ukraine to its own advantage were all signs of Russia’s renewed 
confidence. 
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The NATO-Russia Council, although designed to act as “a mechanism for 
consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action”, 
proved unable to adequately address the aforementioned concerns (NATO, 
2010). It only demonstrated the internal divisions that had come to plague the 
Alliance – divisions between those that favoured a pro-Russia policy and those 
that opposed such a strategy – and highlighted the existing problems 
concerning relations with third countries. For years, NATO had been talking 
about allowing countries from the Western Balkans to join. And there had even 
been talk of granting Ukraine and Georgia access to the Membership Action 
Plan. Yet, beset as it was with other problems, the Alliance did not make good 
on the promises that it had made. In fact, NATO’s hesitant attitude towards its 
eastern neighbours was perceived by the Russian Federation as a sign of 
weakness and as an implicit endorsement of its own policy of slowly but surely 
regaining the influence that it had lost. 
The ongoing discussions about the role and membership of the Alliance 
were compounded by the steadily solidifying isolationist policies from the part of 
the United States. After two terms in office Palin was succeeded by Jeb Bush, 
who carried on several of his predecessor’s policies; especially in the field of 
foreign affairs and security. To many European countries, even those who had 
always been staunchly Atlanticist such as the United Kingdom and the new 
member states that had joined the European Union in 2004, 2007 and 2018, 
this was a clear signal that they had to take the development of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) seriously. And while the improvement of 
the ESDP was by no means an easy task, from 2025 onwards it became 
increasingly clear that the ESDP was overtaking NATO as the world’s most 
important security organization. The relevance of the EU to the security of the 
European continent and – due to the ESDP’s strong external showing – also to 
that of other regions was growing just as NATO’s significance was waning.  
At first hesitantly, but soon more openly, people began talking about ending 
NATO’s suffering. As an organization that had proved itself utterly incapable of 
dealing with the many challenges that the post-Cold War world presented, its 
continued existence was called into question more and more frequently. And so 
it was that in London, on 4 April 2029, the Treaty on the Dissolution of NATO 
was signed and the Alliance was sent into retirement. 
 
 
Scenario 2: Rejuvenation 
The year 2010 turned out to be a turning point for NATO in Afghanistan. Initially it 
seemed as though 2010 would become a veritable annus horribilis: the rising 
numbers of casualties among ISAF’s troops, the growing influence of the Taliban 
in virtually all Afghan provinces and the mounting criticism of president Hamid 
Karzai and his ineffective government gave rise to doubts about the successful 
outcome of this out-of-area operation. The situation seemed to worsen even 
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further when Rolling Stone magazine profiled general Stanley McChrystal in its 
July 2010 issue under the heading “Stanley McChrystal, Obama's top 
commander in Afghanistan, has seized control of the war by never taking his eye 
off the real enemy: The wimps in the White House” (Hastings 2010). 
However, when McChrystal was replaced by general David Petraeus the 
situation began to change. Instead of urging the NATO member states to send 
more and more troops to Afghanistan, Petraeus focused on cooperation with 
the Afghan security forces. Strengthening the country’s policy force and military 
apparatus through various training missions became a key priority for ISAF. 
Also, initiatives such as the jirga – a traditional Afghan form of cooperation – 
were set up to encourage tribal chiefs to work together with moderate members 
of the Taliban to achieve peace and stability on the local and regional level. 
What is more, ISAF’s new commander focused heavily on building relations 
between the international donor community and the Afghan people. Only if the 
achievements of the previous years – in terms of improvements to the country’s 
infrastructure, health care and educational system – could be sustained would 
Afghanistan have a viable future. 
By gradually shifting the responsibility for the security and prosperity of the 
country away from NATO and its allies, Petraeus managed to make ISAF a 
success. In addition, he created the much-needed room to develop a well-timed 
and well-executed exit-strategy. With the lessons that he had learned in Iraq 
firmly in mind, Petraeus was careful to not disentangle NATO from Afghanistan 
too quickly or abruptly. Still, president Barack Obama was able to fulfil the 
promise that he made during his re-election campaign and bring the American 
troops home by the end of his second term-in-office. 
The successful completion of ISAF – NATO’s longest, largest and costliest 
mission ever – gave the Alliance the confidence that it needed to pursue other 
out-of-area adventures. In the early years of the post-Cold War period NATO 
was hesitant to take on new roles and become engaged in peace-keeping, 
peace-building and peace-enforcing operations, but in the newest version of the 
strategic concept (which was adopted in 2016) the pursuit of ‘ISAF-like’ 
missions was designated as the Alliance’s number one priority. NATO, it 
seemed, had reinvented its raison d’être. 
In the following years NATO did indeed undertake several new out-of-area 
operations. Especially noteworthy are the peace-enforcing operations in Sudan 
and Congo, where NATO managed to finally put a stop to the endemic violence 
that had been plaguing the area for years, and the peace-building operations in 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where ethnic tensions had been crippling the entire 
Central-Asian region. In its dealings with the former Soviet republics, NATO 
established close ties of cooperation with the Russian Federation. Initially 
Russia was weary of involvement from its one-time Cold War adversary in what 
it still considered to be its own sphere of influence, but when president Vladimir 
Putin, who succeeded Dmitri Medvedev in 2016, realized that stability in 
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Central-Asia was needed to secure Russia’s unhindered access to gas and oil, 
relations between the two sides intensified and ameliorated.  
The deepening of relations between NATO and the Russian Federation was 
influenced by other factors as well. President Obama and his Russian 
counterpart Medvedev had already decided to ‘reset’ their relations in 2009, a 
pledge that they later renewed in 2010. From that moment onwards, the two 
sides began cooperating on a host of issues, including that of Iran’s nuclear 
program, joint adventures in space and mutual disarmament. Presidents Putin 
and Hilary Clinton who was elected as President of the United States in 2016, 
took this process one step further by giving new impetus to the NATO-Russia 
Council. The NATO-Russia Council was established to act as “a mechanism for 
consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action”. In 
the early years of its existence, it focused mainly on consultation post facto, but 
later on joint decision and joint action became increasingly important. The 
aforementioned peace-building operations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan testify 
to this. 
With the relationship between Russia on the one hand and the United 
States and its NATO allies on the other hand steadily improving, the Alliance 
was presented with the opportunity to resolve yet another long-standing 
problem: enlargement. When the Soviet empire collapsed, the countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe lost no time in declaring their desire to ‘return to 
Europe’ and gain membership of NATO. For several countries in the region this 
desire became a reality, but by the beginning of the 21st century there were still 
many countries in the Western Balkans and the CIS that were waiting to be 
admitted. 
When Vaira Fike-Vreiberga from Latvia succeeded Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen to become the first Secretary-General from a country that had 
previously belonged to the ‘other’ side of the Iron Curtain, enlargement regained 
a prominent position on NATO’s agenda. With Russian opposition to eastward 
expansion muted by the positive experience of cooperation in Central-Asia, the 
Alliance invited many countries from South-eastern and Eastern Europe to join. 
Here, what was helpful was the fact that the aspiring member states had used 
the long waiting-period to bring their military organizations both in quantitative 
and qualitative terms, in line with those of the older member states. And what 
made enlargement even more palatable was the fact that Ukraine and Georgia 
were contented to be part of NATO’s New Neighbourhood Initiative – the 
Alliance’s version of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership that granted far-
reaching cooperation without actual membership. 
With the issue of membership of the countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe out of the way, the ties with the Russian Federation on a higher level 
than ever before and the Alliance able and willing to take on out-of-area 
operations, NATO had managed to resolve the problems that it encountered 
when the Cold War came to a sudden end. The Alliance had proven itself 
191  
capable of dealing with the many challenges that the post-Cold War world 
presented. Its continued existence was no longer called into question. And so it 




NATO in 2029: Retired or Rejuvenated? 
When building different scenarios with regard to the future of NATO, there are 
two trends that are of importance: NATO’s role in a changing world and its 
membership. When bringing these elements together in a single framework, 
various pictures of what the Alliance may look like in 2029 emerge. For the 
purpose of the underlying chapter, two of these pictures have been sketched in 
more detail. In the first scenario, entitled ‘Retirement’, NATO is finding it difficult 
to reinvent its raison d’être, to deal with Russia’s quest for influence in the 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe and to close the debate on yet other 
waves of enlargement. By contrast, in the second scenario, entitled 
‘Rejuvenation’, the Alliance is without a doubt the world’s most important 
security organization, with a clear sense of purpose and an unprecedented 
appeal to prospective member states. 
Admittedly, both scenarios seem rather far-fetched. It is difficult to imagine a 
world where NATO has lost all relevance and has simply seized to exist. It is 
equally difficult to envision an Alliance that happily agrees to more member 
states and to more out-of-area operations. It seems so much easier to envision 
a future that is similar to the present. However, if the history of NATO has 
taught us anything, it is that unexpected events will happen: the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union being cases in point. Throughout 
the more than 60 years of its existence, the Alliance has seen its share of 
unexpected twists and turns 
This is where the two scenarios come into play. From one extreme to the 
other, both scenarios paint a picture in which NATO is an actor that, for better or 
worse, shapes its own destiny and that provides answers to new and 
unforeseen questions. Of course, this is not to say that the events depicted in 
both scenarios are likely to happen, but it is to say that they are possible. When 
thinking about the future, one is well-advised to develop a perspective that is 
broader in scope than the view that one would derive from simply envisioning 
current trends to continue indefinitely; and that is exactly what a scenario-
building exercise is all about. 
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